


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2 NOVEMBER 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-89-070

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egypt Supports Libyan Membership in IPG

90O.A0049b London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 18 Sep 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Jamal Isma'il: "Libya Woos Egypt in International Parliament Hallways in London"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Libya and Sudan

While the first session of the International Parliamentary Group's [IPG] conference decided to suspend Sudan's membership in the IPG until a parliament is formed in Sudan, the IPG's Executive Committee, having an 11-vote majority, agreed to accept Libya as a conference member. Britain abstained from voting. It is worth noting here that the IPG's Executive Committee is made up of 12 parliaments, including the Egyptian parliament. Egypt played a principal role in getting the Executive Committee to accept Libya as an IPG member.

Information derived from Egyptian and Libyan statements, from the minutes of the Executive Committee's meetings, and from meetings which occurred on the side indicate that Egypt's parliamentary delegation, headed by Justice Ahmad Musa, vice president of Egypt's People's Assembly, came to London carrying a draft resolution for Libya's membership in the IPG. During official deliberations, the Executive Committee indicated that it was disturbed by statements made by Colonel Mu'amar al-Qadhdhafi to the U.S. newspaper, THE HERALD TRIBUNE. Al-Qadhdhafi is reported to have said that he "would like to crush all parliaments in the world." The committee almost decided not to accept Libya as a member had it not been for the fact that the Egyptian delegation requested a recess so that it could discuss the matter with the Libyan delegation, which, in turn, affirmed that the statements had been planted and had not actually been made by al-Qadhdhafi. Libya's delegation promised to provide an authentic text of Col al-Qadhdhafi's interview with the American newspaper.

The Egyptian delegation went back to the Executive Committee, and informed it that the Libyan delegation would provide the necessary documents to prove that these statements were not true. The Egyptian delegation said that this will be properly documented.

The Libyan delegation did in fact produce the required documents, and it did prove that the statements had not been reported accurately. The Executive Committee agreed to accept Libya as a member, but Britain abstained from voting. 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Fayturi, president of the Libyan People's General Delegation, expressed the profound thanks and gratitude of Libya's people and leaders to Egypt's leaders, parliament, and people. He said that Egypt had "played an effective and influential role in persuading the states that are members of the Executive Committee to accept Libya." With such

Libyan praise al-Fayturi announced that Libya was committed to the IPG's covenants, and that it would use all of its resources to support the IPG's institutions. Al-Fayturi made that announcement in statements he gave to the Middle East News Agency's correspondent in the British capital. [passage omitted]

Results of Egyptian, Saudi Businessmen's Meeting Outlined

90O.A0049c Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 25 Sep 89 p 50

[Article by Muhammad Ghanim: "Realistically Speaking, What Are Saudi Investors Saying?"]

[Text] In my previous column, I indicated that businessmen from both the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were part of each country's official delegation, when those delegations held a joint meeting recently.

It was obvious that the discussion was positive and that opinions on the economic affairs, which govern the relationship between the two countries, were being shared realistically at the meeting of the Businessmen's Committee, which grew out of the official, Joint Egyptian Saudi Committee. The dialogue was truthful and went beyond diplomatic expressions which make frequent references to the affection, fraternity, and common history shared by the two countries. Diplomatic expressions refer to these and other matters which often wind up the meetings of any Arab delegations. This is done at the expense of the realistic, positive, in-depth conclusions which the experience of the participating countries' representatives should reach when they hold such meetings.

The discussion was candid and the dialogue was truthful, revealing that profound thought had been given to the areas of the dialogue. The discussion showed that the main aim was to achieve the goals which were being hoped for.

Each side listened to the other side's opinion without hard feelings. Those opinions were based on personal experiences in the field, and on the positive and negative experiences of investing in Egypt. The businessmen listened, without comment, to what they were told was new in economic production developments in both Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Among the comments that were made by the Saudis about the new investment law in Egypt was one which stated that, in most cases, problems were caused by those implementing the law and not by the law itself.

The businessmen were testifying that they had expanded their investments in Egypt, and that they would expand them even further as a result of what they sensed from the experiences of senior Egyptian officials who succeeded in overcoming many of the problems which were caused by junior officials. They indicated that they

hoped the development of administrative matters in Egypt would be such that senior officials would not have to be frequently asked to solve many problems, and junior officials would not compel them to take up these matters with senior officials every time.

Saudi investors say that the dominant feature of their investments in Egypt, one they hardly find in the investments they make outside Egypt, is that almost everyone of their projects in Egypt has faltered more than once. Therefore, Saudi investors were required to increase the capital of these projects more than once. No matter how much they relied on top international and local economists in preparing economic studies, they still had to rectify the financing structures for these projects.

The fluctuation of the exchange rate for the local currency, in relation to foreign currencies, is the reason for this. Saudi businessmen express their satisfaction with attempts which are being made to standardize the exchange rate. They are satisfied with the realistic evaluation pursued recently by the government. They wished that these measures had been taken years ago, and they are hoping further that the exchange rate policy in Egypt will remain flexible so that at the proper time it can confront all the requirements of a dynamic market.

Saudi businessmen think that Egypt is actually wasting the most important factors it has to attract investments to Egypt, namely, the abundant supply of manpower. It is this manpower which can bring about the success of a well considered project.

Saudi experts divide the manpower which is required for projects in Egypt into two groups. The first manpower group is the upper management group, and the second group is made up of workers on all levels who do the work. Saudi experts say that, while they do appreciate Egyptian expertise, Egypt does not have an adequate number of Egyptian project managers at the required level of experience.

Saudi experts see nothing wrong with this. Few people have this kind of experience. Furthermore, this kind of experience is rare in all countries which welcome investments from others. What is extraordinary is that Egypt, unlike many other countries, has a large number of these successful and experienced upper management people who are scattered outside Egypt, and who succeeded in their work outside Egypt. A way has to be found to attract those experts to work in Egypt to serve Egypt's interests and the interests of those who invest in Egypt.

The second manpower group, which is made up of workers on all levels who do the work, are puzzled by the major discrepancy between their very low productivity rate in Egypt and their own high productivity rate outside Egypt, especially in the Arab countries.

Saudi businessmen, who know these workers and their capabilities, make the most of these capabilities when they enter into contractual agreements with these workers and employ them to work in their country or in

other projects outside Saudi Arabia and outside Egypt. Matters change, however, when these businessmen try to employ these workers, who succeeded in their projects abroad, in their investment projects in Egypt.

Quite frankly, the businessmen think that the labor law in Egypt is the main culprit in that regard. Without interfering in Egypt's domestic affairs, they are hoping that the protection provided by the law to productive workers does not equal that provided to those who do not appreciate their responsibilities and their roles in achieving Egypt's prosperity and welfare.

Without hard feelings, the businessmen say that sound internal management is not enough to ensure the success of a project. They say that a project's outside needs determine, to a large extent, the success of its internal management. Accordingly, the relationship between a Saudi and a non-Saudi investor and the various forces operating beyond the boundaries of his project, such as banks, various government agencies, suppliers of production requirements, maintenance devices, communication devices, and other devices, have a direct negative and positive effect on the successful management of any project.

In this regard, the businessmen point out a few examples.

How can they be asked to sell some of their products at a price that is lower than the cost of production, when there are no convincing justifications for doing that?

They find nothing in all of their investments in the world which parallels that situation, except in Egypt and Sudan.

How can they be asked to meet their foreign currency needs by continuing foreign currency remittances from their countries, after they already transferred capital? How can they be asked to export the products of their first year of production? This goes against every realistic expectation of proper economic realistic business, and it never happens to them when they invest in any other country.

The same level of candor and realism was observed in the dialogue between the two parties. The businessmen were clearly optimistic, and they encouraged more Saudi investments in Egypt. Despite everything that was said and talked about, the Egyptian side felt, quite clearly, the considerable appreciation the Saudis have for investment possibilities in Egypt.

Perhaps the best achievement of the meeting, and that achievement was blessed by both governments, was the agreement to establish an Egyptian-Saudi Business Council. The council, which would be made up of businessmen from both countries, would meet periodically so it can become a positive factor for more economic cooperation between the two countries. This council is to participate in all of the meetings held by the Joint Governmental Egyptian-Saudi Committee.

Sudanese Military Delegation Reportedly Makes Visit to Cairo

45000019 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Oct 89 p 7

[Column: "Akhbar Mamnu'ah"]

[Text] A Sudanese military delegation visited Cairo last week unannounced so as not to anger rebel leader Garang. "Akhbar Mamnu'ah" has learned that the visit was not for the purpose of purchasing weapons. The Egyptian Government was wary of this and restricted purchases to clothing and boots from the Egyptian market for the Sudanese Army.

ROSE AL-YUSUF Calls Khartoum Peace Conference 'Monologue'

900A0049a Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 25 Sep 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Yusuf al-Sharif: "Monologue To Solve The Southern Problem; al-Bashir Warns of Rebels' Tricks; Garang Requests Artificial Limbs for Crooked Politicians"]

[Excerpts] A number of unexpected political changes, which are closely connected to the problem of south Sudan, occurred last week. The most important of these changes is the fact that the National Conference for Peace was convened in Khartoum. [passage omitted]

30 Initiatives

The fact that Garang did not attend the peace conference aborted many of the positive efforts which were being relied upon. It were as though the peace conference were a monologue. Observers think that the conference should have been preceded by a dialogue about a minimum agreement over a solution to the problem of the south, between the Salvation Revolution and the popular movement. Previous peace initiatives, between northerners and southerners, were not to be ignored. [passage omitted]

There is no doubt that setting out from nowhere and starting a dialogue in the wake of democracy being abolished and members of the political movement arrested could lead Garang, according to observers, to become evasive and reject the solution which might be reached by the peace conference. This is especially true since Garang always rejected a solution to the southern problem that was not related to a solution to national problems. [passage omitted]

The Time Factor

The fact of the matter then indicates that, almost 3 months after seizing power, the National Salvation Revolution has developed a pressing need to save itself from the consequences of its failure to keep its promises, and to find quick and decisive solutions to the southern problem and the economic problem. Neither Sudan's own resources nor the ruling military regime can act separately to solve either one of these two problems and guide Sudan to safety.

This is because Sudan's enemies are counting on the fact that the domestic front in Sudan will remain unstable, and political opposition as well as opposition from the unions will continue to escalate. Sudan's enemies are counting on the fact that members of the Revolutionary Council will have divided views and positions. At any rate, Sudan still has to attract economic and military support from abroad, even as the demon of foreign intervention lurks and waits for the first opportunity to draw Sudan into the spheres of influence and international loyalties.

The ruling military regime has started reviewing its political considerations, with a view to opening up the dialogue with trade unions and with those few political leaders who are thought to be honest by the military regime. The ruling political regime is considering the establishment of a new democratic regime, which would avoid the mistakes of the past. It is also considering the publication of new newspapers, and it is considering other things as well.

But taking precautions with regard to the time factor and the rapid internal as well as external changes which are taking place is a must. Creative formulas must also be devised to guarantee the different national factions input and participation in the decision making process. [passage omitted]

Kuwaiti Oil Accord; Stronger Iraqi Ties Seen

90EF0020z Port-Louis LE MAURICIEN
in French 6 Oct 89 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Mauritius Launches Out Into the Oil and Steel Business"; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] Agreements have been signed with Kuwait to build an oil refinery and a petrochemical plant in Mauritius. A steel plant will be built through an Iraqi-Kuwaiti-Mauritian /joint venture/.

The Mauritian Government has given the green light to projects involving the construction of an oil refinery, a petrochemical plant and, a steel plant (/steel rolling mill/) in Mauritius. An agreement on the first two projects has already been signed with Kuwait; the third project will be a Kuwaiti-Iraqi-Mauritian /joint venture/ designed to produce and export steel /billets/ and other steel products, for instance, zinc-plated pipes and miscellaneous accessories. In this connection, the government decided to call on the Mauritian private sector to participate fully in the completion of these projects, we learned from official sources.

These new developments occurred in the wake of the Mauritian Government mission headed by the minister of industry and technology, Mr Clarel Malherbe, with the participation of Media, to the Gulf country. The prime minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, who closely followed the progress of the mission from the start, expressed his full satisfaction with the breakthrough achieved by Mauritius in a region, which until now had been considered very difficult for this type of prospecting.

As a result, the government will give its full attention to ensuring that these agreements, the result of negotiations between the Mauritian mission and its foreign partners, are the subject of a /serious follow-up./ to use the words of Mauritian Government circles.

As far as the refinery project is concerned, the /feasibility study/ will start as soon as possible. In the case of the petrochemical industry, priority will be given to the production of items made of plastic, including PVC [polyvinylchloride].

In addition, the /Kuwait Investment Authority/ is prepared to provide full financing for the creation of a permanent exhibition center to guide and inform as rapidly as possible any Arab investors wishing to obtain more details on sectors in which to invest.

Another important matter on the agenda was sugar. Mauritius explained its commitments to the EEC and the U.S. market. Iraq asked for 60,000 to 80,000 tons of sugar. For the time being, according to official Mauritian circles, the Sugar Producers Union could ship only 30,000 tons. Further negotiations are contemplated concerning the Iraqi request for a larger quota.

There is also some talk about the creation of a shipping line connecting Mauritius to Iraq. Iraq is already connected to Latin America via an existing line, which could call in at Port-Louis. This would also enable Mauritius to import wood from Brazil.

The Iraqis presented several requests, especially concerning the purchase of Mauritian products: textiles, farm produce, hosiery, tea (six containers are already leaving for Baghdad), and fine leather goods. Iraq represents a market of 2.2 million people and, according to Mauritian official circles, the Mauritian industry will not be able to meet its demand in the immediate future.

Finally, both Iraq and Kuwait are extremely interested in the tourism sector. The minister of tourism, Mr Michael Glover will soon take over from his colleague Malherbe and study the matter thoroughly.

Increase in Arab Exports Reported

90OL0022C Manama AL-BAHRAYN in Arabic
2 Aug 89 pp 12, 13

[Article: "Unified Arab Economic Report for 1988: 10 Percent Increase in Arab Exports Last Year"]

[Text] Arab exports for 1988 recorded a 10 percent increase over previous years which witnessed a 15 percent annual drop in exports during the 1980-87 period.

The unified Arab economic report for 1988, which included a summary of Arab economic activities for 1988, stated that the slight increase in exports is due to improved oil prices and the return of stability to this market at a time when it was influenced by a world recession coupled with lower oil prices, increased trade

protection on the part of the industrial countries, and unsettled rates of exchange for the 1980-87 period.

The report pointed out that, due to the continuation of monetary rationalization policies and concern over foreign balance, imports for 1988 rose by 5 percent over previous years when it had dropped after 1982 by 9.5 percent a year. This was as a result of the AOPEC [Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] restrictive monetary policies followed by the Arab oil producing and exporting countries to effect a balance in their foreign payments.

Europe Number-One Partner

The report explained that the industrial countries' share of Arab exports and imports is two-thirds of the total volume, and that the European Common market is the Arab countries' number-one trading partner, particularly with regard to Arab foreign trade. This is with the exception of Arab oil, which is experiencing a drop due to the fact that the market has turned to North Sea, Soviet, and Mexican oil.

The report mentioned that inter-Arab trade continued to decline in terms of value and Arab foreign trade shares, and that visible Arab exports and imports between the years 1980 and 1988 dropped by an average of one-tenth a year. The report noted that oil comprises 50 percent of the visible Arab trade, while manufactured goods comprise one-fourth of this trade, followed by foodstuffs and petrochemical goods which rose during the same period.

40 Percent Increase in AOPEC Trade Surplus

He explained that visible Arab trade is marked by a geographic concentration in the Arab East. The Arab West's share amounted to about 9 percent of visible exports and 17 percent of visible imports for 1980 and rose to 16 percent [as published] of imports in 1988.

Regarding payments, the report said that 1988 estimates indicate that the AOPEC trade surplus went up by about 40 percent, and the other Arab countries' trade deficit went down by about 4.6 percent.

Foreign Reserves

The report explained that, as a result of weak balances of payments, the Arab countries' 1988 foreign reserves declined, but the 1988 estimated improvement in these balances caused these reserves to go up and improved their efficiency level in relation to imports. It pointed out that the Arab trade surplus had reached its cycle in 1980 at the level of \$123 billion. It then began going down to a little over \$1 billion in 1988 due to the decline of Arab business conditions, which had more than a \$23 billion drop in its trade surplus. This was in addition to a drop in Arab imports brought about by oil market instability, which is thought to have been responsible for the almost \$110 billion drop in the Arab trade surplus.

Oil Sector

About the oil sector, the report said that stability was restored to the market in 1988 when OPEC resumed its role of balancing supply and demand, and Arab oil revenues rose by about one-third. The report explained that this notwithstanding, the market is still being covered by the production surplus which puts pressure on spotmarket prices, thus threatening official prices.

It mentioned that, while the demand for energy in developing countries has gone down and demand for oil has gone up at the same rate as last year, demand for energy has gone up slightly and demand for oil had gone down in the industrial countries. This underscores the industrial countries' commitment to lower their oil consumption rates and raise their dependence on nonoil sources, irrespective of the drop in prices.

Increase in Power Consumption Noted

90OL0022b Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 1 Aug 89 p 9

[Article: "Oil Consumption in AOPEC Countries: Bahrain Second in Per Capita Energy Consumption; Four-Year 4.8 Percent Increase in Energy Consumption"]

[Text] Bahrain placed second among members of the Organization of Arab Oil-Exporting Countries, AOPEC [Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], in per capita energy consumption. A recent report by AOPEC states that the average per capita energy consumption in Bahrain for 1988 was only about the equivalent of 12,000 kgs of oil. Qatar ranked first in this regard; the UAE [United Arab Emirates], third; Kuwait, fourth; Saudi Arabia, fifth; Libya, sixth; Iraq, seventh; Algeria, eighth; Syria, ninth; Egypt, tenth; and last was Tunisia, where the average per capita energy consumption did not exceed the equivalent of 500 kgs of oil.

Two Consumption Groups

The international report divided AOPEC members in terms of average per capita energy consumption for 1988 into two groups:

- The first group includes countries whose average per capita consumption is more than that of member countries as a group. These countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
- The second group includes countries whose average per capita consumption is less than that of member countries as a group. These countries are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia.

The first group of AOPEC countries, including Bahrain, are characterized by the following:

- They rely primarily on oil as a national revenue source and for energy consumption.
- High per capita energy consumption rates of between 4,300 and 12,800 kgs oil for 1988, except for Libya, where the rate was the equivalent of 2,400 kgs of oil.

- High energy use density of about the equivalent of 680 kgs of oil for every \$1,000 of the gross local product for 1987, compared with a rate of 520 kgs of oil for member countries as a group.

Vital Importance

The report points out that during the years 1984-88, total energy consumption in the first group rose from 1.7 to 2.1 million barrels oil, or an annual rate of 4.8 percent. The report attributed this pattern of consumption in the first group to the following:

- A high standard of living where the per capita income in these countries amounted to \$6,750 in 1987.
- The vital importance of high density energy consumption industries like the refining, petrochemical, aluminum, and cement industries have on these countries' economies.
- Low energy prices.
- The long hot summer period which leads to higher electric power consumption levels for refrigeration and air conditioning.

The report underscored the fact that oil consumption in this group of countries, including Bahrain, for 1988 amounted to 1.2 million barrels a day or a growth rate of 1 percent annually for the last 5 years, pointing out that the reason for such slow growth in the consumption of petroleum products was due to a tendency to replace oil with natural gas. Natural gas consumption from 1984 to 1988 has increased at an accelerated rate of 11 percent, the equivalent of 927,000 barrels of oil a day in 1988, raising the total energy consumption level to 44 percent of this group's overall consumption.

Federation of Labor Unions Chief Discusses Workers' Rights

45040528 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Sep 89 p 10

[Interview with Hasan Jammam, secretary general of the International Federation of Arab Labor Unions by Hasan Badawi in Cairo; first two paragraphs are AL-SHA'B introduction; date not given]

[Excerpts] When Hasan Jammam, Secretary General of the International Federation of Arab Labor Unions [IFALU], came to Cairo last August, momentous events were taking place. Moves by political parties and forces, democratic organizations, and labor circles were underway to show solidarity with the iron and steel workers. The authorities responded to these moves by escalating arrests and tortures in jail.

This was the first visit to Cairo by IFALU leadership after a break with the Egyptian Labor Federation lasting 10 years because of the Camp David agreements and the official normalization of relations with the Zionist enemy that followed them.

AL-AHALI had the following interview with Secretary General Hasan Jammam:

[Badawi] The IFALU eighth congress was held on 15 May in Algiers, 10 years after its seventh congress. The congress approved Egypt's return to its membership. What is your evaluation of this step?

[Jammam] The Egyptian Labor Federation had expressed the desire to return to IFALU after an absence of 10 years. It also proclaimed its firm and principled stands against normalization with the Histadrut, (the Israeli labor federation). The IFALU central council and the eighth congress approved the Egyptian Labor Federation's return. This return strengthens the the Arab labor movement's unity and gives an impetus to the progress of its struggle. The Egyptian labor movement has played and is still playing a major role in the Arab struggle against all challenges facing the Arab nation in the confrontation with imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reaction. [passage omitted]

[Badawi] One of the most important challenges facing the Arab nation, particularly the working class, is the question of supporting the Palestinian intifadah [uprising] which started almost two years ago. What will the IFALU do in this regard?

[Jammam] The IFALU has been and will remain a strong supporter of the Palestinian revolution. [passage omitted] What the uprising has achieved in two years we could not achieve in the past 40 years. With regard to IFALU's stand on this problem, it is engaged in intensive activities on this matter and is in contact with member organizations and sisterly organizations in order to give moral and material support for the uprising. Next October I will make a worldwide tour to meet with several regional and international organizations in order to give every possible backing and support to the uprising.

We stand against whoever may try to strike against this uprising or to abort it, regardless of whether this party is Arab or international.

[Badawi] The Arab working class is facing many challenges in work and life: economic crises, unemployment, exploitation, backwardness, and so on. What is IFALU's role toward these issues?

[Jammam] We are in fact facing many challenges. In addition to those you mentioned, there is the struggle for freedom and democracy, and against the violation of labor union freedoms, as well as against some of the Arab dictatorial regimes, the multinational companies, and those who exploit the Arab people and the Arab working class. [passage omitted]

Every labor organization must deal with this crisis in its own region and see how it can be tackled in a manner appropriate to the situation and conditions of its

country. The eighth congress has for the first time submitted an economic working paper containing its views on ways to create Arab economic exchange and economic cooperation, how labor unions can play a role in this field, and how they may wrestle with their ideas for the purpose of achieving this objective.

The central council which is to meet on 8 December will look into these issues.

With regard to unemployment, the eighth congress recommended that Arab workers replace foreign workers in Arab countries hosting such workers who pose certain dangers to them, whether with regard to custom, traditions, language, or morals. We are now discussing with the Arab Labor Organization ways to ease unemployment. Despite the existence of agreements on the freedom of labor movement between the Arab countries, these agreements have not yet been implemented. We must struggle so that such agreements be respected and implemented. [passage omitted]

[Badawi] The freedoms and rights of the labor movement are the targets of attack in the Arab countries to various degrees. How does IFALU deal with this problem?

[Jammam] We are struggling for labor and public freedoms and are expanding and escalating the struggle in this field. This is because without such freedom the working class cannot achieve any further success or develop, especially since the Arab labor movement has not yet fully grown. Some Arab countries so far ban labor union organization, and some others suppress it to varying degrees. The eighth congress has considered the question of labor union rights and freedoms as one of the fundamental principles which under no circumstances can be conceded, and which we consider to be a matter of life or death. We always expect to be the target of terrorism and for our labor organizations to be dissolved. But we are afraid of nothing, and we do not despair or give up resisting any persecution or suppression. Indeed our attitude toward any regime is governed by the extent to which the regime is responsive to the workers' demands, rights, and labor union freedom. Governments may suppress and intimidate, but they will not be able to survive under the strain of such issues. Life will go back to normal, and the toilers will eventually triumph.

[Badawi] One of the most prominent examples of aggression against labor union freedoms in the Arab world was the Sudanese Military Council's decisions to dissolve labor union organizations and arrest labor leaders. What action will IFALU take to deal with this aggression?

[Jammam] We are well aware of the bad situation in Sudan, but whatever the case may be we will not accept the assassination of democracy. Democracy should not be the victim of corruption or of a situation where certain parties take over power without the participation of all the factions and classes. [passage omitted]

About a month ago we sent a telegram to all the federation members requesting them to contact the Sudanese embassies in their countries and voice their views in the manner they deem suitable. At the same time we addressed a message to the Military Council chairman expressing our views on the situation and asking him to permit us to visit Sudan in order to get acquainted with the situation first hand, to discuss it with him, and to find out the views of our federation member in Sudan. We also contacted the Sudanese ambassador in Damascus who promised us to inform the Sudanese authorities, but so far we have not yet received an answer on this matter. When we came to Egypt we contacted the Sudanese embassy here. Within a week we will be compelled to adopt a firm and decisive stand toward the Military Council, and we cannot be lenient with it. If we cannot enter Sudan then we will take steps on the Arab and international fronts, and we will struggle until the Sudanese unions return to their normal position. In the past we used to issue statements of condemnation and denunciation, but now we give time and pursue a quiet approach. If the party concerned fails to respond, then we will be forced to enter a battle with it on the Arab and international fronts.

We will ask all the world organizations, both labor unions and others, to wage a campaign against this regime which has violated Arab and international agreements on labor union freedoms and rights.

Concluding the interview, the IFALU secretary general disclosed an extremely important resolution adopted by the eighth IFALU congress, namely the decision to establish the Arab Center for Labor Unions Freedoms and Rights. He said: "We are now looking for a suitable formula that would enable this center to operate freely in monitoring all forms of aggression against labor union freedoms and rights in the Arab homeland. The center is to be an auxiliary IFALU body, free of all restrictions obstructing its actions. We will discuss the suitable formula at the next central council meeting."

AOI To Repair Sea King Helicopter Engines

45000021 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Oct 89 p 1

[Text] The Arab Organization for Industrialization [AOI] has decided to establish a [production] line to repair Sea King helicopter engines at one of the organization's engine factories.

This Monday, Lieutenant General Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chairman of AOI's board of directors, will witness the contract-signing ceremonies and the start-up of the new line.

The signing will be attended by Air Force Lieutenant General 'Ala'-al-Din Barakat, commander of the Air Force, British Embassy personnel, and representatives of the Rolls Royce Company, manufacturer of the engines.

Journalist Complains About Lack of Iraqi Cooperation

45000022 Cairo AKHIR SA'AH
in Arabic 18 Oct 89 p 55

[Text] Over the past few years, we have said nothing but good about brother Iraq, and there is no Iraqi issue or even celebration in which the Egyptian press has not participated with full representation. We have even taken part in fashion shows. We sent our correspondents to Baghdad to participate and write about these events in our government and opposition press. Art exhibits and song, dance, and art festivals; we have not been absent from any of them. All of this stands side by side with our coverage of the war from the beginning up to the splendid victories. A quick accounting finds that last year we gave Iraq 120 full pages, and 135 pages the year before. But after all this wonderful service, I am distressed that our words do not reach the citizens of brother Iraq or even the Egyptians living in Iraq. Iraqi Information Minister Nusayyif Jasim restricts the number of issues entering Iraq to 250. In a previous issue of AKHIR SA'AH, I asked, why all this concern over brother Iraq if our words never reach its people? Why doesn't Iraq cooperate with our newspapers and magazines the way we cooperate with their newspapers and magazines? Why don't we let the market set the demand? Maybe it will demand even less than the minister of information. Why does the Iraqi information minister limit himself to this number? From Baghdad, we received the response that our directorate of publications is the reason; however, it is a scientific fact that we have no directorate of publications. We are not asking for the impossible, nor even the difficult; we are asking for something very logical; we are asking for cooperation from the Arab Cooperation Council. We appeal to President Saddam [Husayn] to lift the Iraqi information minister's hand from our press.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'Arafat Seeking International Gain To Consolidate Position

44230009d Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 5 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Oded Zara'i: "'Arafat Has Only the Assembly Left"]

[Text] This time there was no sense in giving the V sign in front of the television cameras. At such Arab events PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat was used to enjoying the support of the local media—on orders from above—and security services. This time, however, he suffered a stinging humiliation in the Libyan capital when the media ignored him and centered their interest on his rival, Ahmad Jibril, head of the Popular Front—General Command.

Last Thursday, when he arrived in Tripoli with the status of a chief of state, 'Arafat was even more insulted by the

fact that he was welcomed by a mere colonel. Not by the president, Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi, and not by the second in command in the Libyan hierarchy, 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud.

At festivities marking the 20th anniversary of the Libyan revolution 'Arafat was indeed seated not far from President Asad, but he was not in the front line of seats reserved for heads of state, he was in the second line. According to Arab correspondents, despite the humiliations, the next day 'Arafat expressed unreserved support for Col Qadhdhafi's speech at the ceremonies. He said that the PLO will never agree to "haggle or compromise on Palestine," and all those who talk of the organization's alleged willingness to accept "defeatist solutions" know the real truth.

Gulf correspondents in Tripoli said that, in contrast to his appearances in recent months, this time 'Arafat was depressed, grim-faced, and rarely left his residence. It would seem that what happened in Tripoli was only one link in a whole chain of worries and fears. Last week's statements by Salah Halaf (Abu 'Ayyad), 'Arafat's second in command, and Yasir 'Abd-al-Rabu, member of the Higher Executive Committee and head of the PLO delegation to talks with the United States, gave expression to those fears.

Abu 'Ayyad clearly stated that the dialogue with the United States had come to a standstill. The hopes that Palestinians pinned on that dialogue far exceeded what actually transpired at the four meetings between Robert Pelletreau, the U.S. ambassador to Tunis, and Yasir 'Abd-al-Rabu. Those who followed Arab reactions from PLO sources understood that in Tunis, as well as in the West Bank and Gaza, people expected to see the "great victory" materialize through additional American gestures, or at least to see the dialogue raised to the level of, say, Secretary of State James Baker on the one side, and PLO Foreign Department Head Faruq Qaddumi, on the other.

Not only did "additional gestures" fail to materialize, but the fourth meeting brought the dialogue all the way back to point zero where it had started. There is no doubt that PLO leaders are worried about the heavy disappointment suffered by the masses in the West Bank and Gaza in the absence of the "great victory." However, what worries 'Arafat and his colleagues even more is the fact that for months they have not managed to budge the United States even one inch toward recognizing exclusive PLO representation as awarded to the PLO at the time by the 1974 Rabat summit. Even attempts at what the PLO may view as compromise didn't help. After all, the PLO Executive Committee agreed, at 'Arafat's request, to allow personalities from the West Bank and Gaza on the delegation to negotiations on elections. That agreement may perhaps have been the "limit of concessions" on the PLO's side, which means that the PLO should not be expected to accept the principle of a Palestinian delegation; even if the members are appointed directly from Tunis, made up solely of representatives from the West Bank and Gaza, without "outside Palestinians."

The worries that plague PLO leaders also stem from the frustration prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza and the growing economic problems of the population there. After 22 months the routine course of the uprising may take a sharp turn, the scope and meaning of which cannot be foreseen. It is reasonable to assume that one of the features of such a change may be considerable escalation of terrorism. Such a change may lead to chaos, loss of control, and even internal strife caused, if by nothing else, by revenge for the approximately 100 Palestinians who were murdered by other Palestinians during the same period in the West Bank and Gaza. In 'Arafat's view, the PLO needs an international gain, accompanied by due media campaign, to divert attention from the stalemate and perhaps even to encourage the United States to take another step toward the PLO. Such a gain could be realized from the forum of the UN General Assembly. PLO officials think that in itself 'Arafat's coming to New York would be an important achievement, not to mention if he were to bring a new peace initiative in his speech.

The subject of the visa to the United States stood at the center of 'Arafat's talks last week in Jiddah with King Fahd and in Cairo with President Mubarak. 'Arafat would like a reply from the U.S. Administration before he enters his visa application with the American Embassy in Tunis. PLO sources already leaked to Gulf journalists that King Fahd will tell President Bush that the Administration's refusal to grant 'Arafat a visa "will embarrass pragmatic Arab forces." 'Arafat and his friends agree that one has to go about the visa issue carefully in order not to come to a head in conflict with the United States. What is more, the chances of the UN headquarters being moved from New York to Geneva now look very slim, and that is why 'Arafat refrained from hammering on his participation in the UN General Assembly, while his colleagues claim that that is his personal affair.

Palestinian Poet Calls for Peace With Israel

44230009b Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 8 Sep 89 p 3B

[Article by Ori Nir]

[Text] Al-Mutawakkil Tah, head of the Palestinian Writers and Poets Association, left the Qetzi'ot detention center after a third stint of administrative detention, and began to write peace poems. Not exactly peace poems, but poems to peace, he takes care to specify. "Not peace poems written out of fear or submission, but out of deep conviction and awareness that peace is the only solution for Israelis and Palestinians." Tah is stubbornly working to create a new image for himself, which will be reflected in a new collection of poems soon to be published. This image will be different from the old, warrior image that came through his last book of poetry.

Tah's last book, "The Time of Ascension to Heaven" (in the Hebrew translation, an allusion to Jesus' ascension).

left a very hard, if not frightening, impression on Israelis. The cover bore the picture of a young man, his face covered with a keffiyeh, his arms spread in Jesus' cross position forming a victory sign, and his body engulfed by a large flame consuming his feet. The poems in the book were permeated by suffering and self-sacrifice motifs.

Along that line, the most prominent was a poem written in folk form and in spoken Arabic, devoted to Sana Mahaydali. Some people still remember the young Lebanese woman from Lebanon's Syrian National Socialist Party, who in April 1985 drove a booby-trapped car into an IDF [Israel Defense Forces] convoy in south Lebanon, killing herself as well as two young Israeli soldiers and two Lebanese civilians. She later became a heroine of mythological dimensions in the Arab world, including the territories. Tah's poem, which was written 1 month after the incident, was particularly repulsive. Among other things, it spoke of "hunks of flesh that rose and blossomed, like storks with spread wings."

Today Tah speaks differently and his writing is completely different. He again uses the image of Jesus on the cross in several connections, but this time the meaning is different. "When he was on the cross, Jesus called out for peace," he explained this week in his house in the Dahiyat al-Barid neighborhood north of Jerusalem. "Each one of his words, when he was on the cross, bore a burden of suffering and a message of peace." Al-Mutawakkil Tah is a Muslim, but his poems contain both Muslim references and allusions and images from the New Testament.

Almost 14 straight months of administrative detention at Qetzi'ot brought a certain measure of moderation into the fanatic heat of Tah's thinking and writing style. "Most detainees leave Qetzi'ot even more extremist than they went in, with thoughts of revenge and feeling more aggressive. With me it was different," he said. "In those 14 months I became convinced that we must hasten to achieve a peaceful, fair, and just solution. Arrests, deportations, killings, injuries, and destruction of houses on the one hand, and stones, Molotov cocktails, attacks, and conspiracy on the other will not achieve anything. Both sides must follow the path of reason, and that as soon as possible, in order to achieve a solution of genuine peace."

The stay in prison caused Tah to direct his new poems to a new audience, namely to Israelis: "I understood that the Israeli warden who stands 8 hours a day in the sun on his shift, facing Palestinian prisoners, needs peace just as much as the prisoners do. In jail I wrote mostly about prisoners and to prisoners, but I knew that when an Israeli soldier stands before me 8 hours in the sun, I am actually writing about him and to him, too."

Tah points to a certain moment during his imprisonment which, according to him, had a great symbolic significance in that connection: "One day an Israeli contractor came to Qetzi'ot to install a new fence around our block to prevent eye contact between us and prisoners in the

neighboring blocks. The man had brought his children with him, cute little ones. What happened then moved and surprised all of us. All of a sudden all the prisoners from Block 5 came out of their tents and crowded around the fence to look at the children. Some of them had not seen a child for 8, 10, or 12 months. In point of fact, each one of us was seeing his own children in that Israeli contractor's children. We wanted to ask him to let us touch them, kiss them. Whoever did not shed a tear was crying in his heart. It was a moment of illumination for me. I later sat down and wrote a poem to Israelis, which said that we loved your children and expected to see them walk hand in hand with our children to the springs of peace and love."

Al-Mutawakkil Sa'id Bahar Tah Nazal was born 31 years ago in Qalqilyah. His family is the largest and most important in town and most of its members still live there. His first name, which is relatively rare, was derived from the name of one of the great caliphs in Islamic history. Tah went to high school in Qalqilyah, earned a B.A. in Arab literature from the Bi'r-Zayt University, and an M.A. in the same from the al-Yarmuk University in Jordan. When he returned to the West Bank 8 years ago, he taught in Ramallah for a short time, then became literary editor for the Jerusalem bi-weekly AL-AWDA, which was closed down by the authorities 2 years ago. For the past 3 years he has been head of the association of Palestinian men of letters in the territories. The association, which identifies with Fatah and which he chaired until half a year ago, merged with a parallel association that identifies with the Palestinian communist party, and he is now head of the united association.

Tah lives in a nice house in an expensive neighborhood north of Jerusalem, on the line dividing the jurisdictions of Jerusalem and the West Bank. His house is considered as being in the West Bank. This geographical-political location has now acquired great significance for Tah, after his release from the last administrative detention some 2 weeks ago. Like most of his comrades being released these days from administrative detention, he, too, was forced to exchange his identity card for a green card, which prevents him from leaving the territories and going into Israel. This interdiction is particularly hard on him because it deprives him of access to his work place at the offices of the Palestinian Writers Association in Jerusalem. In fact, he cannot even cross the main road near his house because officially, the road is viewed as belonging inside Jerusalem and as the border of the State of Israel. Tah endeavored to mobilize support from Knesset members and Israeli public figures to undo the harm of the edict, but in vain. The interdiction on going to Jerusalem, he said, chains him to his house and does not allow him to exercise his profession in Jerusalem.

Although his writing is a few steps above average Palestinian literary work, young poet Tah represents and reflects several of the phenomena characterizing the nature of Palestinian literature. One of those phenomena

is the increasing gap between the nature of Palestinian literature in the territories and Palestinian literary works elsewhere. This is not something new; already 5 years ago Nabulus poet and literary scholar 'Ali al-Khalili referred to it bitterly in his book "Literary Conditions and Phenomena in the Occupied Territories" (Al-Fajir Publishing House, 1984).

In his book Al-Khalili sharply opposed claims by Arab critics abroad that the literary works of writers in the territories were not of a high artistic quality as far as creativity, imagination, and fertility as such. At the same time, writers from the territories accused those in the Arab world at large of being too artificial and too cut off in their writings about the occupation and the Palestinian problem.

This tension increased in the course of the intifadah. Palestinian and Arab literati and critics abroad came out in harsh criticism of the Palestinian literary production in the territories. The defense of writers in the territories was based on their perspective and closeness to events. This was expressed in one of 'Ali al-Khalili's interviews for the weekly AL-HADAF of the Palestinian Liberation Popular Front about 1 year ago: "...Writing about the intifadah here goes hand in hand with the intifadah, is a part of it, although it is very simple in style. Some of the Palestinian writers in exile write about the intifadah as if they were suddenly discovering something new" (AL-HADAF, 12 June 1988).

A few months ago the PLO began publishing a series of books dealing with the culture of the intifadah, parallel to the series that the organization has been bringing out since the first months of the uprising and that documents daily events. Some 10 volumes have been published to date in the intifadah culture series. One of them deals with intifadah songs, another with its lyrics, and its title is "Stone Alphabet."

According to literary figures in the territories, the collection is a blow and an insult. That, at least, is how al-Mutawakkil Tah referred to it when I produced the book and asked him to have a look at it. All the while he was turning the pages he was cursing and vituperating, and not without reason.

The editor, Muhammad 'Ali al-Yusfi, had selected several dozen poems dealing with the intifadah, out of which only three had been written by poets in the territories. One of them was by al-Mutawakkil Tah and was dedicated to Palestinian women at Neve Tirtza prison. Tah managed to detect four gross mistakes in his poem as it appeared in the collection, as well as a few other serious professional blunders. The editorial considerations of the publisher are thoroughly clarified in his comments in one of the critical articles preceding the collection. Those comments were mainly responsible for Tah's fury.

This is what the article said: "Reading the poetry of the occupied territories has revealed almost nothing new so far. The poems range between a style of stereotype

egotistical rhythm and strident self-expression, and experiments by poets known to Arab readers....We note the emergence of two poets whose poems stood out among works coming out of the occupied territories, namely 'Abd-al-Nasir Salah and al-Mutawakkil Tah....Both, however, suffer from lack of rhetorical restraint and unoriginal descriptions affected by repetitiveness and too much detail. They would do well to trim and develop their language and to shed the frozen stereotypes of modern Arab poetry."

This passage, especially the last few sentences, elicited a juicy curse and duly accompanying hand gesture from Tah, who then said: "Let's see them, those people in their air-conditioned offices, calmly smoking their pipes, let's see them sit just 1 month, not 14, in the wilderness of Qetzi'ot. They would sing a different tune then."

However, the tension between Palestinian writers in the territories and in exile does not express itself only in mutual criticism and literary jealousy. It also contains a considerable measure of alienation and lack of understanding. Al-Mutawakkil Tah says that he and his colleagues in the territories were not influenced by Palestinian writers and poets in exile, such as Mahmud Darwish and others. "Works from the outside almost don't reach us, and what is published here almost doesn't travel out. They simply don't know the literary movement in the territories and don't really care to know it."

Tah's frustration, which is shared by other writers in the territories, does not stem only from lack of audience outside the territories, but also from the fact that few people in the territories read them. He points out several reasons for that: censorship, the high cost of books at a time of very difficult economic conditions, and mostly, fear of keeping books at home. People in the territories are afraid to keep in their homes printed material that may be viewed by the authorities as provocation or banned nationalistic writings. "I don't keep any book of modern poetry at home, either, not even my own poetry. You won't find here any book or publication that may be considered forbidden."

That is probably why Tah knows all his poems by heart. To date he has written dozens of poems which appeared in three collections, and he recites with ease poems he wrote in the past few months between the fences of the Qetzi'ot detention camp, which have not yet been published anywhere.

Tah predicts, without too much modesty, that his new book of poems will mark the beginning of a new literature in the territories, a poetic dialogue with the Israeli public designed to create an atmosphere of understanding and peace. Judging by the first few examples of that dialogue which Tah recited from memory, there will be no substantial change in the pattern of Palestinian poetry in the territories, which is almost invariably politically engaged and is usually characterized by poster-like superficiality from the viewpoint of poetic depth and imagery.

Mahmud Darwish, who is considered to be the national Palestinian poet, about 1 month ago suggested an interesting description of the situation of current Palestinian poetry in an interview for the French news agency: "Palestinian life is at this time completely mobilized, and poetry laboriously tries to carve for itself a lofty place within it on the one hand, while fulfilling its national role on the other. Between those two missions, the artistic and the national, drops of new rhetoric are appearing. I fear that this new rhetoric is only an echo of the old one, a variation on poetic memory."

ALGERIA

Meeting Calls for Industrial Engineering Development

45190133a *Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 4 Aug 89 pp 30-31

[Article by A. Tareb: "Industrial Engineering: What Tomorrow Will Bring"; first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE introduction]

[Text] A dialogue that will upset many customary views on this controversial engineering issue. Adoption of open, sharply defined positions by the speaker, but heated debate in which a certain bitterness in connection with the matter and in view of the big mess that has been noted in the sector have constantly been evident.

This is not the first time the Algiers Wilaya Association of Public Sector Administrators has had the bright idea of organizing a conference on the topic of national-sector engineering, this time a few days ago at ONAFEX [Algerian National Office for Fairs and Trade Expansion]. ENEP (Petroleum Engineering) general manager Mustapha Mekideche, who introduced himself in his capacity of manager, was the promoter of this conference.

What kind of reorganization of the engineering sector? This was the question that was raised during this conference.

The report in this specific field looks a bit like those for the other sectors of the economy, which in plain language means that, while much has been accomplished, the fact remains that the sector is in a serious predicament.

Yet, for many years attempts to regulate this type of activity have been made through various documents: the Constitution, the resolutions adopted at the special congress in June 1980 and the Sixth FLN [National Liberation Front] Party Congress, various Council of Ministers meetings, and the reports of specialized national institutions. In spite of this abundance of regulation and these guidelines, very few measures have actually been implemented.

Current production volumes are too low to ensure that the needs of the national economy are significantly met. According to the figures cited by Mr Mekideche, the

engineering sector's production potential is estimated to be at least 10,000 engineers and technicians. A relatively low figure is the observation we may make if we compare it with the international norms. Also according to the general manager of ENEP, estimated at 3,000 research scientists, the sector's scientific potential as well continues to be very far from the international norms: that is, 120 scientists per million inhabitants. By way of example, Asia has 380 scientists per million, Latin America 400, and Western Europe 1,000.

Expenditures devoted to research and development are estimated at 0.18 percent of the GDP [gross domestic product].

This low level of research activity in the production sectors in particular is reflected in the very low number of research departments in the national companies, where there are approximately fewer than 10. Mr Mekideche noted that some sectors that are strategic in terms of the accumulation of technological know-how have seen little or no development: industrial engineering, techniques, manufacture of capital goods, product research, and development.

The development of a national production system that has not been administered through a well-defined technology policy and is not provided with effective instruments for its implementation has been an additional constraint affecting the absence of development of the engineering field.

Investments in equipment during the period from 1980 through 1987 for research in the engineering branch amounted to 2 billion Algerian dinars, 400 million of which for engineering per se, for a total investment figure—all sectors combined—amounting to nearly 600 billion Algerian dinars.

We, therefore, have good reason to think that, despite the arsenal of documents and resolutions, the engineering sector continues to be relatively neglected in our country. Comparison with those nations close to our level of development (India, Brazil, some countries in Southeast Asia) scarcely speaks in our favor.

In some of these countries there are today laws that ensure the progress of the engineering sector through local measures that reinforce tax and financial incentives, a system which does not exist here in Algeria. According to Mr Mekideche, independent status for the national companies, could, moreover, worsen the situation for these engineering companies since, in view of their present low productivity, the national companies may be tempted not to call on them, but to instead turn to foreign firms. There is also the risk of seeing these national engineering companies focus on popular, but lower quality lines that produce juicy profits in order to be able to survive while neglecting products of great technological importance, which the production of is difficult to ensure. The general manager of ENEP also thinks that the creation of joint ventures, which are

today authorized by the rules, may constitute a danger for our engineering companies.

The foreign partner may participate totally leaving no share of the market to our national companies. This is not a good formula and Mr Mekideche said that there are many examples of this in the Third World in which there have been damaging effects on the scientific and technical potential of the countries in question that adopted this approach.

In the area of feasibility studies the danger is particularly great since many examples indicate that these kinds of studies conducted by foreign combines have succeeded in influencing the direction investments take.

Today there are numerous proposals for a reorganization of the national industrial engineering sector. Some advocate obligatory association of the national engineering sector with the technological policies of the different branches, specifically at the time licenses or patents are acquired. They also advocate these same companies' participation in feasibility studies.

Some voices are today being raised to demand the establishment of a coordinating instrument that would ensure consistency, efficacy, and flexibility in public company-engineering company relations.

Other proposals are aimed at subsidiarization of the engineering companies. The latter would become subsidiaries of industrial combines or holding companies in their respective branches (steel industry, hydrocarbons, etc.). Mr Mekideche, who advocates this kind of solution, pointed out that, if such a reorganization is not effected, there will be a definite risk of downgrading, or even the disappearance of the existing engineering companies due to their inability to compete with foreign combines.

The human element is an important aspect of any engineering activity. It is both the "essential capital and the chief investment." The training effort is important in our country, but we must admit that it has not been upgraded. Engineers and specialists' careers do not benefit from conditions that might constitute a source of motivation for them, many of the participants in the discussion complained. A career in the field of engineering is so unattractive, one of them said, that many engineers and technicians quite simply turn to the management professions, which are better paid and guarantee better career advancement. Excellent engineers have been lost because they were underpaid, one of the participants said. Today, there is underutilization of the existing human potential, devaluation of the profession of engineer, and there is increasing talk of unemployment at a time when, paradoxically, there is also talk of understaffing. This situation is such that we must acknowledge a major setback for engineering in the national companies.

The problem of access to information was also the subject of heated debate. In this area lack of same is the

only possible word to describe the situation. In fact, very few scientific and technical reviews are received and very few specialists or engineers or technicians participate in international forums or have an opportunity to compare their experiences with those of others. We must also point out that the engineering companies are today subject to heavy import duties in connection with the development of their potential: over 57 percent in duties and taxes for the acquisition of scientific and technical software, for example. Thus the proposals made in the course of the discussion were aimed at upgrading the status of engineering professionals and improvement of working conditions as well as exemption from taxes.

One must realize, for example, the general manager of ENEP said, that most of the engineering companies today are still housed in uncomfortable barracks unsuited to the creative effort demanded by the profession, which prevents any effort to develop the industry. As concerns the risk of seeing the engineering companies be exposed to a kind of insularity, as the general manager of ENEP fears may be the case, or that they may turn to juicy profit lines (quality control, microeconomic reasoning), some retort that mediocrity must absolutely not be developed. There must no longer be a vested market today. Beware of a monopoly, one of them said. Autonomy allows competition and, like the others, the engineering companies must adopt this kind of logic.

Many voices were raised to point out that the 1982 reorganization of the national companies was particularly disastrous for the national engineering sector. The dismemberment of the public companies also led to the dismemberment of the engineering sector, hence the necessity today of reintegrating the engineering companies into the big industrial combines (SIDER [expansion unknown], SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons], etc.). More than the other forms of engineering, industrial engineering is today particularly threatened. Mr Mekideche emphasized in conclusion, much more so, for example, than construction or environmental engineering.

All told, a particularly animated evening thanks to the representatives of the Algiers Wilaya Association of Public Sector Administrators and a positive contribution to the discussion of issues that trouble our society.

Therefore, a performance to be encouraged. And that is what it was.

BAHRAIN

Tourism Statistics Reported

90OL0022d Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 5 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Amal al-Khayr: "Number of Tourists Coming to Bahrain Swells to 661,262"]

[Text] The latest Department of Tourism and Antiquities statistics show that 661,262 tourists came to Bahrain during the first half of this year. The highest rate was reached in January when 135,323 tourists came, while April showed a marked drop to 52,289 tourists.

These statistics established that the number of tourists for this year has increased considerably, perhaps due to the campaign the Bahrain Overseas Marketing Department organized in addition to the holding of fairs.

The number of people coming to the country for business during the same period was 4,130. The highest rate was recorded in January when 1,026 people came in for this purpose, and April had the lowest rate of 466.

It has been noticed that activity picks up in January and falls off in April. This may be due to weather conditions, because the climate in January is moderate. This is in addition to the fact that the holy month of Ramadan fell in April.

The number of people who came to Bahrain to study during the same period was 55, with the highest rate, 13 people, recorded in February, and the lowest rate, 5 persons, in April.

Those who came for medical treatment during the same period numbered 17. The highest rate was in June with 7 persons and March had a very small number.

The statistics also showed that 33 guests visited Bahrain during the aforementioned period. The highest rate was recorded in May with 14 guests while April had no guests at all.

The number of persons who came to work was 6,676. As the preceding figures showed, the highest rate was recorded in January, when 1,298 persons came to Bahrain to work, while April had a marked drop with only 794 persons.

These statistics also established that 5,455 persons came to join their families, with February recording the highest rate of 1,710, and, as expected, April had the lowest rate in this respect with only 94.

It is also noticed that these statistics did not show the number of journalists coming to Bahrain, but did include a number for those leaving it, which was 11 journalists. In addition, between January and June, 3,462 persons transited the country. The highest rate was recorded in January, with 1,100 persons and the lowest rate in May with 129 persons.

On the other hand, the number of people who came across the bridge during the second quarter of the year was 321,250.

It is noticed that this number is lower than the 1988 figure for the same period when 351,444 crossed the bridge, a difference of 30,204. The number of people

who came across the bridge in the first quarter of this year was 448,796, compared to 427,663 for the same period last year.

The statistics show a rise in the percentage of people coming to Bahrain by way of the airport for the first and second quarter of this year (January until last June). They numbered 249,698 people, compared to 230,787 people who arrived during the same period last year.

The statistics show that the number of people who arrived in Bahrain by sea from January to June was 1,181, compared to the lower figure of 1,055 for the same period last year.

Finally, these statistics established that more people came to Bahrain this year than last year. This is attributable to the campaign the Department of Tourism and Antiquities has organized to market Bahrain abroad, to the various tourist fairs held to introduce tourists to Bahrain's tourist capabilities, and to the opening of the King Fahd Bridge.

Irrigation Network Using Treated Water Underway

90OL0022a Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ
in Arabic 29 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Ayyubi: "Sophisticated Irrigation Network in Hamad Using Treated Water To Be Completed in October"]

[Text] A responsible source at the Technical Affairs Department of the Ministry of Housing said that the city of Hamad irrigation project, using treated water from the Tubali station to irrigate farming areas and streets [as published] in the city of Hamad and neighboring areas, is expected to be completed next October. This system has been supplied with 128,000 irrigation points.

The source said that the aforementioned irrigation system consists of irrigation water pumping stations, a 30x30 cubic meter reservoir located north of Hamad, an integrated primary and secondary water pipe network, and automatic sprinkling taps. This system will provide the necessary water for irrigation and preparation and will also pump plant fertilizers, thus preserving the network's components against destruction and deterioration.

The source pointed out every one of the main pumping stations located throughout the Hamad city suburbs has a main 1,000 cubic feet water reservoir in addition to a water filter, fertilizer pumps, and an automatic control chamber. Residential areas are divided into major complexes irrigated automatically two hours a day, according to the plants' water needs. As for the fertilizer, it is mixed with water automatically in a special mixing tank and the mixture is pumped through pipes to planted areas.

He added that the irrigation system in the city of Hamad serves neighboring areas, for allowances have been made

for carrying irrigation water to the Bahrain Beltway and the Safirah horse racetrack which is supplied with water. The main reservoir at the pumping station, built out of reinforced concrete, holds about 1,000 cubic meters of water, which is enough to supply and irrigate the green areas in all the suburbs for one day.

He said that the primary pipes extend from the north of the city to Zallaq Street in the south for a distance of 12 kms and join with the secondary reservoir in the suburbs, and that the length of the pipes used for irrigation in Hamad is 54 kms.

He added that the Technical Affairs Department coordinated with all competent sides to draw up appropriate standard specifications for pumps used in the implementation of this project compatible with others pumps used in Bahrain. Furthermore, the aforementioned method of implementing this project is part of a state policy aimed at rationalizing the use of sweet water for irrigation and using only treated water for farming and forestation.

EGYPT

Mubarak Resists Pressure To Sell Public Sector

45040519h London AL-DUSTUR
in Arabic 11 Sep 89 pp 29-30

[Article by 'Abd al-Kadir Shuhayb: "The Public Sector To Continue in Egypt"]

[Text] Egyptian president Husni Mubarak recently stopped an auction by the Wafd Party and certain businessmen to sell the public sector—an auction encouraged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and applauded by the U.S. Agency for International Development [U.S.AID].

President Mubarak told reporters that there was no contemplation of selling the public sector or letting go of its huge establishments. Even its unprofitable small and marginal units will not be sold until they can no longer be reformed. The Egyptian president therefore put an end to the auctioning off of the failing as well as the successful public sector units in Egypt.

The auction was triggered by previous press statements in which President Mubarak demanded an end to the losses incurred by certain public sector establishment, even if it became necessary to sell them for lack of another solution.

AL-WAFD newspaper, organ of the Wafd opposition party, seized upon those statements to launch a wide-scale campaign against all public sector establishments, including successful giants that form the bulwark of the Egyptian economy. All public sector opponents, even among Egyptian businessmen and the national press, took part in this attack.

The campaign relied on magnifying public sector losses and minimizing the profits of successful units in order to justify the sale of all of them to the private sector at the most depressed prices.

AL-WAFD newspaper persisted in publishing reports, under screaming headlines, claiming that public sector losses exceeded three billion pounds in addition to another three billion in indirect losses representing the values of idle capacities or depressed goods in public sector warehouses.

Those articles and reports claimed that the public sector, with assets exceeding 40 billion pounds, had profits of no more than 0.5 percent which could be increased to 15 percent if the private sector were allowed to buy and manage the public sector. The conclusion to sell was therefore inevitable.

AL-WAFD and a number of Egyptian businessmen who joined it in the attack on the public sector, fostered several rumors of mutiny within government ranks led by a so-called Nassirite lobby seeking to frustrate President Mubarak's wishes to sell the public sector. Dr. Rifat Al-Mahjub and the Egyptian minister of industry were the two main targets of those rumors.

Curiously, rumors and lies succeeded for a time in obscuring public sector successes and the actual losses sustained by certain of its units. The profits were higher than rumored, and the losses were lower.

Figures by the Egyptian ministry of industry reveal that the number of losing public sector industrial companies dropped from 36 in 1983 to only 20 last year. Aggregate losses also dropped from 304 million pounds to only 163 million pounds. Meanwhile, profits of public sector industrial companies rose from 460 million pounds in 1983 to 1,200 million pounds last year. The value of their exports also jumped to about a billion pounds—equal to Suez Canal revenues.

But opponents of the public sector in Egypt disregarded all those accomplishments and joined a campaign to defame all units, even the successful giants, in order to justify their sale to the private sector. They ignored the fact that several private sector establishments created during the past 10 years are stumbling and facing many difficulties. By the estimates of businessmen themselves, there are some 500 such companies, of which some are facing liquidation because of debts accumulated by their owners.

Of course, certain businessmen in Egypt seized the opportunity to pressure the government to sell certain public sector units, naturally not to serve their narrow interests but in the service of Egypt. Some of them even went as far as to call upon the Egyptian government to induce Egyptian and foreign businessmen to buy public sector units by granting such concessions as 20 percent price reductions with down payments, not to exceed 20 percent of the reduced price, and the balance to be paid on the installment plan at interest rates not to exceed 3

percent. The government would carry the burden of the surplus work force which the businessmen would naturally let go after purchasing the [public sector] establishments that employed them.

Businessmen went to excess because certain foreign entities, led by the IMF and U.S.AID, had also insisted that the government sell public sector units.

The IMF, as a condition for a new agreement with the Egyptian government, demanded the privatization of at least half of public sector units.

USAID, on the other hand, offered the Egyptian government 400 million pounds in aid in order to facilitate financing purchases of public sector stock.

But the hubbub created by businessmen, AL-WAFD newspaper, and other opponents of the public sector caused concern among the workers of that sector, as well as among a larger sector—those with limited incomes whom the public sector provides with basic and essential goods at reasonable and suitable prices.

Recent statements by the Egyptian president, which put an end to auctioning off the public sector in Egypt, were intended to address those concerns and to somewhat reassure employees of public sector establishments and units.

Some observers believe, however, that external and internal pressures to shrink the public sector in Egypt will not cease in the future. They might even intensify.

Sawhaj Governor Discusses 'Plots,' Religious Issues

45040532 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 13 Sep 89 p 4

[Interview with Major General Hasan al-Alfi by Muhammad Fathallah: "I Welcome the Islamic Groups and Invite Them to a Dialogue With Me"; first paragraph is AL-NUR interview; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] We went to Maj Gen Hasan al-Alfi, the governor of Sawhaj, to discuss with him some of the issues raised in the arena, in addition to a number of other matters of interest to Sawhaj Governorate in particular. We wanted to know what ideas he would like to see implemented as a preliminary step toward applying God's Shari'ah on earth.

[AL-NUR] How do you view the Islamic tendency in the governorate and how do you deal with it?

[Al-Alfi] I believe that the Islamic tendency, its large numbers notwithstanding, has less of an impact in Sawhaj than others have in any other governorate such as Asyut, al-Minya, Bani Suwayf or al-Fayyum. I think this is due to the leadership style used in dealing with this tendency before I came to power. I take issue, however, with its haphazard way of handling various affairs in Sawhaj or any other place, which is incompatible with any of the divine messages. [passage omitted]

This is not an attack on my fellow groups, but I do object to their ideology and the solitary way in which they deal with the issues.

Our Goal Is to Safeguard the People's Security and Safety

As for my style of dealing with these groups, I say: Once again I welcome you to a dialogue with missionary [the Call to Islam] and al-Azhar leaders, if that is what you want, but I will inflict the most severe punishment on anyone who entertains the idea of harming the people, whoever he may be. Our goal is to safeguard the security and safety of our citizens.

Religious Surge

I have noticed a tremendous healthy religious surge among our Muslim youth, which is an indication of a growing religious awareness among its various factions. However, there is a small minority of delinquents who I believe will not have any impact on the state of security in the governorate.

[AL-NUR] The police are accused of arbitrariness in dealing with these issues. How do you explain that?

[Al-Alfi] First of all, I would like to explain that if the police had not been firm, the situation would have been quite the opposite. It is true that the police may go too far in some cases, and may have gone overboard in the recent events, but we do not want our agency to be weak. If the police are weak, safety and security in Egypt will turn into anarchy and fragmentation, and things will get out of hand.

[AL-NUR] Do you have any new plans to vitalize Islamic Missionary work in the governorate?

[Al-Alfi] Yes. The first thing I thought about after I came to power is how to advance Islamic missionary work and religious awareness, especially in the villages and small hamlets that are deprived of this sort of thing. In the first meeting I held, it was with the chairman of the missionary committee, the director of awqaf, the director of Sawhaj Azhar District and a number of missionary leaders and preachers in the governorate's cities and centers. My first instructions to them were to intensify their efforts and deal with the vital issues that are important to everyone. I also made sure that my instructions included taking care of the young people because they are the country's hope and future. We also decided in that meeting to ask the missionary committee to hold weekly seminars at every center in the governorate, in addition to the mosque mission and other duties. I also coordinated with the Ministry of Awqaf to send religious convoys, on a monthly basis, to the governorate to reinforce the religious consciousness of the people in Sawhaj.

Foreign Designs

In reply to a question about the present state of our youth and his plans to save the young people of Sawhaj,

Maj Gen al-Alfi said: "I have not set up a plan for dealing with our young people because, so far, we can say that they are in good shape. But I would like to ask them to be vigilant and to know who their enemies are, because every one of the government agencies has been penetrated by fallacious ideologies backed by a foreign design whose primary goal is to destroy Egypt and Islam from within. These designs are represented by white narcotics, by cultural and ideological invasion, and by booze, causing the young people to shun growth and productive developments."

Maj Gen al-Alfi emphasized that "psychological, ideological, and religious wars are being waged in Egypt, in an effort to destroy the Egyptian Muslim youth. No party hostile to Egypt and Islam would like to see the Muslims prosper anywhere in the world and, therefore, I call on our young people to understand the situation, and to never lose sight of the fact that their enemies are fighting them, and to be careful not to fall into this trap."

[AL-NUR] Closing down the bars in your governorate is a commendable effort on your part, but doing it without an official order took many people by surprise, the Sawhaj natives in particular.

[Al-Alfi] To those who were surprised that the bars were closed without an order, I say: Where were you when closing instructions were issued? You would do better to be surprised by the long lines of intoxicated people staggering in the streets. Yes, I did close these places without an order. No permit issued by the local council is permanent and may be revoked by the issuer at any time whenever necessary or if deemed harmful. I decided that selling alcohol in the governorate is detrimental to public security, to the health, and to the pocketbook. Accordingly, I considered these points in contravention of the issuance of permits, so I decided to revoke them so as not to give bar owners a chance to challenge the decision if issued by a direct order. I call upon officials and guardians, with a special appeal to the People's Assembly, to amend the law governing the sale and use of alcohol with a view to eventually revoking all alcohol sale and production permits in keeping with the Islamic Shari'ah and in order to protect human health.

The Shari'ah Is a Commitment

About the application of the Shari'ah as a major popular demand and his perception of this demand and how it can be fulfilled, the major general replied: "No two people disagree that the application of the Islamic Shari'ah is a cardinal demand and the hope of every Muslim. However, we must first apply the Shari'ah to ourselves because, by doing so, we can demand that the government officials do the same, but if we as a people are not committed or are unwilling within ourselves, there is no use asking for ratification."

He added: "No one denies that Islam is the solution, not only for Egypt but for the whole world. By practicing Islam and following its path, we can save all of the

people. Our Prophet brought Islam not only to Egypt or the Arabs but to the whole world."

"We have not sent thee but a universal Messenger to men, giving them glad tidings and warning them against sin" [Koran:35/28].

Liberals Warn 'Elements' Against Striking at Democracy

90OA0023a Cairo AL-AHRAR
in Arabic 18 Sep 89 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Liberal Party Communique About Plot To Strike at Democracy"]

[Text] Certain elements, that do not believe in the democratic system, have tirelessly tried to stir public opinion against the political parties, and to confuse it against the Egyptian democratic system that rests on a plurality of parties and on democratic socialism under the Egyptian Constitution, based on a plurality of parties, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion and thought, and freedom of belief.

These elements have attempted to strike at democracy and the multiparty system by claiming, time and again, that fronts have arisen and that splits exist within the Egyptian political parties.

The Liberal Party condemns this blatant method that conflicts with the Constitution and contradicts the free democratic party system that the country is experiencing under the leadership of President Mubarak, who is completely committed to kindling freedom of opinion, strengthening the political parties, and considering them part of the country's legitimate system.

The party advises this group to respect the Constitution and the law, and to exercise its constitutional democratic right to express all ideas that interest it through legitimate political channels—namely, the political parties, parliamentary assemblies, and the press. It should avoid this destructive demagogic style that benefits only renegades from democracy. The people reject this style. After having lived almost a quarter century under a single one-party system, Egypt, by its free will, saw fit to change its Constitution into a multiparty system based on freedom of thought, freedom of opinion, and freedom of belief.

To this group, the Liberal Party says that if it thinks it has the political strength and the ability to make progress by legitimate means, it should found a political party representing its political program, instead of this demagogic style that the people of Egypt utterly reject.

Security Police Reportedly Arrest 170 Protesters

90OA0023b Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 20 Sep 89 p 4

[Article: "Three Villages in al-Minufiyah Stormed, 170 Citizens Arrested"]

[Text] About 20 riot police cars raided the village of Mit 'Afiyah, Shibin al-Kawm district, last Sunday. They broke down house doors, combed the village, and arrested 15 citizens, including the village chief Hilmi al-Nu'mani and mayoral candidate Fakhri al-Nu'mani. The latter was released at 2 am. During the raid, security police used tear gas bombs, which they hurled into homes, leading to many injuries among the citizens. Those arrested were held in Shibin al-Kawm police station. They were beaten in the presence of Major General Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hafiz, al-Minufiyah's assistant director of security, and Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa al-Daghidi, head of the Bureau of Investigation for Shibin al-Kawm. The raid occurred after villagers demonstrated to protest fraud in last Sunday's mayoral election on behalf of Mansur al-Sharbini, a relative of Brigadier General 'Ali al-Sharbini, commander of the Central Security Police in Alexandria. Several years ago, the latter was charged in a case involving forcing his police recruits to drink sewer water.

'Voice of Arabs' Broadcaster, Activist Joins SLP

45040526b Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 12 Sep 89 p 7

[Text] Muhammad Abu al-Futuh is one of the early pioneers of the Voice of the Arabs radio. The stands of those early pioneers were quite clear: they considered their work in the Voice of the Arabs a "struggle" against the forces of Zionism and colonialism. Strugglers everywhere in the Arab countries appreciated the heroic role those people played. The Voice of the Arabs was indeed a "rapid deployment" battalion against all the forces of colonialism and Zionism, chasing them wherever they were, from the Gulf to the Ocean.

Muhammad Abu al-Futuh was responsible for political affairs and one of the most prominent commentators. In addition to this important responsibility he was also responsible for programs beamed to the Arab Maghreb countries. It was natural that the Algerian revolution captured a major share of his attention. The revolution's leaders and cadres regarded him as one of the revolution's advanced battalions. In 1971 he was among those who were dismissed from the radio in the well-known "Hatim massacre".

Because the radio for him was not just a job but a position of struggle against Zionism and colonialism, he went to Libya where he contributed to the struggle against colonialism and all the capitulationist plans, such as the "Camp David" accord, and for many years he was one of the leaders of this struggle through the Voice of the Arab Homeland Radio in Libya.

Recently he returned to his country in the hope that the limited freedom of expression would enable him to continue the struggle against the forces of Zionism and colonialism. He found his new struggle position in the world of publishing—he established the Middle East Publishing House.

Since he returned, Abu al-Futuh has been observing the political movement in Egypt in order to choose for himself the banner under which he will continue the struggle. After an objective and careful study he chose the Socialist Labor Party [SLP] where he found rapprochement with the thoughts and movements of some of the party's leadership, foremost of whom are brethren 'Adil Husayn, Dr Ahmad al-Mahdi, and Majdi Ahmad Husayn. So Muhammad Abu al-Futuh has joined the SLP in order to continue his struggle under its banner. He is welcomed as an honorable struggler among honorable strugglers.

EEC Grants \$2.5 Million for Ras Muhammad Development

45000012 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 22 Sep 89 p 43

[Text] The EEC has granted Egypt \$2.5 million to develop the Ra's Muhammad area in southern Sinai and make it a international tourist area and nature preserve with tourists in mind.

The first phase of development in this area began a short time ago and will cost \$750,000.

This agreement was signed on the Egyptian side by Minister of Cabinet Affairs Dr 'Atif 'Ubayd, the minister responsible for environmental affairs. It was signed on the European side by Francine Henresson, head of the EEC delegation to Cairo.

Market President Interviewed on Investment Companies

45040519a London AL DUSTUR in Arabic
11 Sep 89 pp 34-35

[Interview with Dr Muhammad Hassan Faj-al-Nur, president of Financial Markets Authority, in Cairo by Muhammad Basyuni: "All Investment Companies. With the Exception of al-Rayyan, Have Defined Their Status"; first two paragraphs are AL-DUSTUR introduction; date not given]

[Text] One and a quarter million Egyptian expatriates and about a quarter of a million Arabs who have deposits with investment companies have been waiting 14 months for Egypt's Money Markets Authority [MMA] resolutions to protect their rights and reclaim their funds that were wasted because of foul play by certain investment company owners.

Dr. Muhammad Faj-al-Nur, president of the MMA and chairman of the Federation of Arab Stock Exchanges, recently unveiled the MMA's resolutions which came in the form of statistics that were not understood by many depositors. AL-DUSTUR interviewed Dr. Faj-al-Nur on the future of investment companies in the nearterm.

[AL-DUSTUR] Why were your resolutions so late in coming?

[Faj-al-Nur] The MMA, before adopting its resolutions, was careful to gather complete data on depositors and deposits as well as the foreign and domestic assets and holdings of the companies in order to check them against company books and documents. The time it took to accomplish this huge task is relatively short. Therefore, we were not late. Protecting the interests of depositors, companies, and the national economy underlies the work which we have done and which we shall do.

[AL-DUSTUR] You mentioned that money-receiving companies will be classified under the new law regulating them. What are these classifications?

[Faj-al-Nur] The classifications are determined under the law and according to the status of the companies. Certain companies escaped the legal classification of money-receiving companies because they received funds only from a specific group of depositors, not from the population at large. Under the law, a company must have received funds from the general population and not only from a specific group.

Certain companies have restructured and received MMA approval. Others are still under study. Legal action has been initiated against a third category which did not put its house in order. A fourth category of companies has been allowed to continue operations. A fifth category has decided to liquidate.

With the Exception of al-Rayyan

[AL-DUSTUR] Which companies restructured and were approved by the MMA?

[Faj-al-Nur] There are four of them: al-Sharif Economic Development, al-Sa'd Real Estate Investment, al-Sa'd Trade and Development, and al-Sa'd Industrial Investment. They have 167,202 depositors with combined deposits of 1,331,908,230 pounds.

[AL-DUSTUR] But al-Sharif is not yet a legal entity as a money-receiving company and is still awaiting council of ministers approval.

[Faj-al-Nur] That is true. Al-Sharif requested an exemption from the legal ceiling of 50 million pounds. Since it wants to be capitalized at 100 million pounds, it requested the exemption from the prime minister as the law stipulates. After this is done, it may proceed with formalities for the commercial register then for the register of money-receiving corporations.

The three al-Sa'd companies, on the other hand, have completed the formalities and applied to the commercial register and the MMA register.

[AL-DUSTUR] The MMA's recent statement on investment companies did not mention al-Rayyan. Why?

[Faj-al-Nur] We covered the companies whose financial status were subject to recent determination. Al-Rayyan

is still up in the air, since the compilation of its domestic and foreign assets and deposits is yet to be completed by a special committee.

[AL-DUSTUR] The MMA has ordered six companies to refund depositor funds within a 30-day period ending 9 Sep. What is the status of these companies?

[Faj-al-Nur] These companies did not restructure under the law before the deadline. By law, they must therefore prepare schedules for refunding the deposits. They are: Islamic Companies for Domestic and Foreign Trade, al-Ahram Investment Center, al-Ikhlass Import and Export, International Industry and Development, Jamco International Agency, and al-Anwar Islamic Transactions. I must emphasize that those companies chose that path and were not forced to liquidate. They may continue private operations without interruption in as far as their assets and projects are concerned. However, they are enjoined from money-receiving activities. They may also transform into a different legal entity such as a stock company or an individually owned business. Those companies have 2,154 depositors with deposits amounting to 27,703,899 pounds.

Companies Under Consideration

[AL-DUSTUR] How about companies whose documents are still being studied by experts at the MMA?

[Faj-al-Nur] The applications of ten such companies are currently under study. They are Badr Investment, Dar-al-Wafa and al-Zahra' Arab Information, Islamic Cooperation Center (I.C. Center), al-Hijaz Companies (Ahmad 'Ubayd 'Issawi and Muhammad Ahmad 'Ulaywah), Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Shalabi al-Sayyid, Ahmad 'Asim Shalabi al-Sayyid, Sultan Investment, Engineer Muhammad al-Marakishi's Engineering and Trade Office, al-Huda Misr Investment, Islamic Commercial Real Estate, and New Cairo Investment. Some of those companies submitted their documents in the final week before the deadline. They have 84,907 depositors with deposits of 727,623,227 pounds.

[AL-DUSTUR] There was a fuss about one company against which legal action was taken even though it submitted its documents to the MMA.

[Faj-al-Nur] We did not reject a single company that came forward to settle its affairs. The company in question submitted its documents on the day before the deadline. Its case is still under review by the MMA's board of directors and has not been referred to the prosecutor's office as claimed. The MMA has liquidated only one company, and it can easily continue operations as a stock company on condition that it does not receive deposits.

The Refunds Have Begun

[AL-DUSTUR] Certain companies have actually begun refunding deposits. Is this supervised by the MMA?

[Faj-al-Nur] Companies that submitted a refunding schedule are subject to procedures approved and supervised by the MMA. Twelve such companies have actually begun refunding depositor funds. They are given until next 9 June to refund to 2,970 depositors a total of 21,490,048 pounds.

[AL-DUSTUR] Which companies are these?

[Faj-al-Nur] They are Misr Paints and Chemicals, Islamic Fatah Investment and Development, al-Hadi Trade and Contracts, al-Marwah Packaging, Dar al-Marwah Trade and Packaging, the Rabbit Project, Business and Investment Consultants, WALICO Establishment, Haykal Commerce and Industry, al-Ayman Investment and Development, Muhammad Hasan Mahmud Sallam, and Delta Investment. The new law has been a factor in separating serious companies from those that collected funds through the promise of huge returns. There are no more dreams of high returns ranging from 24 to 36 percent. No real investment in the world can have this kind of return. Hard work, diligence, and sound management are now the only alternatives for growth and contribution to the national economy, while giving depositors high returns that could never reach the aforementioned levels. Depositors must recognize this and realize that the law is there to protect them. Had those companies been allowed to continue operations much longer, deposits would have vanished and depositor funds would have been lost forever.

Companies Outside the Law

There are 33 companies which are yet to resolve their legal position. They have 255,081 depositors with combined deposits of 2,081,021,505 pounds.

The MMA has taken legal action against 19 other companies that did not resolve their status during by the legal deadline. They are Egyptian-Saudi Investment, al-Fadl Investment, five al-Hilal companies, al-Sahiyah Investment, 'Issam's Pharmacy, al-Jadidah Automotive, 'Abd al-Hafiz 'Uthman, al-Nahdah Trade and Contracting, International Center for Water (al-Sahiyah), Ibrahim al-Zuhari, International Establishment for Projects, Egyptian-Aramco, International Integration Information, and al-Salam Investment. They have 12,513 depositors with total deposits of 149,181,000 pounds.

Protection for Depositors

[AL-DUSTUR] Egyptian expatriates worry that companies that did not put their houses in order may not refund their deposits by the 9 Jun 90 deadline.

[Faj-al-Nur] The MMA has laid down the following specific controls and procedures to ensure the reimbursement of depositors:

- No discounts allowed of any amounts previously disbursed to depositors, except for distributions of principals prior to December of 1987. Profits and losses are to be calculated for the period from January

of 1988 to the present and reported to depositors. The amounts due depositors would increase to the extent of profits or be reduced by the amount of losses.

- Companies are to determine the amounts due depositors and notify them of a schedule of repayment. The MMA would approve and oversee that schedule.
- Funds which are not timely withdrawn by their owners are to be put in bank demand deposits and the owners are to be so notified.
- The schedule of repayment is to be published in two daily newspapers of wide circulation.

[AL-DUSTUR] Under the law, approval by the prime minister and the minister of economy is an important and necessary condition for increasing capitalization. What happens if such approval is withheld?

[Faj-al-Nur] In that case, the company must return funds in excess of its legal ceiling and must also prepare a schedule for repaying those excess funds within a year.

Speculation in Gold and Foreign Exchange

[AL-DUSTUR] Investment companies caused a severe crisis in the Egyptian market by their long-time control of liquidity and by transferring depositor funds overseas. Is there anything to protect the market from such risks in the future?

[Faj-al-Nur] The Egyptian council of ministers is currently studying this issue. The tendency is to forbid companies from engaging in domestic or foreign speculation in financial papers, gold, precious metals, foreign exchange, or any other banking activity. This would ensure Egyptian market stability and liquidity, safeguard our foreign exchange resources, and protect the Egyptian pound. I would like to emphasize that the MMA's role will not end with restructuring or reclassifying the companies as previously discussed. Under article 12 of the law, the MMA will keep an eye on these companies and will have the competence to admonish them in writing to remove whatever violations are uncovered. The MMA will also have the competence to appoint an observer as a temporary member of a company's board of directors. In order to protect depositors and safeguard the national economy in case of proven violations, the MMA also has the right to dismantle a board of directors with the approval of the minister of economy.

Article 13 of the law stipulates that a company may be scratched from the MMA's register for proven violations of the law or its by-laws, or for pursuing actions contrary to public policy and morality or harmful to the national economy or to bond holders.

Privately Secured Bonds

[AL-DUSTUR] Investment company depositors will be issued bonds. What are they?

[Faj-al-Nur] A bond, as a financial paper, guarantees the rights of depositors. It is to supply data on the depositor,

amounts deposited, the level of interest, interest payment dates, and methods of regaining the principal. The MMA, in order to protect depositors, has obtained full guarantees including additional guarantees to cover the real amounts of the bonds, secured by the private assets and properties of company owners. But investment companies had requested a transition period for refunding depositor funds in full. Some even requested 10 years. After a thorough study and in order to safeguard the future of these companies and the stability of the Egyptian market, we decided on a four-year transition period at the end of which depositors would have the right to withdraw their deposits in full from companies that restructured or those not affected by law. Companies with specific reimbursement schedules must adhere to them.

Study Surveys Empty Housing Units

900A0023c Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 20 Sep 89 p 5

[Article by Dr Milad Hanna: "1986 Statistics Correct; 1 Million Empty Apartments in Urban Egypt; 800,000 Empty Apartments in Rural Egypt"]

[Text] When some officials raised doubts about the correctness of the announcement that there were 1.8 million empty housing units in Egypt, the Central Bureau of Statistics made a field survey, selecting samples in areas where this phenomenon was widespread. The results of the survey were recorded in a paper published under the title, "1988 Report on Housing Unit Construction." Specific areas were selected in the governorates of Cairo and Alexandria as samples of urban governorates. Other areas were selected according to scientific and statistical evaluation in the Lower Egypt governorates of al-Daqahliyah and al-Sharqiyah and the Upper Egypt governorates of al-Jizah and al-Minya. Let us let the words of the report speak for themselves.

The total housing units in the sample urban areas rose from 31,328 units in the 1986 census to 41,672 units in the "1988 Report on Housing Unit Construction."

In rural areas, the housing units in the sample areas totaled 12,203 units in the 1986 census. This rose to 13,231 units in the 1988 report.

The result of the "1988 Report on Housing Construction" indicated that empty housing units in 1986 in the urban areas of the governorates numbered 16,809, or 53.7 percent of the total housing units in the sample areas. According to preliminary results of the 1986 census, there were 18,348 such units, or 58.6 percent. Thus, there was a decrease of 1,539 units, or 8.4 percent.

In the rural areas, the result of the report indicated that there were 2,639 empty housing units in 1986, or 21.6 percent of the total housing units in the sample rural areas. According to preliminary results of the 1986 census, there were 2,974 such units, or 24.4 percent. Thus, there was a decrease of 335 units, or 11.3 percent.

It became clear that the increase in housing units can be attributed to the appearance of new buildings, while their decrease can be attributed to the razing or removal of some buildings and housing units or to the existence of buildings in the process of completion. The latter were registered in the citizen reports as finished, but empty.

Based on the method of choosing sample areas within the governorates, one can consider the percent of difference between the number of empty housing units in the 1986 census and their number in the 1988 report on housing unit construction as a pointer toward a more correct estimate of the figures on empty housing units in the 1986 census in these areas. (Here ends the text of the paragraphs of the Central Bureau of Statistics report and study.)

In summary, then, the Central Bureau of Statistics, with full scientific reliability and with the neutrality that befits sensitive government agencies, has silenced the mouths of officials at all levels who doubted the figures of the preliminary results of the 1986 census. The number of empty housing units, (i.e., new units that have not been taken possession of or in which there are no household furnishings), was as follows:

- In all of the Egyptian cities there were about 1 million units.
- In all of the Egyptian rural areas and villages there were about 800,000 units.
- In Cairo there were about 250,000 units.
- In Alexandria there were about 100,000 housing units.

The Central Bureau of Statistics was generous and fair. In the 1988 report, it also counted units that had been taken possession of, but which were found to be permanently locked—i.e., those occupied by a family located elsewhere inside or outside the country.

Locked units in urban areas of the sample districts numbered 3,107, or about 26 percent of the empty homes. In rural areas in the sample districts, they numbered 480, or about 24 percent of the empty homes.

If we take these figures merely as indicators and as a random sample according to statistical principles applied by specialists, we can estimate the number of locked units for all of Egypt at approximately 160,000 units in both urban and rural areas.

Thus, we had something over 2 million housing units either empty or locked in 1986. This represents about 20 percent of Egypt's real estate resources. The matter has come to be in need of investigation and examination by all agencies responsible for economic, social, and hence political conditions.

I imagine that if matters continue according to the same pattern, the 1996 census will show that this proportion is increasing and that the crisis is heading toward unknown consequences. The slogan which was raised among the people and which received general acceptance will be

quite correct: We are living in an age of "homes without inhabitants, and inhabitants without homes."

But there is more to be studied in the matter—namely, the social reasons that have led to this phenomenon. The report of the Central Bureau of Statistics presented important indicators. These will be a surprise to the Egyptian people, when we summarize them in the next article.

Peasants' Conference Criticizes Agriculture Policy
900A0026 Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 20 Sep 89 p 5

[Article by Dr 'Ali Nawiji: "On Occasion of Peasants' Conference: Critical Situation of the Egyptian Peasant"]

[Excerpts] A conference on economic reform in the field of agriculture and food security was held in Cairo, between 24 and 26 June 1989, under the chairmanship of Dr Yusuf Wali. University professors and presidents, representatives of diplomatic missions, and representatives of international organizations were invited to the conference. At the opening meeting, the chairman of the conference announced the economic policy that the government will follow in the field of agriculture. As stated by Dr Yusuf Wali, this policy can be outlined as an end to government interference in Egyptian agriculture with regard to production, marketing, and planning. The government will not finance the credit necessary for Egyptian agriculture. It will not interfere in planning crop makeup, as it continued to do for many generations. After 2 years, it will finally leave marketing of all crops to the private sector.

We cannot understand the results that may ensue from this policy unless we clarify certain aspects of Egyptian agriculture at the present time. We shall consider the five main crops: cotton, rice, wheat, corn, and clover. During the growing season about to end, these crops occupied an area of about 8.285 billion feddans. The cost of producing these crops on that area was 3.760 billion Egyptian pounds, taking into account the tax assessment on agricultural land, the 300 million pounds spent by peasants on seeds for this production, the 1.726 million tons of fertilizer (officially priced at 382 million pounds), and the 536 million peasant days of labor (costing 2.144 billion pounds). Also, there was the use of simple mechanization, using irrigation machines and plowing tractors, at a cost of 658 million pounds.

Without credit, the peasant cannot farm and pay this cost. Since 1961, the government has been granting credit to cover the cost of production. [passage omitted]

This year, although agricultural costs were 3.760 billion pounds, the government granted 647 million pounds in credit, an amount not much in excess of the credit offered in 1985, when agricultural costs were about one-third of the present costs. [passage omitted]

The results of applying this policy require no conjecture, nor even the application of the methods of what is

termed "futuology." The recent past is still present in memory. The experience of what has occurred with certain agricultural requirements is an indicator of what we shall encounter. [passage omitted]

If the government leaves trade in agricultural requirements to the private sector, prices will rise so that they drain all of the farmer's production. He will have nothing left to induce him to plant. We have a clear example of this in the fruit and vegetable sector. In the wake of private-sector control of the requirements for vegetable and fruit growing, the kinds of vegetables and fruits have declined. We have lost banana farms; in the coming year we shall lose grape farms.

What if we leave the marketing of our agricultural crops to the private sector? What happened with vegetables will happen with other agricultural crops. Prices for agricultural products will be low until the peasant has sold them; then they will rise for consumers, as is happening with fruits and vegetables. Producers of these crops receive at best only one-third the price the consumer pays—and these are crops that cannot be stored. On the other hand, the traditional agricultural crops that we have mentioned can be stored and will therefore be bought from their producer at the lowest price. The traders will store them for sale to the consumer at the highest price.

What if we leave it to the private sector to provide credit to the peasants? The interest rates for the traditional crops we have mentioned range between 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent. The actual interest rate prevailing in the market is about 20 percent. This is what the peasant will pay. If prices of agricultural requirements rise because the private-sector alone provides them, they will increase even more because of the rise in the interest rate, which has already nearly bankrupted poultry farmers.

What will happen to the industries that depend on the crops we have mentioned—spinning, weaving, rice hulling, and grain milling? What if the new owners of these crops—businessmen—having cornered them, prefer to export them? The result will be collapse and destruction.

The announced agricultural policy was not the result of planning error or bad estimates. Rather, it is a policy that is being planned for and pushed for by new social forces. These forces grew up during the period of the Open Door Policy and are represented by the Businessmen's Union. Leading them is the most ruthless and impulsive of these groups, the Alexandria group. These do not want manufacturing or production; they want speculation and exorbitant profit by means of this speculation. Buying the public sector does not attract them (see their statements in AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, 21 August 1989). They see the prospect of an easy and sure killing. The numbers we have quoted make their lips drool and their mouths water. The cost of production could double, and it would go into their pockets. The price for this year's production, estimated at about 6.451 billion pounds, could drop

greatly. Their profits would increase, and agriculture would become a heavy burden on the peasant. [passage omitted]

Column Calls Mubarak Best Leader To Reunify Egypt, Sudan

90A0024a Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 18 Sep 89 p 6

[Article by al-Hamzah Da'bis, Court of Cassation lawyer and Liberal Party Attorney: "Mubarak and Setting Things Right"]

[Text] With God's help, the ruler most capable of restoring the single nature of Egypt and Sudan may be President Husni Mubarak—may God strengthen him, and guide us and him to the application of God's law. Fair winds have blown upon him now that Africa has unanimously chosen him chairman of the African summit conference, because of his important position in Africa and the wisdom of his foreign policy. One need not mention the coming to power, in Sudan, of Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir, who has expressed sincere respect and great love for Egypt and the Egyptians and for President Husni Mubarak, who was the first person he visited outside Sudan and with whom he consulted.

President Mubarak has reciprocated his love. Before going to Addis Ababa, he visited Sudan to express the mutual love and glorious bonds between the Sudanese and the Egyptian people, and to complete the consultations and discussions that began in Egypt. There was nothing strange about the signs of mutual understanding surrounding the conference, or about the great affection that restored matters to their natural state, after the sky of Egyptian-Sudanese relations had become clouded, for personal reasons with which the Egyptian-Sudanese people had absolutely nothing to do.

All talk of reasons for the natural unity between the two countries is superfluous and need not be repeated. Sudan was torn from Egypt on the pretext of independence. In reality, it was separation. It was a colonialist trick that fooled the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir—may God have mercy upon him. The Sudanese people were granted a plebiscite to choose between two things: Egyptian rule or independence. It was natural to choose independence. Had the plebiscite expressed the truth—unity or separation—the Sudanese people would not have hesitated to choose unity.

Fortunately, the elements of a return to a single nature—not to say unity—for the people of Egypt and Sudan have been augmented by yet another element of success, that can be ascribed first to God's grace and then to President Husni Mubarak. This element is the clear relationship linking him to John Garang, who has split from Sudan. I discovered this link during my presence in Khartoum, this April. I met Mr al-Sadiq al-Mahdi at that time, and sat with him in the company of six people from Arab countries. I learned that President Mubarak was behind

the agreement between Mr al-Mirghani and John Garang. This information was confirmed after the Revolution of Salvation.

In this political climate, it is possible to establish an Egyptian-Sudanese federal union, including both the northern and southern halves of Sudan. First, it would erase the separation between Egypt and Sudan, and second the split between the North and the South in Sudan. It would have a single president. We do not doubt that in the current stage of affairs this will be President Husni Mubarak, the leading personality in the African movement. There would be three prime ministers: one in Egypt, the second in the north of Sudan, and the third in the south of Sudan. This union would have a single foreign ministry, a central agriculture ministry, a joint interior ministry, and a defense ministry that would include the entire union. It would also have single finance and justice ministries.

By God's grace alone, this unified country would possess such factors of strength as a dense population provided by Egypt, extensive agricultural land provided by Sudan, and stable security in which Egypt has excelled. This extension has existed throughout history, from Pharaonic times, through the time of the Islamic state and the age of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha and his dynasty, until the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir—may God have mercy upon him—demolished it. It remains for President Mubarak, who says that he is an extension of the 23 July Revolution, to erase this blemish from it and to restore right and justice.

I do not believe that saying this is strange for an age of large entities. The proposed union is a long step on the road to mutual cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the countries of the Arab Cooperation Council. It could link them in preparation for Arab unity. The latter can be considered a penultimate step toward the Islamic unity whereby we shall regain glories that are our right—a right we exercised with strength and ability until early last century. It is time for right to prevail again and for the sword to return to its scabbard. He who is in earnest finds. He who sows reaps. He who travels on the road arrives.

Article Questions Motives of Foreign Agriculture Companies

45040534 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 19 Sep 89 p 2

[Article by Ahmad Sha'ban]

[Text] A new stratagem for foreign penetration into Egypt's depth is called "agricultural products export companies." These companies have appeared in the heart of the Egyptian countryside, in an picture of agricultural activity through which some of them are pursuing a hellish plan to destroy the Egyptian countryside, specifically agriculture, and fan the price fires even more. These companies rent agricultural land at high fees from fellahs [peasants] and use it, according to their claims, to raise vegetables for export. They are also

purchasing all of the vegetables and seed in the markets, thereby causing a damaging price war and striking the achilles heel of small farmers and employees, after obtaining the keys to the markets in the villages through their permanent stations planted among the fellahs.

In addition, these companies are collecting detailed information on commercial conditions, prices of commodities, and the customs, traditions, and lifestyles of fellahs, thus arousing suspicion of spying and scheming to strike the achilles heel of the Egyptian countryside. This is especially true in their attempts to mix with rural society through their wives, who walk semi-naked in the streets of the villages, and through their organization of free trips to the beaches, during which young men and women and naked women are together, which constitutes a grave danger to the morality of the countryside and its conservative traditions.

This is precisely what is happening in the village of Kafr Barash (20,000) in al-Sharqiyah, where there is a foreign company, whose name we will withhold. This company, which has an Egyptian partner, specializes in the cultivation, production, and export of vegetables.

It has rented 50 feddans from a large landowner in the village on the agricultural road for the purpose—according to the landowner—of exporting vegetables abroad to bring in hard currency and create new employment opportunities at reasonable wages, (120 Egyptian pounds per month), for youth, especially graduates of schools and universities.

While landowners focused the conversation on this point regarding the goals of the company, they refused to talk about the company's nature and origin, the beginning of their relationship with it, and its particular circumstances. They were content to state that "we have a verbal, unwritten agreement with it. We are free to rent or plant our land, or leave it fallow. This is our business. Why then are you exhausting yourself. The procedure is no secret. The state, with all of its agencies, knows everything!"

Among the Fellahs

In an attempt to discover the truth about what is happening, we hastened to the quarters of the village to meet with the people—the fellahs, the simple people—who affirmed that it would be wonderful and unobjectionable if the company's goal were limited to bringing in hard currency to the country and employing villagers. However, that is a screen for a plan being carried out to destroy the countryside's economy and morals and thus starve it out.

Price War

Muhammad Abu-Sulayman, an Arab studies examiner at al-Azhar University who is from the village stated: "We were surprised by these foreigners among us. They have been renting agricultural land from the large landowners for a year and 3 months at double the rate at which small fellahs rent it—in other words, 1,200 Egyptian pounds in

cash instead of the 600 Egyptian pounds which small fellahs have been paying to landowners in installments.

"We have noticed that the foreigners are planting vegetables, said to be for export, on all of the 100 feddans which they are renting in the area. We have also observed them gathering vegetables from the municipality's market and the neighboring seven villages, in which 100,000 people live. This has fueled an increase in vegetable prices, such that the price of a head of lettuce is now 50 piasters, up from 5 piasters!

"This is happening at a time when we have seen the foreigners throwing vegetables grown by them into drainage ditches and onto the roads neighboring the rented lands."

Seed Crisis

Muhammad Khalil, an employee, adds that their collection of vegetables from the markets at the highest prices was aimed at encouraging the fellahs to plant vegetables on their land instead of wheat and durra, so that the fellahs would fall between the jaws of the bread crisis. The foreigners went so far as to propose to a wise fellah named Sulayman, as well as to many fellahs, that he lease them five feddans of his land, which was sown with unharvested wheat. They then asked him to "mow" the wheat and toss it onto the road in order to clear the land for vegetable cultivation in exchange for the payment of all indemnities. However, the clever fellah refused, because wheat provides nourishment to the people, and it is forbidden to waste it. However, they succeeded in this in neighboring towns!

All of this has led to an insane increase in seed prices, especially wheat, durra, and rice seed prices, which has tightened the stranglehold on rural residents and employees with small agricultural plots, who subsist by buying and cultivating grain seed.

Life Is Hell

When I asked villager Umm-al-Hana her opinion of the foreigners, she stated: "May God destroy their homes. I know what their love for us is here. States have strangled us. They have drained away our life and made it hell with sky-high prices. They have leased the land and been tightfisted toward the poor fellahs who were renting to them, because they are sowing it with durra and grain and making bread for their families. Life is hell, my son, because of them. An ardabb [198 liters] of wheat costs 80 pounds, after being 60, durra costs 70 pounds after being 35 pounds, a sack of rice costs 150 pounds after being 80 pounds. Even a can of durra, which was 70 piasters, sells for 150 piasters."

Collection of Information

The same thing was said by S. Z., a commercial store owner in the village, who asserted: "When these foreigners began their activity, three of them, accompanied by a private interpreter, toured the village to collect

comprehensive information on the types of cultivation being carried out. They also investigated the commercial operations being carried out between the village and the seven, small, surrounding villages.

"They visited me personally and asked me about the prices of goods in my store, specifically seed!"

He asked derisively: "Did they tour the village to make sure of the health and safety of its inhabitants, or because they are plotting against us! The process is as clear as day!"

It is odd that, for a number of years, the cotton crop rotation has not applied to the land which the foreigners have rented, even though cotton crop revenues are a basic national income component. The small fellah who owns $\frac{1}{2}$ feddan is, by the anvil of the law, fined 50 pounds per feddan if he violates the rotation.

We Have No Power Over Them!

A local council member asked Engineer Abu-al-Fattuh, the administrative director of agriculture at Mashtul to which this land is subordinate, whether the agriculture administration had taken measures regarding the violation of the agricultural rotation on this land (50 feddans) while it writes official reports on small farmers in violation!

His response was that the owners of the land in violation gave the agricultural administration 50 alternative feddans from another area. Notwithstanding, he pretends to have forgotten that the agricultural rotation turn for this alternative land will come because it is in none other than Egypt!

When a number of village youth raised this matter again in discussions with the agriculture director, he responded that the foreigners' activity is not his concern and that he has no power to enforce compliance with the agricultural rotation!

Hard Averages

A fellah of Kafr Barash, who is a natural agricultural expert, asks how the production of a feddan of the land rented to foreigners could possibly cover the enormous expenditures made for it. Rent alone is 1,200 pounds. The foreigners also raised laborers' wages, so that a laborer harvesting okra earns 120 pounds per month. How much more is spent on the salaries of fellahs and foremen, insecticides, equipment, irrigation, and other needs? Can any crop in the world cover all of these expenses, even if it is exported?!

Dr Hasan Ramadan, a professor at the agricultural college, who is from the village, emphasizes that if we concede that cultivation of the land rented to the foreigners covers their costs and more, it would be beneficial if these expenses were changed from dollars into pounds through the bank to benefit the state treasury. Then, planting this land with field crops (wheat, durra, and cotton), would spare the extensive use of insecticides

required by vegetables, thus sparing the environment and humans from exposure to pollution and public health dangers.

Moreover, wheat, durra, and cotton yield the same return as that of vegetables in relation to the state. This is clear regarding the cotton crop. A simple calculation shows that the average production of a cotton crop is 8 kantars (1 kantar = 55 kg of raw, unprocessed cotton)). Consequently, the quantity of raw, unprocessed cotton from a feddan is $8 \times 55 = 440$ kg. If the price of a kilogram of exported spun thread is \$4, the income from a feddan would be $\$4 \times 440$ kg of unprocessed cotton, which yields \$1,760.

We can thus say that a fellah who plants one feddan of cotton supports the state with about \$1,000. Are those who plant vegetables supporting the state treasury in the same way?

How is it conceivable that small farmers support the state while large landowners help only themselves, whereas everyone benefits equally from the state's subsidization of goods, food, and education?!

Destruction of Morals

The worst of it is that the process has not stopped at fueling price increases, but has transcended that to threaten the morals of rural youth with destruction and to include spying on the village. Since these foreigners came to the village, they have rented two apartments in it, states M. L., a teacher. Their wives, in a semi-naked state, accompanied them on numerous tours of the village on the pretext of becoming familiar with the countryside's landmarks.

Their wives began to mix with the village women in an attempt to gain their favor and share in their social life so as to find out about everything in our homes. After a while, they stopped living in the village and lived in another place! These are tricks of the Jews, even if they came in the form of other nationalities.

The biggest calamity is that they organized mixed-gender trips for the young men and women who work with them—most of whom have diplomas and certificates of qualification—on the pretext of recreation. These included trips to Cairo, al-Fayyum, and finally to the Jamsah summer resort, which was organized for the two days of the blessed Feast of Immolation. During the Jamsah trip, a vehicle accident occurred, resulting in the death of the company's translator, two drivers, and an unidentified person. When the al-Qanayat Hospital near Zaqaqiy made inquiries, the owners of the company and their charge d'affaires refused to take any responsibility for the trip to avoid having to pay damages!

On the morning of the accident, the village awakened in great dismay, faced by an even greater question: How is it that a girl from the conservative countryside goes on trips during which she spends a full day in mixed company?!. Moreover, how is it that she goes to a beach

at which men and naked women mix, and spends an entire day on the pretext of recreation at the beaches with male traveling companions?! The angry words stream forth from the villagers who are in an uproar over this situation. Abu-Sa'id, a fellah, states: The work of the Jews—they want to steal our religion and morals from us, and deplete us so that we live as wanderers!

A youth who works for the foreign company, who refuses to give his name lest his livelihood be cut off, states with difficulty: If they were actually concerned with our welfare, why do they not ensure us under social security, for example. We work with them and we are in the hands of the devil. One can be fired at any instant. We have worked with them on a fixed-rate basis alone!

The Rapid Spread Has Begun

The company has not been satisfied to concentrate on Kafr Barash, but has extended its activity to other neighboring villages, where it has rented similar land from large landowners in Sinnahwa and Kafr Suhbi in al-Sharqiyah and in Kafr Sa'd and Tukh in al-Qalyubiyah to repeat in them what it has done in Kafr Barash.

Is Agricultural Minister Dr Yusuf Wali aware of the true facts concerning this company, especially inasmuch as those dealing with it disclose that everything is done under his supervision and in implementation of his orders?

Are the governors aware of the sudden danger which has begun to gnaw at the bones of our countryside?

Finally, we have presented this dangerous picture from inside our countryside before it gains ground. It remains for anyone desiring confirmation to visit the countryside to talk with its inhabitants and see the facts for himself!

Editorial Says Prices To Blame if People Revolt

900A10024b Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 20 Sep 89 p 1

[Editorial: "Price Inflation and the Poverty of Policy"]

[Text] The crime of raising prices continues. Preparations are being made in Washington. In a few days, the next episode in the series of negotiations between the Egyptian government and the IMF will begin. During the negotiations, agreement will be reached on the economic measures that must take place for Egypt to continue the course of borrowing, postponing debt repayment, and searching for financial equilibrium.

The most important measure proposed is to increase the price of a group of commodities and services, as AL-AHALI has indicated at the top of this page. These increases range from a loaf of bread, government-supported food and clothing, to transportation, telephone, and electricity services, and other things. The government is preparing for another jump in prices. It is preparing in two ways: in the area of economics and

gaining international and "debt fund" approval, and in the area of security; for the hungry people will have to be repressed and intimidated.

The government wants to raise prices and fears the reaction.

This explains the arrest campaigns, trumped-up charges, and "public" prison crimes intended to intimidate those active in politics who are sounding the alarm before the government and the masses.

Oppression is at once comprehensible and unacceptable. What is incomprehensible is for the government not to try to find another economic way out of the bottle-neck of submission, constant price increases, and encroaching upon the support of the poor in order to support the rich. It is incomprehensible for the recommendations of the economic conference, which the president convened early in his term, to remain unimplemented, and for the second scheduled conference to be continually kept pending and suspended. It is incomprehensible for the government not to listen to the views of patriotic experts from all political directions. We ask, for example, whether you have read the studies by the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping] and its experts—high-ranking economists who hold international or academic posts or who formerly held ministerial posts in Egypt? Have you tried to discuss the experiment of self-reliance, instead of the IMF prescription? Have you studied the proposals that others put forward?

Danger besets Egypt from all sides. Poverty and anger are increasing. Do not become angry when the masses rise in revolt. The one to be indicted for agitation and revolt is the government.

Columnist Protests Applying Emergency Law to Journalists

45040526a Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 6 Sep 89 p 10

[Commentary by Philip Jallab: "The Protector and the Thief"]

[Text] Last week we did not imagine that the arrest of the educated, the workers, and the politicians was more than a "war of attrition" which the government sometimes wages against those who think or read in this country—irresponsible government measures which the prosecution or the court usually rectify.

We have been trying to understand the political and psychological motives that prompt the government to invent imaginary secret organizations and to choose members for these organizations from among its opponents or those it believes are its opponents. When a government in a multiparty system lacks a majority party or even just a party, it sees in every opponent a dangerous party threatening its existence. As we already said, it also sees the "Central Security" [forces] as the only party on which it relies.

Previously in this column we have defended the right of both our opponents and friends "from all religions and persuasions", even those accused of armed terror, to be treated in accordance with the law, and demanded that under no condition should their dignity be violated. We can hardly believe what we hear about the violation of dignity, and physical and moral torture.

Last week I saw with my own eyes the "rule of law" and manifestations of "respecting human rights" on the bodies and morales of my colleagues Dr Mumhammad al-Sayyid Sa'id, expert at the al-Ahram Strategic Studies Center, Midhat al-Zayid, and Mustafa al-Sa'id of AL-AHALI. I have also heard about others—lawyers, engineers, politicians, and workers.

We have heard how scores of prison wardens and officers, as well as the Central Security and the State Security Intelligence, gang up against unarmed citizens inside their cells and beat them with sticks and hands and kick them with their feet for no reason at all, not even because of a heated argument. As for the obscenities heaped on these citizens, they are something that we have not heard even from the lowliest of the lowly criminals.

You said that standard laws are insufficient to deter armed terror. You also said that the emergency law is the only deterrent to terrorists. You have applied the emergency law against citizens who throughout their lives used nothing more than paper and pen. Does the emergency law also provide for beating, torture, abuse, the violation of people's dignity, and insulting their fathers and mothers?

Under what law, custom, or tradition may these scores of "thugs", in official uniform or in civilian clothes, be used to single out citizens—who are denied even prisoner's rights—in order to practice on them the type of "bravery" for which these species that lack manly characters are known?

Is there nobody who would bow his head in shame from these disgraceful actions and bring their perpetrators to account without the need of prosecution, investigation, and judiciary trials? Is there nobody who wants to save the honor of this government, some of whose men have put its reputation in the mud before the public opinion and the whole world?

There is not a single justification for a policeman to insult any citizen, regardless of his educational standard or the charges leveled against him.

Meanwhile, the brave gentlemen who try to devour the peaceful citizens become angels and obedient servants to the veteran criminals and major drug smugglers. Should the citizen be a cocaine dealer or should he violate the public law so that he can live in dignity and honor in our jails and enjoy the services of security men and the law enforcers?

Of course, the task of the prosecution and the judiciary will be extremely difficult, since all cards can be settled because "the thief is the protector"—all the cards are in his hands. But nothing can make up for what the regime loses and has in fact lost because of its harsh treatment of the citizens. All the Central Security forces or the central "beating" cannot protect the reputation and honor of a regime that remains silent over violating its citizens' dignity.

The brains of some of those around the ship's helm are politically empty and devoid of wisdom. They are filled with sticks and whips. Such people are capable of sinking the most powerful ship in a few inches of water.

Unless those criminals are punished in accordance with the law to which they pay lip service, the ship shall sink. There is no government that is stronger than a wronged people.

ISRAEL

High Court Considers Custody of Dome of the Rock Antiquities

44230167 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
21 Jul 89 p 5B

[Text] Gershon Solomon, a veteran toreador in the dangerous arena of the Temple Mount, smelled chances for success this time, after innumerable defeats. Solomon wagered and, apparently, also won at least a propaganda victory, if not more than that. Two weeks ago, at the end of three years of deliberations, the High Court of Justice gave three months to the mayor of Jerusalem, the director of the Antiquities Branch, and the Legal Advisor to the Government, in order to decide whether they intend to bring to trial or to take legal measures against the Supreme Moslem Council, on the basis of the material in the hands of the police and other official bodies, for violating the planning, construction, and antiquities laws on the Temple Mount. In the course of the deliberations, the state confirmed for the first time the allegations of the "Temple Mount Loyalists" that there was justification for the famous tours of Knesset members during the last 2 years.

In a cursory glance, High Court of Justice 193/86 appears to be a passing episode in the struggle of the "Temple Mount Loyalists". But that appeal did not deal this time with the Jews' right to pray in the area of the Mount or with the possibility of realizing that right. Appeals of that sort were submitted innumerable times since the 6-Day War, and all of them were rejected. This time, the appellants tried to force the state authorities to enforce Israeli law on the Temple Mount, which is a de facto Palestinian autonomy—something that has not yet been done.

In the preliminary correspondence, prior to the appeal, most of the recipients denied the allegations of violations of the law on the site. Dr Asher Kaufman, a physicist by

profession, was the only basis for the appeal. Attorney Moshe Drori and the Solomon group started out with him. The allegations of the amateur archaeologist, which were the factual basis for the appeal, painted a picture of construction and renovation activities without a permit, the destruction and defacing of Jewish relics and monuments on the area of the Mount, with the Waqf orchestrating everything.

Kaufman, who has been engaged for years in research on the Temple Mount, presented a list of tens of Jewish sites, which, he alleged, had been destroyed by the Waqf in recent years or had been covered with earth or concrete. Kaufman did not argue that the Waqf had committed these acts with malice aforethought. On one occasion, he even took pains to note that he does not necessarily identify with the basic aims of the "Temple Mount Loyalists."

The most important archaeological journal in the world, *BIBLICAL ARCHEOLOGY REVIEW* [as published], devoted a giant main article to Kaufman's allegations that included four pairs of photographs. An ancient Jewish site appears in each pair—before the defacing, in one photo, and after the defacing in the other. Even a near-sighted person would have a hard time not seeing the differences.

In an editorial in the same issue, the editor wrote, *inter alia*: "It's quite evident that no excavation should be allowed on the Temple Mount except by a qualified archaeologist....Only after an archaeologist completes his work—and if no ancient remains are found on the site—will it be possible to use the area for another purpose....Needless to say, bulldozers should not be allowed to work in the area of the Temple Mount....Antiquities should not be removed without the approval of an archaeologist, and even then only after the antiquities have been examined, photographed, and documented....Approved experts should be given access to every part of the Temple Mount at appropriate times and with prior notice....Israel has not only the right, but also the obligation to verify that this will be the situation. The archaeological finds on the Temple Mount belong neither to Israel nor to the Moslem authorities. They belong to all mankind, and not only to this generation."

A Description That Is Blacker Than Black

From the factual viewpoint, the reply to the High Court of Dan Bahat, the Jerusalem District Archaeologist for the Ministry of Education, was surprising. The state, so it appears, does not deny a large part of the facts that are described by the "Temple Mount Loyalists" in the appeal. But the district archaeologist is not ready to adopt "the blacker than black description and the exaggeration that emerges from the allegations." Bahat stresses that "as with other broad parts of ancient Jerusalem, the Temple Mount is also an antiquities site according to Paragraph 7 of the Antiquities Law (...) given that the Antiquities Branch certainly is very interested in what goes on at the Temple Mount, and I cannot say that I am

satisfied with everything that is done there. It is also correct that things are being done on the Temple Mount without the said permits in Para 29(a) and (c) of the Antiquities Law (...)" (from the responding affidavit of the Antiquities Branch to the High Court)

At the beginning of 1987, Bahat estimated, in a memorandum to the High Court, that he and the Branch had a very clear picture of what was going on in the area of the Mount, but that the contact between him and the Waqf "is not a formal, official, or orderly contact, and it is not possible, as was mentioned, to say that it meets all the requirements of the Antiquities Law (...)" As a scholar, Bahat declares to the Court, "I would find it difficult to confirm unequivocally that a clear hostile tendency on the part of the Waqf as alleged in the appeal has indeed been proven. (...) We are not entirely unaware of what goes on at the Temple Mount. Violations of the Antiquities Law are certainly being committed there. We certainly are not happy (...) about much of what is being done there. But there is still a gap, to the best of my knowledge, between the descriptions of the appellants and reality."

Bahat reveals to the High Court that non-Jewish relics also have been damaged on the Temple Mount. For example, a structure from the 14th century that was built from the remains of Crusader construction, known as the Dome of the Dikduk. In another place, the archaeologist specifies, in the northern part, in the Makkam el-Hadr, a generator was placed on the lowest floor and a medieval structure was damaged. "The Antiquities Law does not distinguish between 'Jewish' and other antiquities....To sum up, what goes on at the Temple Mount is not entirely unknown to us, violations of the Antiquities Law are certainly being committed, we certainly are not happy, to put it mildly, but there is still a gap, to my best estimation, between the descriptions of the appellants and reality."

Another part of the appeal spells out violations of the Planning and Construction Law (mainly the construction of prayer platforms without a permit). The appellants requested that the mayor of Jerusalem be compelled to sign administrative condemnation orders, and even to carry them out, exactly as the Municipality does everywhere else in Jerusalem, while the Temple Mount is not just "everywhere else." Teddy Kollek tried to convince the justices "that attention should not be focused narrowly on the legal aspect of violation of statutes of planning and construction, but that attention be paid to other aspects, mainly the political aspect and everything connected with it. [no closing quotation marks] "The problem of enforcing the planning and construction statutes on the Temple Mount does not stand alone, but is enmeshed in a tangled and complex system of difficult, delicate, and complex questions," Kollek wrote.

The Legal Advisor to the Government, Yosef Harish, submitted a 14-page affidavit to the High Court, in which he wrote, *inter alia*: "It would be best for this

entire subject to be handled on the 'arranging' governmental level rather than on the 'deciding' judicial level—even when the governmental treatment does not always seem to be sufficient, and even when, as it were, there occasionally "appears" not to be any governmental treatment at all... There may be policy considerations regarding the material of the sensitive holy places, which are such as to dictate to the Government great caution and a slowing of the pace of the treatment, and even the cessation of the treatment from time to time." Harish quotes Justice Witkon in High Court 188/77: "Regarding the deliberation at the government level—as opposed to the deliberation at the judicial level—I can imagine cases where the sit-and-do-nothing approach is entirely appropriate and legitimate. After all, this is one of the things that characterizes the deliberation on the political level, as opposed to the judicial deliberation. The former can take into account considerations of a decision that is liable to hinder relations with another state, and it may be that on the government level it is both desirable and permissible to refrain from it."

This, argues Harish, holds here, as well: "As the slow, very flexible, characteristically diplomatic, and not-according-to-the-strict-letter-of-the-law pace of the authorities' handling of the subject of the appeal is based upon political considerations, as were spelled out, the esteemed Court will not see fit to intervene." Harish's central argument, supported by many legal citations, was for a finding of nonjudgeable. The command of the Royal Proclamation was the basis upon which the Legal Advisor to the Government relied in his arguments: "In view of what is written in Paragraph 2 of the Royal Proclamation on Palestine (Holy Places) 1924, the Court does not have the authority to intervene in the matter, and, therefore, the appeal must be rejected."

After 9 months had passed, this High Court ruling made a little history. For the first time since the 6-Day War, the members of the Moslem Waqf broke a vow that they had made. Tens of them—sheikhs, preachers, and guards of the El-Aksa Mosque—came, dressed in their traditional robes and wearing red tarbooshes, to a hearing of the High Court, after it had decided to add them as respondents to the appeal.

They refused to relate to the thrust of the assertions. Attorney Jamal Abu To'ema argued before the judges that the court did not have any authority to hear the appeal, because the area that is the subject of the appeal—the Temple Mount, like all of East Jerusalem—is still Jordanian sovereign territory. The High Moslem Council, declared To'ema, does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

Temple Mount as a Jewish Center

This argument was taken furthest by Sheikh Sa'ad el-Din el-Alami, the chief of the High Moslem Council, who asserted full and exclusive ownership over the right and the sovereignty in the place. "The realization of the goals of the appellants, the 'Temple Mount Loyalists,' and

acceptance of all or part of their demands, would doubtlessly cause a religious struggle, whose dangers to the principle of maintaining public peace and order cannot be determined by anyone," the sheikh added.

"To the best of my knowledge," the Mufti declared, "every non-Moslem secular administration that ruled in Jerusalem for hundreds of years honored a basic principle: not to undermine the separate powers of the Moslem religious authority appointed over the Holy Places, and not to intervene in its actions and in matters within its authority." Sheikh Alami explained that he did not wish to refute each and every point in the appellants' assertions, so as not to enter into a debate with them, especially as "the intentions of the appellants and their aim is not the fulfillment of the instructions of the Antiquities Law or police orders. Their declared goal is to turn the Temple Mount into a Jewish religious center, and to that end they are using the aforementioned laws to achieve their goals." This principled position of the Waqf, which denies Israeli sovereignty and, consequently, also the authority of the court, did not make life easy for their attorney, Abu To'ema, in court.

The judges asked frequently if the Waqf were ready to deviate a bit from the hard line that it took.

Justice Aharon Barak: "Both the Jerusalem Municipality and the Antiquities Branch noted that there are violations of the Planning and Construction Law and also of the Antiquities Law...."

Abu To'ema: "Only repairs were involved, and I am not willing to undertake that in the future I will do nothing there. We are the sovereign there on the basis of the Jordanian Law."

Justice Shlomo Levin: "Let's assume that a complaint is received by the police that you are going to erect a skyscraper there. Shouldn't the police investigate the complaint?"

Abu To'ema: "There is also reason and probability, and there is a difference between repairs and a skyscraper."

Justice Barak: "But shouldn't there be an investigation whether you indeed intend to erect a skyscraper there?"

Abu To'ema: "We did not prevent anyone from entering the Mount."

Justice Barak asked over and over whether the Waqf would agree to a police investigation of the complaint that was the subject of the appeal. Abu To'ema formulated his answer several times, but gave Barak to understand that the Waqf would not cooperate with the police in such an investigation.

Barak continues to press: "What is your position regarding a visit by the Court to the site?"

Abu To'ema: "I also oppose a visit by the justices to the Temple Mount, if the intention is to investigate what is asserted in the appeal. I am not willing to debate the

issue itself with you. My arguments are on principles. You have no authority to judge on this case."

Barak (somewhat surprised): "The gentleman opposes a visit by the justices regarding this case within the framework of the appeal?"

Abu To'ema: "I certainly am opposed."

It was difficult not to get the impression that the deliberations in the High Court on this matter were a bit discomfiting to the justices, not to speak of the state's representative, Attorney Renato Yarek. More than once, the justices—Aharon Barak, Shlomo Levin, and Eliahu Winograd—made various proposals to the appellants, in an attempt to satisfy them and bring about the withdrawal of the appeal, and for more than a short time. The appellants' representative, Attorney Moshe Drori, would not relent.

At one stage, the justices asked Harish to present to them quickly his final position "regarding the policy of the various authorities and the criteria for actions in everything pertaining to the Antiquities Law and the Planning and Construction Law on the Temple Mount." In a document not presented until a year later, there was no mention of the central assertion on the main points of the argument that had been submitted at the beginning of the deliberations regarding nonjudgeability. Harish wrote instead—and, it seems, for the first time, explicitly: "In principle, the area of the Temple Mount is part of the territory of the State of Israel. According to the Basic Law, Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and the law of the state of Israel prevails there, according to the Ordinance of Government and Law, 5726-1967. Within this framework, the antiquities Law, 5738-1978, and the Planning and Construction Law, 5725-1965 also prevail on the area of the Temple Mount."

Interreligious Strife

However, Harish notes that it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that in everything regarding the Temple Mount, the situation is very special. "It is not at all easy to reconcile the unshakeable principle regarding the imposition of Israeli law...with the 'pragmatic' considerations that stem unavoidably from the extraordinary character of this special site. The authorities concerned must desire that the law be obeyed, without being drawn into actions that are liable to ignite a conflagration of interreligious and international strife, whose end no one could foresee."

Harish specified for the first time a procedure according to which the Local Planning Committee of the Jerusalem Municipality and the Antiquities Branch would exercise "current supervision over what is done on the Temple Mount, including on-site visits and the receipt of reports, including police reports, so that these bodies would have an up-to-date picture of everything concerning the observance of the planning and antiquities laws on the Temple Mount. They would report to the Legal Advisor to the government through their legal advisors, whenever a

serious and substantial violation of the planning or the antiquities law was discovered, according to each case.

"In judging what is a violation that requires a report to the Legal Advisor to the government, those factors that have been given responsibility for the subject will take into account: the extent of the violation, the kind of construction or the activity that was carried out there, the extent of the damage to the value protected by the law and the possibility of preventing the damage to the protected value without resorting to criminal procedures." Harish also instructed that "neither the local committee, nor the district committee, nor the Antiquities Branch, nor the police will take any action to enforce the law, including demolition or the issuing of a condemnation order, the collection of notices, arrests, or indictments, without prior coordination with the Legal Advisor to the government."

On the site itself, the Waqf has frozen several jobs that it had planned to carry out. The reason became clear after the fact. At one of the hearings, the state's representative, Attorney Renato Yarek, requested to reveal to the High Court a written report on a rare meeting between Israeli officials and the members of the Waqf. The document, which was written by the legal advisor to the Jerusalem Municipality, Attorney Shabtai Ziv, included almost everything that the appellants, the "Temple Mount Loyalists," had requested from the state, except bringing persons to trial.

Ziv reported to Dorit Beinisch on the wording of the warning that had been transmitted to the Waqf, which was as follows: "We find it proper to point out to you that we cannot accept that the instructions regarding the said subjects, which obligate all citizens and residents of Israel, and are in force everywhere including the Holy Places, will not be honored by you. Lack of care in obeying the law, in everything concerning the activities being carried out on the Temple Mount, is liable to intensify the tension and exacerbate the relations between the various religions. Therefore, you are requested to act in everything connected with the works being carried out on the Temple Mount within the framework of the relevant laws, and in that way there will be no need to take legal measures against you, as required where there is a violation of the law."

Now, after 3 years of on-and-off wrangling in the High Court of Justice, the justices found that the material in the file "is ripe for the determination of the Legal Advisor to the government as to bringing persons to trial." They instructed Harish to notify them by the end of September of his decision. The justices also gave 3 months to Amir Drori, the chief of the Antiquities Branch, in order to decide to use his authority according to Paragraph 31 of the Antiquities Law. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, was also asked to reconsider within the same period if there was no reason to use the Planning and Construction Law on the Temple Mount.

A negative decision by these three factors or any one of them will, apparently, bring about the resumption of

hearings in the High Court. "If the appellants find it proper," the justices wrote, "they may submit a new appeal. That appeal would be heard by Chief Justice Aharon Barak, and would be given precedence. The appellants may attach as part of the appeal the material that was submitted to us."

[Box, p 5B] The List of Injuries

In the list that the "Temple Mount Loyalists" attached to their appeal, the following injuries are listed inter alia:

- The remnants of a thick wall, the northern wall of the outer courtyard of the First Temple, were covered with earth.
- Large stone tiles of a basin from the Herodian period were covered with earth.
- The remnants of a thick wall, identified as part of the Arab wall of the Temple Mount, were covered with earth.
- Two remnants of a thick wall made of hewn stones were destroyed during the excavation of a trench.
- The foundation of the northern wall of the Ezra which is in the Second Temple. Other remnants of a thick wall, also built of hewn stones, from the foundations of the northern wall of the Second Temple, were also destroyed during the excavation of a trench.
- During the excavations of a trench for the foundations of the new prayer platform, part of the water conduit that had been discovered by Shick 100 years ago was uncovered. The Waqf filled the exposed part of the conduit with concrete.
- Covered or destroyed: The remnants of a wall about 5 meters thick, built of rough stone, the remnants of a round structure, distinguished by the different kind of vegetation around it, on which a path was paved.
- The archaeologist Dan Bahat noted in the past a few more examples: The pavement of all the northern portion of the expanse that was hewn in the Herodian period, and the sealing "beyond recognition," in his words, of the Triple Gate, one of the two Gates of Hulda, through which pilgrims entered during the Second Temple Period. "Next to the Triple Gate, they filled part of the steps with earth and covered it with floor tiles," Bahat added. According to him, some of the actions of the Waqf can be undone—that is, the former situation can be restored by removing the covering. As for the rest, which was destroyed—nothing can be restored.

Politics, Ideologies of Journalists Covering Territories

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[Article by Ya'ir Lapid: "Our Correspondent in the Territories Reports"]

[Text] In May 1988, Avino'am Bar-Yosef, MA'ARIV's reporter in the territories, arrived at the Rome airport to catch the flight to Tel Aviv. He walked around in the

duty-free shop looking for gifts for his children, and then heard someone shout out his name. Behind him stood Ihram Haniya, a former source and a friend, the editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper EL-SHA'AB, who was deported in 1986 on the recommendation of Rabin, apparently due to concern that he would harm the Israel-Jordan dialogue.

After embracing, Haniya said, "Come, your flight takes off at 1:20, we have time for coffee." Avino'am was fearful for a moment. He knew that, since he was deported, Haniya had become one of the persons closest to Arafat. "What's up," he asked himself, "Haniya knows my departure time?" When Haniya noticed the expression on his face, he said, quietly, "I always look up flight times for Tel Aviv, Avino'am, I miss home." After coffee, they continued the tour in the duty-free shop, and Haniya asked Avino'am to take some chocolate as a gift for his son. Avino'am at first refused, "Don't get me involved." After Haniya convinced him, Avino'am agreed to take the bar of chocolate that Haniya had purchased. A few moments later, when the security men asked him the traditional question "Has someone given you something to take on the plane?" he hesitated for a moment, and then said, "No."

Avino'am tells this story with embarrassed discomfort, with the knowledge that he confirms, to an extent, what certain portions of the Israeli public think about those who report on the territories. He remembers the incident also because of the feeling that this was the first and last time where he crossed over, for a moment, the border he had set for himself, even if he hadn't been "on assignment" at the time. On the other hand, the plane from Rome did not blow up. Sometimes you have to decide that you believe in someone.

Bar-Yosef is a member of a small group of reporters for whom the territories are "the assignment." Five men and one woman. The names are recognized. The faces, less so. Dani Rubinstein, of DAVAR, Avino'am Bar-Yosef of MA'ARIV, Roni Shaked of YEDI'OT AHARONOT, Uri Nir of HA'ARETZ, Michal Sela of THE JERUSALEM POST, Oren Cohen of HADASHOT. Our reporter on the territories. They move within the tangled, spider web-like circle like the images in a Le Carre spy novel—members of some quasi-official organization whose aims they themselves define, and whose methods they almost don't define at all. The intifadah does not have its own master spy. There is no one who wants to know everything, in order to solve everything. No side has the basic ability required for any clear thinking—the ability also to suspect its own people. Sometimes—such as the encounter with Haniya—it's also not clear who, exactly, are "our people."

This sextuplet are the human beings that the settlers call "the hostile media" in official conversations, and "those whoresons" in off-the-record conversations. Over time, they became part of their own stories. You can't have a discussion about the intifadah without someone getting

up with the impossible sentence that frightfully contradicts itself but sounds so good: "It's true that in a democracy there has to be reporting, but not of everything." And if not that one, then its no less threatening step-brother: "The country needs a free press, but it must not misuse its freedom," as if this freedom were a tricot shirt meant to show off the bosom, but it's forbidden to expose one's stomach.

The reporters move in the midst of this blindness, writing their stories, each one from his point of view, in the full knowledge that they are daily supplying ammunition to their opponents. Because they, more than anyone else, are aware that they are not telling the true story, or, at least, not the whole story.

"I, in fact, have not been writing about the intifadah for a long time already," says Dani Rubinstein. "I am writing about events. About stone-throwing and demonstrations. That is not the intifadah, because that does not have in it the truer story, about how a people is coming into existence there."

Of course, it's impossible to ignore completely the assertions about them. Maybe they are not always sufficiently aware or don't want to remember that the good-Palestinian-friends are enlisted in a cause that does not exactly conform to the interests of the State of Israel. It's clear that there is also a process of rapprochement, a natural one, with their sources. Crime reporters drink ranch-style coffee with criminals in Yafo, economic reporters drink decaffeinated filter coffee with magnates at the King David. In the territories, the deterioration of the reporting of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] spokesman and the turning inward of the settlers have resulted in only one factor that remembers how much sugar you take in your coffee-with-cardamom: the Palestinians.

But it's a bit too easy, and certainly a bit too simple, to decide that the reporters submit to the unavoidable and report only the side that spoils them with that journalistic delight—information. Roni Shaked is the "bithonist" [security-minded] of the bunch. His office, in the YEDI'OT AHARONOT building in Jerusalem, is reminiscent more than anything else of the office of the commander of a sector. He is also considered, rightly or not, as the one closest to the IDF, and he certainly doesn't conform to the round-spectacled and long-haired image of the "leftist," that demonic image that the settlers so often paint. "I've reached the conclusion," he says incisively with the same tone in which it is sometimes customary to shout 'Attention,' "that we must, for our own good, report on the situation as it is. My motives in reporting are those of a Jewish and Zionist reporter. I'm not from the United Nations and I'm not in the territories on behalf of Israeli society, but this society must, not for the Palestinians but for its own sake, know how to take what is happening in the territories."

This text, in various versions, is repeated by all of the reporters. There is something desperate, tired in

advance, in their brandishing of the fact that they are Israelis and Zionists, knowing that there is already someone who would cast doubt on that. "They don't stop asking," complains Dani Rubinstein in a somewhat bored voice, "why we always write about the Palestinians. Damn it, I am the reporter in the territories, and in the territories 96 percent of the population is Arab. So they are the story."

And Avino'am, that same evening: "It's a war between two peoples, over the same territory. But we are also the government of those who are fighting against us. And as the government has to take care of their basic needs, we must reflect their basic aspirations."

And Uri Nir continues a day later, but from the very same point: "Our work stands in contradiction to Israeli sensitivity, sometimes also to Israeli interests. The emphasizing of Palestinian suffering is not good for Israel. From here to being seen as a traitor is not a very long way."

And thus, very slowly, without being aware of it, they substitute for the worn and used version "the public's need to know," a new, tortured version, "the public's obligation to know," or at least its obligation to take an interest, to take a look, to flip through the pages. That you voted for Gandhi [nickname of Re'havam Ze'evi, former general with a very "hawkish" position on the territories], they try to explain, doesn't mean you have to be ignorant. "I, for example," admits Uri Nir, "deal less with the political side. I try to focus on folklore, to show the processes of the building of a people from their human side, with the feeling that this already turns me into a foreign correspondent." This foreign correspondent, by the way, will marry next week a real female foreign correspondent, who came here from a small town in California to cover the Middle East for THE BOSTON GLOBE.

The part that they almost don't speak about is the really frustrating part: the danger. The fact that the direct, physical threat to their lives comes almost always precisely from the people whose "recruits" they are thought to be. Oren Cohen once went to the Segaya neighborhood in Gaza to cover the funeral procession of a student from Bir Zeit: "It was in December 1986, before the intifadah. I arrived alone, in a neighborhood with which I wasn't familiar. They sat me in the middle of a big room, crowded with people, in front of some cousin who had agreed to speak with me. And then the thing that we all fear occurred—the appearance of the nut who starts the blaze. Shouting, someone asked me, 'Who are you?'

- 'A journalist.'
- 'A Jew, a Christian, or a Moslem?'
- 'A Jew.'

"And then it began to go through the room, like a great wave, 'Yahud, Yahud, Yahud,' and from this wave a hand shot out and cut off the electricity. There was complete darkness, and suddenly tens of hands were on me. I wasn't afraid. It was so crazy that I didn't have the

time to be afraid. The cousin who spoke with me shouted, 'No one touch him,' and in the moment of surprise after that sentence I got up and walked slowly, in a straight line, to the exit. Some fists were waved, but they didn't really touch me. In the end, I got to the car somehow and I left. The funny part is that the next day I was in the editorial offices and the editor asked me what happened, so I said to him, 'Drop it, I didn't bring the story, because they almost killed me.' He made me sit down and write about it, and only after I had put everything on the computer did I begin to feel the fear passing through my whole body."

Fear, even though it passes through the entire body, doesn't last. They continue to go out, twice, sometimes three times a week. "No, not every day," says Roni Shaked, "the demonstrations, after all, repeat themselves. Today I don't go out for every burning tire." In the almost 2 years that have passed since the intifadah began, both they and it have changed. They transmit, faithfully, the IDF [Israel Defense Force] version on "the relative calm in the territories," with the feeling that the first news of theirs in a long time that the readers are happy to read is also the least correct.

"It is, indeed, true," says Michal Sela, "that Palestinian society is already not the way it was before December '87. They are getting tired. But it's not that the intifadah has calmed down so much as that its significance has changed. Something has come into being that won't stop and won't be stopped." Again a text that is repeated with all of them, in various forms. Dani Rubinstein: "The media point to the calm in the disturbances and the violence, but that's not the intifadah today. The intifadah is the closed schools, the strikes, an entire society that is not paying taxes, the fact that there are no police. The coming into being of the Palestinian state, the fact that this is an unavoidable process that will in the end lead to negotiations. That, today, is the real story, but it doesn't go over."

Avino'am Bar-Yosef argues that Jewish society is so far from recognizing what is going on, that it is missing even the low points of the Palestinians: "You know, one of the few times that there was a real chance that the intifadah would be extinguished was when Israel launched the new space satellite. That created desperation in the Palestinian street. They suddenly grasped the lack of proportion. They, with stones, and we, with outer space."

The story that was missed no less is the settlers. Dani Rubinstein, who wrote a book about Gush Emunim and was the first to expose the affair of the Jewish underground, is considered a "settler expert": "The problem is that the reporting about them stems from their own attitude toward themselves, which is quite confused. On the one hand, they want to say that the situation isn't bad, in order to win people over, and on the other hand, they inflate events, in order to have their security increased. As I said, confused." The day before, he stood at the center of the tumult of the beginning of the MKs' [Knesset Members] tour of the Ramallah region, and

looked around with an amused countenance. "Look, look how many societies these settlers have: 'The Company for the Development of Mateh Binyamin,' 'The Institute for Cave Research,' 'The Land of Israel Academy,' 'Mateh Ma'amatz'—they simply are ready to do anything, just not to work." He laughs at his own joke, and then decides to clarify what exactly is 'Mateh Ma'amatz.' Next to the yellow bus stands MK Ge'ula Cohen, who definitely takes DAVAR into account in her frequent speeches about the "leftist Mafia." Rubinstein smiles at her.

- Ge'ula, what is 'Mateh Ma'amatz'?
- It's the abbreviation for something.
- But what?
- I don't know, Kutch'ke, you really have to ask.

And this little friendly conversation is really a characteristic chapter in the strange relations between the sides. Michal Sela smiles when I relate this. "Listen to a story. One day, not so long ago, a friend of mine, a journalist on the radio, sat in the office. The telephone rang, and at the other end someone said, 'Shalom, I'm from the Society Against Hostile Media. We are going to demonstrate against the media opposite the Prime Minister's office, and we would like you to come cover us.' Isn't that crazy?"

- And what did the friend do?
- He hung up.

Or take the short dialogue that Oren Cohen had with the settler who made the accusation: "You always bring only the Arabs' side and not our side."

- And what's your side?
- I don't talk to journalists.

As was stated, it's confused. Complicated and confused. Both Avino'am and Michal Sela received many blows from settlers before it became fashionable. He, at Alon Moreh, after the murder of Tirza Porat; she, when accompanied by Avi Sasportas. But neither of them made it public. They didn't want to kill future sources, or didn't think that it was important enough. "The blows didn't hurt," says Michal Sela, "as much as it hurts when they don't want to talk to me. I was terribly insulted when a man such as Yisra'el Har'el, whom I respect and esteem, despite the differences in opinions, said to me on the telephone, 'With you I'm not willing to speak.' Why, I really wanted also to bring the side of the people of 'Ofra, as it is. I don't understand that refusal."

There is some indulgence—not necessarily mutual—on the part of the reporters towards the settlers. "After all," says Roni Shaked, "We travel on the same roads, and we know exactly what risks they are taking." The indulgence disappears, with surprising speed, when the subject of the IDF comes up. The complaints are in every direction. They tell about unpleasant hostility of the soldiers in the field, and about unclear, and certainly inconsistent, policy from the commanders.

"The IDF," says Uri Nir, "is following a kind of playing down of what is going on with policy. The result is that the spokesman apparatus has lost its credibility in a manner that should worry not only every reporter, but also every Israeli." The comments apply, mainly, to the exact numbers of killed and wounded, which is the most recurring problem, the most tiring problem. Every one of the reporters, in turn, tells the not-exclusive anecdote about the "scoop" with which he called up the office of the IDF spokesman, only to receive the indifferent response, "Why, you're going to write what you want anyway." The versions differ not on the question of whether credibility has been lost, but only on the academic discussion, which is too late and sterile, on the reasons for the loss of credibility.

Roni Shaked, for example, rules 'Not guilty': "Their problem is that for most of the factors there are reasons not to report 'upstairs.' Not every opening fire, especially when plastic bullets are concerned, is reported. Aside from that, the IDF is fed by reports from the field and from government hospitals, but in the territories there is a complete network of independent medical care that would not think of giving information to the army, for fear that the wounded would be arrested. A hospital such as Maksad el-Hiria will not say a word to someone from the IDF. It is a nationalist hospital. They have a third floor, the intifadah floor, which is really something to see. On all the beds there are Palestinian flags, kefiyyehs, everything. Don't forget that to extract a plastic bullet, which doesn't involve fear of infection, from someone's leg, a small clinic is sufficient. The result is that the spokesman's numbers are not accurate, because he simply doesn't know. The second result is that we need to rely on their sources, in the field, which have already been checked and were found credible. And, despite everything that I said, I still call up and ask every night."

This sextuplet, even though it sometimes sounds as if its versions were completely coordinated, is not homogeneous. They cover a big area, don't meet often, don't engage in the exchange of information as is customary among the criminal and military reporters. "Nevertheless," smiles Michal Sela, a slow and soft smile, while leaning back on a seemingly hard pillow in the POST's editorial offices, "we are a group." And Uri Nir, over his fish at the Hyatt Hotel, "We all understood that, in any event, the story is so big that it's impossible to grasp it all." And Oren Cohen, in Tel Aviv of all things, while packing for his first vacation in 2 years, "actually, only we understand what the others are saying," and when he also adds a smile, he suddenly looks a lot like Abu Pulan, the character that he invented in order to tell the story of the intifadah in the newspaper, as it has not been told for the thousandth time.

[Box, p 37]

Dani Rubinstein (Kutch'ke)

- Newspaper: DAVAR
- Age: 51

- Previous work: Information Center
- In the territories since 1968
- "Scoop": the underground affair
- Plans to remain on the job: Doesn't know

Roni Shaked

- Newspaper: YEDI'OT AHARONOT
- Age: 43
- Family status: Married, three children, one son in the army
- Previous work: Ministry of Defense
- In the territories since 1982
- "Scoop": the Peres-Hussein meeting in London
- Plans to remain on the job: As long as possible

Uri Nir

- Newspaper: HA'ARETZ
- Age: 29
- Family status: Bachelor for 1 more week
- Previous work: Researcher for television
- In the territories since: March 1986
- "Scoop": Doesn't remember
- Plans to remain on the job: A few more months

Michal Sela

- Newspaper: THE JERUSALEM POST
- Family status: Divorced, two children
- Previous work: The same thing, for KOTERET RASHIT
- In the territories since: 1984
- "Scoop": The liquidation of Misbah el-Suri affair

[Box, p 36]

Oren Cohen

- Newspaper: HADASHOT
- Age: 32
- Family status: Married, two children (the youngest was born on the day the intifadah began)
- Previous work: Sound man and substitute reporter on television
- In the territories since: the end of 1985
- "Scoop": Ansar-2
- Plans to remain on the job: at least a few more years

Avino'am Bar-Yosef

- Newspaper: MA'ARIV
- Age: 42
- Family status: married, one child
- Previous work: Reporter-researcher on Kol Yisra'el
- In the territories since: September 1984
- "Scoop": The meeting of Sharansky and Shmu'el Goren with Feisal al-Husseini
- Plans to remain on the job: a few more months.

QATAR

Industrial Development Emphasized as Base for Economy

90OL0028c Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 3 Sep 89 p 8

[Article: "Industrial Development as Economic Foundation"]

[Text] Qatar, in its desire to reduce dependence on oil as its sole source of national income, has adopted a policy for comprehensive economic development and is constructing a sturdy economic foundation of industrialization, linking the petroleum industry to the national economy in its various manifestations, and rationalizing resources in order to diversify and expand society's economic and social foundations. Qatar is also diligent in exploring and exploiting the country's natural resources, especially of oil and natural gas, emphasizing other productive sectors, and completing the economic infrastructure.

In 1974, the state took final control of its natural resources of oil and natural gas and adopted a balanced policy to reduce the depletion of reserves in order to preserve nonrenewable oil resources for as long as possible. The state also adopted a strategy for the parallel development of all economic sectors, and especially of industry which is the main axis for other sectors. This is the sure and correct path to continued comprehensive development and to diversification of sources of income in preparation for the postoil era. The state, in order to reach its development objectives, has continued to develop and expand oil and gas-based industries as a means of boosting industry and building an industrial society based on articulated methodology, research, deliberation, and study.

The Technical Center for Industrial Development was created for that purpose in 1973 in order to plan and oversee the country's industrial development in accordance with its needs and available resources. Recognizing that the public sector could not accomplish this task alone without private sector involvement, the state formed an industrial promotion legislation organization that provided such incentives as tax holidays and customs exemptions and made land available to Qatari investors in order to encourage their active participation. This helped bring about far-reaching fundamental changes in the country's economic structure.

Qatari Industries

The Fertilizer Industry (QAFCO): The Qatar Chemical Fertilizer Company (QAFCO) was created as a joint venture in 1969 and is currently owned by the Qatar General Authority for Petroleum (75 percent) and Hydro Norsk of Norway (25 percent). The company aims to build a complex at Umm Sa'id that utilizes natural gas as raw material and feedstock for the production of ammonia and urea at daily rates of 900 to 1,000 tons consecutively.

Fertilizer production began in 1973 at design capacity, and was doubled last year to about 735,000 tons of ammonia and 780,000 tons of urea annually. The fertilizer plant's actual output could exceed design capacity if warranted by world demand.

The Petrochemical Industry (QAPCO): The Qatar Petrochemicals Company was created in 1973 as a joint venture of the Qatar General Authority for Petroleum (84 percent) and Chemie of France (16 percent) in order to build and operate at Umm Sa'id a petrochemicals complex for the production of ethylene at an annual capacity of 280,000 tons, low-density polyethylene at an annual capacity of 140,000 tons, and sulfur at an annual capacity of 46,000 tons.

The complex at Umm Sa'id went on line in 1980 and is the first of its kind in the region. It presently produces ethylene at design capacity. The production of polyethylene, however, exceeds design capacity by 20 percent at peak times.

QAPCO products are marketed throughout the world by the Marketing and Shipping Department of the Qatar Authority for Petroleum. Ethylene output is expected to increase when the North Field gas project is completed. **The Iron and Steel Industry (QASCO):** This company accomplished high outputs of steel blocs and structural bars in 1988. Its output of sponge iron, steel blocks, and structural bars has exceeded rated design capacity.

Last year, 495,158 tons of sponge iron were produced for an increase of 95,158 tons over design capacity. The output of steel blocks amounted to 519,732 tons, or an increase of 19,732 tons over design capacity. Structural bar output reached 533,010 tons for an increase of 203,010 tons over design capacity.

The plant is considered the first integrated plant of its kind in the Middle East and apply modern direct reduction process utilizing natural gas. QASCO markets its product locally to supply domestic construction needs but most of its output is exported, especially to such Gulf markets as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE [United Arab Emirates].

Qatari cement is of such high quality that the company won the Asia International Award in March of 1981 at the nomination of the Committee of Asian Industries in Singapore [as published]. Established in 1965, this company was among the first national industrial companies in Qatar. For raw materials it depends on domestic natural resources of gypsum and caustic soda. Its output of cement amounted last year to 161,717 tons for an increase of 35,205 tons over the year preceding. Sales increased in 1988 to 161,015 tons from 124,079 tons in 1987. **Chain of Light Industries:** This company was created in 1969 and was capitalized by the private sector at five million Qatari riyals. It has since been recapitalized to 13 million riyals. The company's 1988 output and sales amounted to some 36,674 metric tons of meal and two kinds of flour, compared with only 32,982 metric tons in 1987. This growth in output was not

prompted by an increase in consumption but rather by a desire to augment the stored reserves of this strategic commodity. **Organic Fertilizer:** The organic fertilizer facility has been operative since 1977 under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. Its objective is to turn garbage into organic fertilizer and to produce 70 tons of organic fertilizer daily to improve farm output. This facility produced some 41,993 tons of organic fertilizer last year—its highest output ever since its creation in 1981 [as published]. **Paper and Plastic Facilities:** The Paper and Plastics Facilities is a private sector company that ensures the country's supply of paper and plastic packaging materials through the output of 22 plastics facilities and more than 20 paper plants. **The Detergent Industry:** The Qatari Detergents Company is a private sector firm that ensures the domestic supply of high quality detergents. It has an annual output of some 9,000 tons of powdered detergents and 18,000 tons of liquid detergents. **The Factory for National Gases:** It is a private sector facility at Salwah which processes gas and liquid oxygen, nitrogen, and argon for industrial and household use. It began production in 1981 at an investment cost of some 20 million riyals. The private sector also owns two facilities for household dyes, one facility to compact and process scrap iron as feedstock for the iron and steel complex, and two other plants for dairy products.

State's Agricultural Policies Aim at Self-Sufficiency

90OL0028a Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 31 Aug 89 p 7

[Article: "To Accomplish Agricultural Self-Sufficiency: Arable Area Expanded, Experimental Farms Created, Water Resources Developed, Modern Technology Employed, and Farmer Awareness Raised"]

[Text] Agricultural programs are taking long strides towards accomplishing self-sufficiency and creating an additional source of national income besides oil. The strategy of the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture revolves around expanding arable area, creating experimental farms, developing water resources, employing modern agricultural techniques, raising farmer awareness, and promoting scientific research.

Agricultural Development Basics

The state is keen to expand farmlands and survey cultivated as well as arable acreage in order to improve the soil and increase productivity. A most important project is that of creating contour maps of farms and arable land after surveying them topographically.

Agricultural statistics indicate that Qatar has 650,000 dunums of arable land in addition to some 320,000 dunums that could be farmed after reclamation and irrigation. Some 908 farms have been registered by the end of 1987 for an aggregate cultivated area of about 48,350 dunums. Implementation has recently begun of a program to improve the performance of plastic greenhouses and another for the classified harvesting [as published] of

farms and fallow land. Other programs that fall in this category are those for agricultural extension, experimental farm crops, protected crops, and water resource development. A project has been completed to drill 26 feeding wells in order to harness rain water as additional feedstock for aquifers in certain depressions of the al-Shamal [the north] region. Three deep wells have also been drilled to explore for water suitable for agriculture.

Experimental Farm Stations

The state has also been keen to establish stations for farm research. The experimental station at Rawdat al-Faras is the oldest such station in the country and is an extension center for farmers and visitors as well as pupils and university students. The Rawdat al-Faras station also produces several types of seedlings and makes them available to farmers free of charge. The center has so far produced 1.5 million vegetable seedlings and 100,000 decorative and fruit trees seedlings.

Several other model farms have also been established in al-Shamal, al-Ghuwayriyah, al-Khawr, and other regions. All are experimental farm stations that seek to produce domestically suitable strains by hybridizing crops and researching farm pest control.

The al-Uturiyah research station and a project for the greenhouse cultivation of vegetables and fruits have also been completed.

Animal Husbandry and Fisheries

Animal resources are a pillar of the national economy and play a very important role in bolstering it. The state has paid a great deal of attention to this resource. The state has implemented a number of constructive projects to develop this resource and encourage private investment in it.

The Qatar Arab Company for Poultry and Eggs

A joint venture of both public and private sectors, it was formed to supply domestic needs and reduce imports. The company meets about 10 percent of domestic demand.

The Fresh Dairy Products Project

The project relies on cooperation between government and private capital to raise cow herds. The company, which has an output of five tons of raw milk, comprises cow divisions for breeding stock, milk producers, and meat producers.

The Sheep Farm

It has 13,000 heads of sheep, and seeks to develop good breeders for distribution to sheep farmers in order to improve the strain and increase productivity. The farm supplied the market last year with approximately 10,000 heads of sheep for an increase of 5.5 percent over the year preceding.

The Qatar National Company for Fishing

This company implements several programs to develop the country's fish resources and conducts studies of fishing beds. The company owns a modern fishing fleet whose output fully meets all domestic demand year-round.

Veterinary Services

The Veterinary Department supplies veterinary care through centers throughout the country. There are three such centers—al-Doha Veterinary Center, al-Rayyan, and al-Shamal Center for Veterinary Services.

In addition to caring for rare animals, the centers have treated several cases and vaccinate animals free of charge.

There is a project to care for and protect such rare animals as gazelles and deer which are an important resource. The project also aims at creating a resource for the exchange of academic expertise and information on these herds which receive health care from and are protected by the ministry.

Farm Income

Statistics indicate that farm income amounted last year to about 324 million Qatari riyals. Dairy products accounted for 28 percent of that income, red and white meats for 14 percent, and fish for 4.9 percent. Vegetables accounted for 23 percent of aggregate farm income.

Details of Employment Statistics Provided

90OL0028b Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 2 Sep 89 p 11

[Article by Sidiq al-Zayn: "According to the Annual Civil Service Report: Qataris Occupy 48 Percent of Accredited State Jobs"]

[Text] Accredited state jobs tabulated at the end of Jamadi al-Thani [8 February 1989] increased by 2.13 percent over the preceding year. The increase in total number of employees was calculated at 2.17 percent.

Vacancies increased by 1.51 percent to 1819 by 8 February 1989 from 1792 vacancies a year earlier, according to the annual report for 1989 prepared by the Census Division of the Personnel Department at the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum. The report broke down the country's employment figures by job level, nationality, occupation, educational status, length of employment, and age.

Job Classification

Figures published in the report indicate that there were about 32,111 accredited state jobs by 8 February 1989 compared with 31,442 jobs a year earlier, for an increase of 669 jobs.

Broken down by level, there were 592 jobs of level 1, 8,809 jobs of level 2, 8,001 jobs of level 3, 14,600 jobs of level 4, and 109 jobs as absent leave without pay. The government sector employed about 24,103 employees compared to 23,799 employees in the last year. Women

employed by government totaled 6,189 women compared with 5,815 women in the preceding year, for an increase of 5.78 percent.

The report pointed that 14,444 jobs, or 47.68 percent of all positions, were occupied by Qataris as of 8 February 1989. Arabs occupied 9,284 jobs, or 30.65 percent of the total, and foreigners held 6,564 jobs, or 21.67 percent.

Government Agencies

Broken down by government agency, the report said that 2,810 employees worked for the Prime Ministry, 1,065 at the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, 11,646 at the Ministry of Education, 5,973 at the Ministry of Water and Electricity, 1,691 at the Ministry of Information and Culture, 479 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 1,037 employees at the Ministry of Communications and Transport.

Breakdown by Occupation

The Personnel Department's annual report indicated that 12,046 male and female employees were engaged in scientific and technical professions, 8,768 were production workers, and 6,401 were in clerical jobs. This accounts for 90.27 percent of all state employees, leaving only 10 percent engaged in services, administration, agriculture, and fisheries.

Analysis showed that most Qatari employees were engaged in scientific and technical pursuits, followed by production jobs, clerical jobs, then services.

Breakdown by Education

The report classified civil servants by educational qualifications revealing that 11,324 had no educational certificates at all, 7,390 had high school or middle school diplomas, 7,431 were university graduates, and 651 had postgraduate degrees.

Qatari employees without any formal education numbered 6,227, or 34.11 percent of the total. Qataris with elementary and middle school certificates were counted at about 4,368 employees. University graduates accounted for 23.18 percent of all Qatari employees, or 3,348. The number of Qatari men and women with master's or doctorate degrees was 91 employees, or 63 percent of all Qataris [as published].

Breakdown by Length of Service

A breakdown by length of service reveals that by the 8 February 1989, 10,930 male and female civil servants had served for a period of five to 10 years, 5,921 served from 10 to 15 years, 5,644 served for less than three years, and 2,823 served for a period ranging from three to five years.

Generally speaking, 25,318 men and women, accounting for 83.58 percent of all state employees, had a length of service of less than 15 years, while 16.04 percent served for more than 15 years.

Breakdown by Age

The report indicated that 5,701 men and women employees were less than 30 years old. 16,475 employees ranged in age from 30 to 50 years. Those older than 50 years numbered 5,572 or 18.39 percent of all state employees.

There were about 4,361 Qatari employees younger than 30 years, or 30.19 percent of the total. Those between the ages of 30 and 50 years occupied some 5,611 jobs, compared with 3,202 male and female employees older than 50 years.

Job Development

The report indicated that the number of government employees as of 8 February 1989 increased by 188.61 percent from 15 January 1975. This means that the number of state employees increased by about 189 fold over a 15-year period.

A further breakdown reveals that the ratio of Qatari employees dropped steadily in the period from 15 January 1975 to 15 April 1983 as the ratio of non-Qataris steadily increased.

The situation was reversed in the period from 3 April 1984 to 8 February 1989.

The report said the state employed a total of 15,221 day workers as of the end of 8 February 1989, compared with about 15,016 a year earlier.

A breakdown by wages revealed that 36.83 percent of those workers were paid daily wages of less than 30 riyals, 20.86 percent received wages ranging from 30 to 32 riyals, 11.26 percent earned between 36 and 287 riyals, and 8.17 percent commanded daily wages of 50 riyals or more.

Graduates

The report mentioned that the Committee for Placing University Graduates handled 3,346 graduates as of last 5 March, of whom 1,336 were male and 2,010 were female.

There were 816 graduates with degrees in the sciences and 2,530 with majors in the humanities. Qatar university graduated a total of 2,556 men and women, while 790 others, or 23.61 of all graduates, received their degrees abroad.

Government agencies employed 2,932 university graduates, of whom 979 were men and 1,953 women. Of the 414 men and women graduates placed with government institutions, 188 had science specialties, and 169 had majored in liberal arts.

Civil Servants Broken Down by Sex and Formal Education As Of 8 February 1989 Compared With a Year Earlier

Year	8 February 1988		8 February 1989		Total		Ratio		
Sex	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	% Males	% Females	% Total
None	10,724	713	10,605	719	11,437	11,324	98.89	100.84	99.01
Primary	1,148	60	1,137	76	1,208	1,213	99.04	126.67	100.41
Middleschool	1,283	133	1,258	158	1,416	1,416	98.05	118.8	100
Secondary	2,946	666	3,007	707	3,612	3,714	102.07	106.16	102.82
Middle Diploma	2,274	1,196	2,401	1,275	3,470	3,676	105.58	106.61	105.94
BA or Equivalent	3,821	2,896	4,024	3,045	6,717	7,069	105.31	105.15	105.24
High Diploma	284	68	286	76	352	362	100.7	111.76	102.84
Master's	191	38	212	57	229	269	110.99	150	117.47
Doctorate	315	41	340	42	356	382	107.94	102.44	107.3
Other	813	40	833	34	853	867	102.46	85	101.64
Total	23,799	5,851	24,103	6,189	29,650	30,292	101.28	105.78	102.17

Civil Servants Broken Down by Nationality and Sex as of 8 February 1989 Compared With a Year Earlier

Year	8 February 1988		8 February 1989		Total		Ratio		
Sex	Males	Females	Males	Females	1988	1989	% Males	% Females	% Total
Qatari	10,317	3,823	10,420	4,024	14,140	14,444	101	105.26	102.15
Arab	7,051	1,828	73,17	1,967	8,879	9,284	103.77	107.6	104.56
Foreigner	6,431	200	6,366	198	6,631	6,064	98.99	99	98.99
Total	23,799	5,851	24,103	6,189	29,650	30,191	101.28	105.78	102.17

Civil Servant Breakdown by Sex and Occupation as of 8 February 1989 Compared With a Year Earlier

Year and Sex Occupation	8 February 1988		8 February 1989		Total		Ratio		
	Males	Females	Males	Females	1988	1989	% Males	% Females	% Total
Applied and Technical	7,227	4,159	7,704	4,434	11,386	12,046	106.6	104.4	105.8
Administrative	395	212	367	191	607	558	92.91	90.09	91.93
Clerical	5,619	782	5,601	931	6,401	6,532	99.68	119.05	102.05
Services	2,053	179	2,024	170	2,223	2,194	98.59	100	98.7
Farming and Fishing	233	—	194	—	233	194	83.26	—	83.26
Production Workers	8,272	528	8,213	555	8,800	8,768	99.29	105.11	99.64
Total	23,799	5,851	24,103	6,189	29,650	30,292	101.28	105.78	102.17

Growth in Number of Civil Servants During Period Under Study, Ratios, and Breakdown Nationality

Number of Employees Year	Qataris		Non-Qataris		Total	
	Number	Ratio	Number	Ratio	Number	Ratio
15 Jan 1975	6,735	64.17	3,761	35.83	10,496	100
4 Jan 1976	7,711	61.56	4,816	38.44	12,527	100
23 Dec 1976	9,184	56.47	7,080	43.53	16,264	100
13 Dec 1977	9,534	52.95	8,472	47.05	18,006	100
1 Dec 1978	10,341	51.34	9,800	48.66	20,141	100
22 Nov 1979	10,818	50.4	10,645	49.6	21,463	100
10 Nov 1980	11,152	46.7	12,727	53.3	23,879	100
30 Oct 1981	11,918	43.2	15,669	56.8	27,587	100
15 April 1983	12,552	41.54	17,668	58.46	30,220	100
3 April 1984	12,943	44.63	16,056	55.37	28,999	100
24 Mar 1985	13,318	45.41	16,011	54.59	29,329	100
13 Mar 1986	13,621	45.81	16,113	54.19	29,734	100
3 Mar 1987	13,862	47.42	15,373	53.58	29,235	100
20 Feb 1988	14,140	47.68	15,510	52.32	29,650	100
8 Feb 1989	14,444	47.68	15,848	52.32	30,292	100

SUDAN

Two Million Pounds Allocated to Electricity Project

45000020 Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 10 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Central Region Governor Major General 'Abd-al-Wahhab Abd-al-Ra'uf has announced that he will provide 2 million Sudanese pounds to support the al-Duwaym National Electricity Project. This amount is derived from allocations from the Central Region and the White Nile Province which he had promised to pay.

Editorial Discusses Market Reform Strategy

900A0061a Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH in Arabic 16 Aug 89 p 5

[Editorial by Dr Jamal-al-Din Sadiq: "Economic Debates on Strategy To Rescue Sudanese National Economy"]

[Text] The country's worsening economic condition stems not only from consumption greater than production but also from political, economic, and legislative fluctuations that have engulfed the country's political life in a short period of time.

In the past few years, the economy has gone through several economic systems, each with its special ideology and strategy. Consequently, all the country's economic structures have cracked.

We also notice that inadequate performance resulted in slow decisionmaking, which caused the problem to reach its present level of deterioration.

If we seek to correct the economic course, we must repair the crack and lift our economy from the abyss of deterioration.

Production Issue

There is no doubt that the production and consumption issues require careful technical studies. Productivity

under the current circumstances is so low that we cannot describe it accurately. Therefore, efforts must be made to increase production with all means and methods, including increased-production incentives, creating different cadres in every sector, and devoting attention to training at all levels so as to train the largest number possible of workers and technicians.

Consumption Issue

We don't see the tiniest hope of reducing the consumption rates because the Sudanese consumption demand generally is (inflexible), meaning that one cannot imagine that the demand volume will drop even if prices rise. Therefore, the required quantities cannot be reduced because they represent the minimum living requirements.

Constant Economic Policy

All the economic conferences held in Khartoum have emphasized the need to follow a constant economic policy that seeks to:

- Establish a realistic price for goods and services;
- Improve the Sudanese pound's exchange rate in stages;
- Focus on increasing production and expanding the production base;
- Reduce government intervention in economic activity and foreign trade;
- Eliminate the losing public sector units and gradually confine public sector activity to the production units;
- Divide the burdens carefully by rationalizing tax collection;
- Properly manage the public debt burden and new loans;
- Promote saving, especially by expatriates;
- Allow availability to control markets and to reduce prices.

There is no doubt that if such a serious policy is applied, observed, and implemented, it will lift the Sudanese economy from its present predicament. It is a policy that merits attention, care, and appreciation.

Constant Strategy

Therefore, what is required primarily is to draft a constant strategy for Sudanese national action so as to compensate the people for what has been missed and to meet the daily-growing demands which are necessarily based on improving the standard of living—a strategy which urges the need to confront the future with careful scientific planning founded on visualizing all the needs and determining all the objectives that pave the way for the future Sudan and for correcting Sudan's international image.

Mainstays of Economic Policy

There are a number of components which are considered mainstays for drafting Sudan's national economic strategy:

- To belong to Sudan and not to adhere to a certain ideology.

- To have the strategy emanate from Sudan's special circumstances by focusing on, supporting, and developing national production primarily and by relying on the intrinsic capability and resources.
- To reinforce the national production mobilization policy so that all citizens may participate and so that both men and women may have a vital role, considering that they are the element of strength in the family society and in the labor society.
- To insure the stability of national plans so that they may not change with the change of cabinet ministers or of individuals.
- To determine objectives clearly so that careful planning may be made for them.
- Provide the infrastructure, including roads, communications, energy, and services.
- Fully to survey all available human, material and natural resources.
- To exploit technology and the experiences of foreign nations that are relevant to our social conditions, especially the experiences of Korea, Japan, and Germany.
- To follow up immediately on steps to implement plans, which must be flexible, and evaluate implementation in light of the objectives set for the plans. Study any difficulties that may develop so as to overcome them.
- To be sincere with ourselves, we must look for:

First, the causes of the complete disruption of production in some production sectors;

Second, the causes of the partial disruption of some factories and production units;

Third, the causes of low productivity in the various sectors;

Fourth, we must reconsider the investment law.

Fifth, we must draft a constant tax policy that contributes to strengthening production so that it may meet consumption.

Sixth, we must find out the causes of capital flight.

Seventh, we must look for the means to attract expatriate money and enhance the guarantees which we can offer expatriates in this regard and which insure the flow of this money [into the country].

Eighth, we must look for the true causes behind the drop in the Sudanese pound's exchange rate and for the means and methods capable of stemming the decline in the pound's value.

Ninth, we must examine customs fees and determine how they can be used as a flexible instrument that works to increase exports and reduce imports, especially of provocative luxury items. We must also study the quota system as an alternative means.

Tenth, we must look for the causes leading to a fabricated demand whose dimensions exceed the dimensions of the actual demand.

Eleventh, we must determine the reasons that actual savings are below expected savings and we must offer incentives to promote saving by virtue of the close connection between the savings volume and the production volume, considering that savings are a main source for financing the production and investment process.

SYRIA

New Developments Cause Reduction in Arable Land

900L0020a Damascus AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 19 Aug 89 p 7

[Article by 'Abd-al-Hamid Sulayman: "On the Sidelines of the Higher Agricultural Council's Agricultural Plan Debate: Farm Land in Confrontation With Urban Sprawl"]

[Text] During the Higher Agricultural Council's agricultural plan debates, discussions touched on the subject of urban sprawl at the expense of farm land and using up large areas of fertile land for buildings, houses, residential apartments, and other structures at a time when the government and all the competent authorities are seeking to increase farm land, cultivate all arable land, and reclaim new areas for farming.

This subject is of considerable importance as it requires urgent measures, decisions, and rules regulating building construction and expansion at the expense of farm land within necessary limits that serve the interests of agriculture, the land, and those who work it. We believe that such decisions and rules do exist, but they actually need to be applied and implemented.

Using Up Farm Land!

As a result of natural development and a relatively high population or growth, building development in the country has expanded. A family that used to own one house owns several houses since the children have gone on their own and have their own houses. Of course, we are not against development or house construction or building of new families. On the contrary, the family is society's primary pillar and basic foundation. We are, however, against the idea of unplanned urban sprawl at the expense of groves and farm land that produces agricultural and animal products. Visitors to the al-Ghab region with its plains can see the great building expansion at the expense of fertile farm land, not to mention the fact that the method of construction used takes up large areas of land.

Farmers are accustomed to building spacious homes that use up large areas for courtyards. Buildings stretch horizontally, threatening the ever-shrinking farm land.

This is true not only of the al-Ghab region, but indeed of most, if not all, other regions. In other words, farm land in the various regions and provinces has been receding in favor of cement forests. The Damascus oasis, green Syria's lifeline, which used to provide Damascus with the fruits and vegetables it needs, ward off desert crawl, and supply the Damascus inhabitants with recreation and amusement, has begun to recede and shrink in the face of the building crawl. The city is creeping up on it from one side and villages scattered within it have started to expand and grow, thus affecting the Damascus climate in general and adding to air, water, and environmental pollution.

Do We Arrest This Threat?

The matter did not stop at residential building expansion, which would not have been as bad, but rather went beyond that to the acquisition of large tracts of land for building installations, factories, and utilities in groves and on farm land, not on barren land.

Why turn toward green areas while overlooking barren land in the Damascus outskirts and elsewhere that are vast enough for developing large suburbs that can accommodate the growing building demand?

The government is spending hundreds of millions on the forestation of limited areas in an effort, successfully or unsuccessfully, to cover them with greenery while we are killing the trees and uprooting them to plant cement and gray instead of green.

Desert crawl is threatening several regions in our country and the desert is creeping up on us. Instead of stopping this crawl by protecting the green regions and increasing their area, we are removing them.

This is the truth and not an overstatement. We are drawing attention to it and others are as aware of it as we are. The problem is very close and does not need any explanation. The press has tackled this subject many times and has opposed the acquisition of vast areas of groves everywhere to set up a factory, an installation, or a plant that can be built elsewhere.

But with all that has been said, the green is being devoured and buildings and installations are going up all over the place as though no one cared and as if we were talking about another country and another land. We understood from the 1989-90 agricultural plan debates that the state is serious about incorporating large areas of irrigated land to raise production and meet our growing need for agricultural products. The government has spent billions on land reclamation and the building of dams and irrigation canals in order to increase the areas of arable land while we are using up fertile farm land for building construction and cement forests!

Agricultural Villages

For several years, the competent authorities, mindful of the menace threatening farm land, have sought to stop

this crawl and seek unfarmed land on hills and plateaus for building new towns to accommodate the inhabitants of villages built in the agricultural heartland. The project is under implementation, albeit very slowly and at a pace that does not bode well for moving to these new villages soon.

We are aware, of course, of the great capabilities such an endeavor requires. Tens of villages need to be moved to new locations, in addition to tearing down and clearing away old inhabited villages worth much money.

Hence, the matter is not that easy. Indeed, it requires great capabilities and swift action to complete the new villages because time is not on the side of farm land. The longer it takes us to solve the problem the bigger the building area will grow at the expense of farm land.

What Is the Role of Local Authorities?

It is a known fact that any kind of building requires a license and compliance with certain conditions within set specifications that take other matters into account. It is true that municipalities are associated with buildings inside the town or village administrative boundaries and within an area circumscribed in the town or village plan, while everything else falls within the scope of farm land and outside the municipality's boundaries. But since this matter has to do with the interests of the town and its inhabitants and, accordingly, that of the farmers and the land, things ought to be changed to extend municipal responsibility or, if not that, the responsibility of farmers' associations or other authorities bent on protecting the farmers, the farming system, and agricultural production beyond the town or village boundaries.

Hence, the matter is not restricted to the central authorities. Indeed, local authorities, from the highest to the lowest, must assume their responsibilities and organizations, associations, and all other parties must step in to protect farm land and bar building construction on it except within necessary boundaries and areas. Local authorities are better acquainted with the true situation in their areas and so they must all cooperate and coordinate among themselves to prevent the problem's getting out of control.

If the various local parties do not work together to grapple with this issue, this matter will not go beyond wishes, recommendations, and futile appeals.

We are not telling those who till, work, and cultivate the land not to build a house on their own property. Rather, we are asking that the building process be organized, that land use be regulated, that horizontal expansion be replaced with vertical expansion, and that multistory buildings be allowed to go up to conserve arable land, for this will ultimately be in the interest of the farmer, agriculture and the country.

In Conclusion

This is meant to call attention to the way things are and to point out an important matter which is the responsibility of each and every person. We all will have to pay the price if we fail to arrive at suitable solutions that are fair to growers and farmers and can conserve large areas of farm land. We may not be more concerned about the land than the owners themselves if they are not the ones who are abusing it, that is, and the matter may be related to other parties who are overbuying farm land!

This issue remains open for discussion and reexamination by each and every one so that we will not reach a time when we will regret our ill-advised actions.

Farming in Hamah Discussed

90OL0018a Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
7 Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) p 7

[Article by Ahmad Haydar: "This Year's Agricultural Plan for Hamah Province"]

[Text] Weather conditions in the country this year have had a very adverse impact on the implementation of agricultural plans. These conditions constitute a force majeure which nobody can defy or prevent.

Not a single crop has escaped the effects of a whole series of weather conditions and elements and the drought that ravaged the cultivated areas before the plants had a chance to sprout because of the frost that swept the country. Nevertheless, our farmers remained steadfast, using the vast experience they have amassed to wangle their way out of this situation in order to cultivate the land.

Today's topic will only deal with the agricultural reality in Hamah Province where we took a field tour during which we met with a number of officials, foremost of whom was As'ad Mustafa, the governor of Hamah, who offered us a detailed explanation about this year's agricultural plan, about the factors that influence the drop in production, and about the recent results that have been achieved in the wake of all these circumstances.

Comrade Marwan al-Ibrahim, chief of the party's farmers' bureau in Hamah, gave us numerical data on winter and summer crops and on areas designated for farming. Following is the information we have obtained:

Preliminary Data

First, it must be pointed out that Hamah Province has about 489,000 hectares of arable land, of which 105,000 hectares are irrigated and 374,000 unirrigated. The province has also huge forest resources with 140,000 hectares of forested land.

As for the agricultural workforce, it is estimated at 122,000 workers out of a total population of 683,000 persons.

All arable land is used for growing agricultural crops, vegetables, and fruit trees in accordance with a production plan approved by the Higher Agricultural Council.

Significant statistics that bear mention show that the province has close to 365 farmer associations and about 49,284 cooperative members.

There are also about 20 livestock and grassland improvement associations with about 8,449 cooperative members, in addition to 12 cattle-fattening associations with 1,256 members.

Hamah Province has an agronomist union; two agricultural and veterinary alumni associations; an agricultural development union comprised of various agricultural technicians, including engineers, veterinarians, and inspectors; and agricultural high schools. There are also a veterinary college and institute, an agricultural high school in al-Salamiyah, and a veterinary high school in Hamah.

Comments

The purpose of this review is to give readers a complete picture of the agricultural state of affairs in Hamah Province to allow them to compare the land's harvest and other wealth with the huge workforce, the various kinds of cooperatives, the educational and scientific centers, and the vast areas on which the province is situated.

Readers may not be able to come up with an explanation when they find out that the number of farmers working in agriculture is less than half the estimated 122,000 farm workers and we are almost certain that it is much lower than that. This is true not only of Hamah Province, but also of all other provinces where the agricultural work force is shrinking daily for a multitude of reasons and factors which we will not enumerate and discuss at this point. It must be said, however, that the crux of the problem is migration to the cities in search of easy work that does not require physical exertion. Moreover, nontechnical education and student enrollment in academic colleges are a major dilemma because people with higher degrees find it difficult to work in farming because of the widespread social attitude that views this kind of work as a shame and insult to university graduates. The situation is different in some agricultural countries where agricultural work is performed by anyone who is able to work the land, regardless of academic degrees; for work is what makes a man.

How can the reader explain the fact that the country has 489,000 hectares of irrigated and unirrigated arable land, but lacks a comparable labor force? The theoretical figure we mentioned at the beginning of this article is not enough and, even assuming that this number is actually true, the rate of labor to land would be 3 workers for every 100 dunums at best. But when we realize that the theoretical figure is totally unrealistic, the equation becomes totally different with a ratio of 1 worker or less for every 100 dunums. No one can deny the agricultural

labor shortage in Hamah and other agricultural regions. This leads us, by necessity, to talk about the importance of agricultural mechanization and automation to decrease dependence on agricultural labor. What is also amazing is to read these figures that are an indicator of the huge capabilities that ought to be concerned with agriculture, but this is not the case at all. It is true that we turn out agricultural cadres on an annual basis, but the question still stands: What kind of agricultural work are they performing?

Where are our farmer associations in Hamah and elsewhere and have they actually assumed their active and effective role?

There are many observations that can take up much space in this article, but we may come back to them at a future date so that we may now talk about the contents of the Hamah Province agricultural plan.

Cotton

As we said at the beginning of this article, weather conditions contributed largely to the shrinkage of areas planted with a number of important crops, including cotton. The water shortage played a major role in farmers' unwillingness to grow cotton because this crop requires continual irrigation. Nonetheless, Hamah farmers did their best to implement the cotton-growing plan which called for cultivation of 31,498 hectares and, thanks to the farmers' efforts, the cultivated area was 27,000 hectares.

In the al-Ghab plain alone the plan called for cultivating 23,008 hectares, 20,042, or 87 percent, of which were cultivated, making the planted area 2,966 hectares less than designated in the plan. This was due to the lack of water to irrigate the whole area earmarked for this year.

Hence, the area designated for cotton growing in the al-Ghab shrank by about 3,000 hectares due to a water shortage: not enough rain fell this year to fill the dams. A comment is in order here. We all know that the problem in al-Ghab used to be the flooding caused by rain and water flowing out of the dams. Al-Ghab farmers suffered heavy losses in the past years as a result. This year, however, it is the other way around. Al-Ghab, known for floods, is in need of water. Last year tens of millions of cubic meters of water were lost to the sea and today we are in dire need of a drop of water.

This is a difficult equation which can be understood only by realizing the importance of dams, especially after posing the following question: How long is our agriculture going to remain captive to the elements? If rain falls, we can eat; if it does not, we starve.

Is not the answer to that question the heart of the problem we are trying to solve?

By and large, the bet was on the al-Ghab farmers who hastened to deal with the situation in their own special ways because dam water is not enough and they had to

rig abandoned wells, repair broken pumps, or dig new wells, always taking the initiative and the credit. The al-Ghab farmers set out to plant cotton and geared up to secure water and all other farming and production requirements. Some farmers, however, did not have the cash flow for such purchases, so they were forced to borrow from the Agricultural Bank which does not grant loans for the purchase of pumps unless the well is licensed. Licensing requires set procedures and applications that have to go through the al-Ghab Institution, the 'Asi Basin Directorate, and the Ministry of Irrigation. Farmers have to wait through the entire procedure to find out whether the loan is granted, for this requires studies and committees to determine whether the well falls within the Tar al-'Ila al-'Asharinah network. If the well falls within that network, it is impossible to obtain a license; if it does not, approval is granted. The reason for rejecting an application is that wells within the network could impact on the basin's water supply.

Whatever the reasons and justifications, the farmers' needs and concerns about their crops prompt them to open wells and buy pumps by borrowing money. If farmers are so eager to protect the harvest, should we stand in their way and not give them the help they need? We cannot be more clear than that because everyone knows what farmers go through to track down a paper in some bureau or department to no avail. I will not fail to mention that last season Hamah Province sent 71,000 tons of cotton to cotton gins and we hope this figure will not drop very much this year.

Wheat

The elements and water shortages notwithstanding, Hamah Province outproduced all other provinces in wheat this year. The difference between designated and planted areas was not great, for out of 41,210 hectares earmarked for wheat growing, 40,791 were actually planted, which means that the rate of implementation was over 99 percent. This is a significant indicator, given the difficult weather conditions that control the farming process. There was also great concern that these conditions would affect the wheat harvest, but the care and attention the farmers gave the wheat crop came to fruition at harvest time when people were racing to take part in the harvesting and marketing process. The government did not stand idly by vis-a-vis the farmers' contribution, for it proceeded to offer profitable prices for the wheat crop in addition to promotional bounces for those who turned their entire crop over to the state. Our brothers, the farmers, may compete to deliver their production to grain centers without duress. Hamah Province was thus able to deliver over 100,000 tons of wheat to granaries, exceeding its delivery plan.

Other Crops

Although the government at the beginning was strict about implementing the plan, it had to give in a little because of the water shortage, thus giving the farmers a chance to plant what they deemed more profitable for

them. Some crops, such as yellow corn, yellow and red watermelon, chick pes, ordinary sunflower, potato, beans, sesame, Jew's mallow, and others, were grown without a prior plan and other crops, such as dry onions, oil sunflower, soybean, tomato, peanuts, pepper, eggplant, cucumber, and white corn, exceeded the plan set for them. The plan earmarked 559 hectares for growing onion but the actual area used was over 600 hectares, bringing the implementation rate to 107 percent. This is due to the fulfillment of contracts concluded with the Salmiyyah onion plant when onions were grown in areas earmarked for cotton.

The above rate was realized in the al-Ghab region alone, while in other parts of the province only 413 out of 874 hectares earmarked for onion-growing were used. The al-Ghab region was supposed to use 1,200 hectares for growing oil sunflower, but actually used over 1,350 hectares; small areas used in other regions brought the implementation rate to 126 percent. This crop is popular with farmers for economic reasons and because it uses very little water for irrigation.

The rate of implementation of the soybean crop was close to 100 percent, for almost the same reasons that prompted farmers to turn to oil sunflower farming. During our visit to some planted fields in al-Ghab and Tar al-'Ila, we observed a marked advancement in the methods used to plant these two crops. Moreover, germination was very good and the plants seemed to be in good shape, promising a good farming season. Asked about how they felt about planting soybean and oil sunflower, some farmers emphasized that this kind of farming is very profitable because it is a lot less costly than growing cotton. Tobacco farming is becoming widespread in the al-Ghab region where the government has set aside land for farming and has encouraged farmers to farm by granting them facilities. This explains why the plan was implemented in full.

Vegetable farming, mainly tomato, cucumber, and eggplant, is also very popular in the al-Ghab Plain where strategic crops such as cotton and wheat have been affected by this kind of farming. The produce is sent to major markets in Muhradah and Hamah for delivery to consumers. Mention must be made here of an important aspect represented in efforts to set up a canning plant in al-Ghab capable of processing the huge amounts produced annually which often spoil or are sold mostly at low prices.

Although the government has been strict about banning farmers' planting dense crops because of the water shortage, farmers did not comply with the competent authorities' instructions; they planted dense crops, primarily yellow and white corn, cucumber, beans, and certain other types of vegetables, right after they harvested the wheat and barley crops.

This kind of farming created many problems in terms of irrigating the cotton crop because dense-crop farmers were sharing water allocations with cotton farmers and,

quite often, water is stolen at night by pumping it out of the irrigation systems using motors and plastic pipes rigged for this purpose.

Irrigation was not confined to the tapping of irrigation lines. Indeed, farmers made use of their entire artesian well water reserves. Even in this case, many problems have been created by indiscriminate irrigation and lack of organization, discipline, and rationalization of well-water rations, causing some wells to dry up and the water levels in others to drop. Had the water been used rationally, none of these problems would have occurred.

It may be said that the main crop most affected by the water shortage was cotton, followed by sugar beet which matures in an extremely short time, creating great complications in organizing a picking schedule. Technicians lost control of the picking process because, with the high heat and water shortage, the crop matured early and all at once. Nonetheless, the Sahlab sugar plant is doing all it can and is operating at maximum capacity to process the largest possible quantity of sugar beet. Furthermore, the company's management has taken steps to make sure that the crop is not left at the plant's gate for many hours, a move greatly appreciated by the farmers.

Given these measures, operating at maximum capacity and unlikely sudden stoppage notwithstanding, indications are that production will exceed projections and the delivery rate will surpass the manufacturing capacity, thus creating a problem for company management and technicians. This matter requires immediate attention in order that we not miss the boat. We must also think about whether the quantities delivered from Dayr al-Zawr to the Sahlab plant are overtaxing and must look into the possibility of diverting them to another plant to allow the al-Ghab farmers to deliver their crop as quickly as possible.

It is worth noting that the area earmarked for tomato farming in al-Ghab has grown from 388 to 681 hectares or an implementation rate of over 163 percent, while yellow corn occupied 228 hectares; red watermelon, 548 hectares; and yellow watermelon, 216 hectares. The area earmarked for soybean grew from 441 to 885 hectares, an implementation rate of over 200 percent.

Hamah Province has designated 179,972 hectares, most of it unirrigated land, for barley farming and the province has also set aside significant areas for lentils, chick peas, grass pea, potatoes, and other crops that exceeded the levels set in the agricultural plan.

In Conclusion

Although the farmers have violated the agricultural plan, and notwithstanding the haphazard use of rationed water, the results will have a positive impact on the country's economy because the farmers' harvest will flow into the state coffers. It can also be said that the farmers' concern over the crops prompted them to violate instructions and use water in an unordered manner to save their

farms, without distinction between what is important and what is more important.

With due respect to all the efforts being made and the results that have been achieved, we find ourselves compelled to pose once again the question: Does it make sense to leave our crops and our farming activities at the mercy of the elements or should we control these elements in favor of our agricultural process? We hope control can be achieved!

TUNISIA

Central Bank Governor Interviewed on Economic Reforms

45040521a London AL-MAJALLAH
in Arabic 23 Aug 89 pp 39-40

[Interview with Ismail Khelil in Tunis: "We Will Not Back Down on Reform Decisions"; first few paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction; date not specified]

[Text] Ismail Khelil, the Tunisian Central Bank governor, is the preeminent official economic personality in Tunis today. He enjoys the powers of a minister and is the head of the government economic team.

These capabilities notwithstanding, he is the watchful eye of the economic process and, therefore, is often critical of certain manifestations.

Ismail Khelil is a courageous man, but he covers his courage with much composure and kindness. When he was asked to join the cabinet in December 1977—he was the ambassador to Brussels at the time—he turned down the position at a time when no one dared refuse an offer from Bourguiba, because he was opposed to the policy followed by the unions and Habib Ashur.

Moreover, Ismail Khelil is the author of the so-called reform or corrective program which was passed for the purpose of freeing the economy.

Not only is Ismail Khelil one of the most outstanding Tunisian economists, but he is also a world figure. He has worked more than once as an advisor to the World Bank, and has represented the Arab world at the IMF.

He is accused of being an advocate of total economic liberation, but contends that two things must be kept in mind in dealing with economic matters. We asked him:

[AL-MAJALLAH] Tunis is going through an economic crisis which some say is temporary and caused by the drought, and others say it is structural and caused by, among other things, the debt. How do you assess the situation and how successful is the reform program you helped pass in 1986, and which some say has been stalemated following the relatively positive results it attained in 1987?

[Khelil] We have to assess the gains we have achieved since the reform program was passed in the summer of

1986 to realize that most of the economic indicators have been positive. Exports, tourist revenues, and foreign currency reserves all point to success.

Tunis has been able to secure its foreign equilibrium and to correct the imbalances it experienced in 1986. By the end of 1988, the foreign currency reserves were enough to cover imports for 100 days, which was unprecedented since independence 33 years ago. This surplus in our balance of payments is a good indication of a sound economy and economic trends.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But no one can deny the difficulties we are facing.

[Khelil] We have actually been facing the circumstantial difficulties since last year. The drought and failed crops have had a negative impact on production and new job opportunities, in the farming sector in particular, and on the balance of trade as well. The country has had to import a large percentage of its food supply.

Of course, the severe drought for two years in a row is responsible for such complications, and we are hoping for better weather next season to help this situation.

Accordingly, I do not believe that the Tunisian economy is in a crisis. Exportation is still growing at high rates from year to year. Exports at current prices have increased by 40 percent, while imports grew at less than 36 percent.

Traditional tourism, particularly with European countries, has grown by at least 7 percent, and currency reserves during the first half of 1989 maintained their outstanding level of \$650 million, or enough to cover imports for 2 months, our need for substantial imports to cover food shortages caused by the drought notwithstanding.

All of these indicators substantiate the validity of the choices we have made since 1986, and have been affirmed by measures the new regime has adopted with a view to bolstering investor trust and peace of mind.

Better results could have been anticipated had we not had to grapple with the severe drought. We are confident, however, that economic recovery will take place, thus fostering the indicators we have mentioned, not the least of which is greater job opportunities.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What job opportunities? Are you going to continue the social employment policy which has nothing to do with production?

[Khelil] Employment takes top priority in our national concerns. We are making every effort to find social solutions to the unemployment problems. Nonetheless, we believe that the only way to curb unemployment is through profitable economic projects, which alone can provide lasting and productive job opportunities to advance economic growth.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Then will the reform program, which you drew up and the Central Bank approved, proceed?

[Khelil] The reform program, which was aimed at lending greater viability to the national economy, is not a magic wand. Things have not actually changed. Reform requires resolution and perseverance, and is accomplished over a number of years. A significant aspect of it is under implementation, for all the measures aimed at freeing investment, foreign and domestic trade, the loan policy, and personal initiatives are part of this program.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Privatization (transferring ownership to the private sector) remains only a hope despite statements supporting the transfer of a number of public sector firms to private sector ownership.

[Khelil] We have begun this process within the framework of a policy requiring the government to give up certain sectors or institutions based on competition. This policy is to be enforced according to a set schedule which we have honored. It is neither proper nor beneficial to back down on this reform we established in 1986, especially since it has produced good results despite inclement weather conditions. The reform program will guarantee the Tunisian economy's incorporation into the global economy, and will boost its competitive edge, especially in view of the developments occurring in Europe which is on the verge of unifying its markets in 1993.

Reform requires patience, perseverance, endurance, economic restructuring, and a shift from an economy dependent on the domestic market to one marked by flexibility and openness. This is a difficult and arduous process that requires much perseverance and extends into the end of the current plan, namely the end of 1991. It will inject new life into our economy by the beginning of 1992, when the economy will be marked by greater advantage, more flexibility, and less confrontation in foreign markets.

And whereas we have recorded a 1.6 percent annual growth rate, compared with 5.6 percent in 1967, and an estimated 3 percent for this year, we are satisfied with these modest rates that allow us to realize this shift and build a viable and flexible economy capable of producing high growth rates.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you not expected to back down on the reform program you have been defending since 1986, especially in view of the failure to implement a number of programmed measures, some of which are a bitter pill to swallow and may not be popular?

[Khelil] There is no chance of backing down on this policy and this reform. Many measures aimed at freeing the economy and personal initiative have been adopted and others will be adopted in the future, including greater control over public spending by controlling budget transfers for the benefit of the public sector or the subsidy fund.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is it not true that the recorded delay has affected the results of the reform program?

[Khelil] It is true. But all this has been caused by the drought and the difficult circumstances noted from 1988 to present. The drought did not allow the government to adjust basic commodity prices. It had a negative impact on job opportunities, exacerbating the unemployment problem. That is why the government decided to defer some of the decisions, especially since wages have not changed for several years and it was necessary to take these circumstances into account.

We have not made much progress in privatization for the same reasons. For at a time when enough job opportunities are not being created and agriculture is not putting out its usual production, the government plans to protect the rights of the employees working for the firms that it intends to turn over to the private sector. We do not want to add to unemployment when conditions are not propitious for taking in new employees.

All of this has prompted us to take our time. But in the wake of the positions President Ben Ali announced in his 25 July speech, the government has devoted its time to subsidy matters, the status of public firms it intends to give up, and the restructuring of the ones it plans to keep to boost their benefits and returns.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is it not true that Tunisia is as bad off today as it was in June 1986, and that it is unable to meet its obligations?

[Khelil] Not at all. Let us first mention that, whatever the difficulties of 1986, Tunisia is one nation that has never failed to meet its obligations and has paid its debts on time.

We are very solvent today compared with 1986, and Tunisia has ample foreign currency reserves, as we have demonstrated.

But this does not preclude the fact that foreign debts are weighing heavily on us for two reasons:

- Fluctuating exchange rates that have caused an artificial increase in our debts. The same value has doubled for reasons beyond our control. We are currently paying out more annually to meet our debt than we receive from abroad in terms of financial aid or loans, and this situation cannot be allowed to continue. This phenomenon emerged in 1986 but has intensified to the point of putting us in the red, for we are paying out 300 million Tunisian dinars more than we are receiving. It can be said that half of our debt is due to exchange rate fluctuations and not to any personal reasons related to us.
- The second reason pertains to a drop in aid and fixed-rate loans, keeping in mind that Tunisia's debts amount to no more than \$5 billion.

We are committed to the payment of our debt, and this is what we are doing now. We are afraid, however, that the debt may be satisfied at the expense of development.

Debt initiatives have cropped up all over the world prompted by the advanced countries' feeling that they are impeding the development process in Third World countries, thus affecting the industrialized countries themselves.

Some minds have come up with solutions for impoverished or heavily-indebted nations that have defaulted on their payments. Tunisia is neither this nor that, hence our feeling that it is being punished for not being poor and for not defaulting on its payment and that it enjoys a great reputation, as evidenced by the quick response to our loan request from the financial market.

Tunisia wants the Great Powers to find solutions to its debt problems, especially since these debts are public for the most part, and do not come from commercial banks.

What makes a solution necessary is the fact that Tunisia is suffering from high unemployment, and is working to achieve a higher growth rate. This is difficult to do as long as these high payments have to be met.

We have prepared a complete vision, which we plan to put forth this fall, in an effort to sensitize all of the friendly and fraternal countries, so that we may work together and with their approval to find a way to alleviate the debt burden.

Ports Said To Need Additional Expeditors

45040521b Tunisia AL-SABAH in Arabic 21 Aug 89 p 6

[Article: "Shipping at Tunisian Port: One Longshoreman in Morocco, 5 in Algeria, and 16 in Tunisia To Unload One Ship"]

[Text] There are 864 full-time and 1,784 part-time longshoremen working in Tunisian ports. By law, each longshoreman works 6 hours and 40 minutes a day, the period known in their lexicon as a shift. A longshoreman may work more than one shift a day, if he wishes.

The law regulating this occupation goes back to 1949. It was not until 1975 that it was partially revised as part of a joint agreement. Crew work in Tunisian ports is marked by close-knit organization among its members to the point of adopting work procedures and selecting activities according to the ship's contents.

We would like to point out that to unload an ordinary ship, 26 longshoremen are required in Tunisia, compared with 16 for Moroccan ports, and 14 for Algerian ports.

To unload a ship by using a transportation vehicle, one longshoreman is required in Morocco, 5 in Algeria, and 16 in Tunisia.

To unload a container ship, 3 longshoremen are required in Algeria, 8 in Morocco, and 16 in Tunisia.

Besides this bad situation, another example underscores the nature of this occupation. In 1970, a shift used to unload 120 tons of freight at Halaq al-Wadi Port and 300

tons at the Sfax Port. Although the unloading gear and equipment has been upgraded, this volume dropped in 1988 for the same period of time and the same size crew to 60 tons at Halqa al-Wadi Port, and only 150 tons at Sfax Port.

The longshoremen work schedules are prepared every morning on site, at the ports themselves, and priority is given to full-time and permanent employees. If the workload warrants, additional part-time longshoremen are added to the shift. An employee may work a second and a third shift during the same day if physically able, noting that working hours are 6:00 am to 12:40 pm (first shift), 1:00 pm to 7:40 pm (second shift), and 8:00 pm (third shift).

According to some sources, the average working day for a longshoreman is 1.7 shifts, and the average full-time salary is 318 Tunisian dinars and 950 millimes a month.

STM Company

The STM [Societe de Transport de Marchandises] Company employs 1,428 workers and cadres, and 80 percent of its trade is allocated for longshoremen wages. This firm supervises the longshoremen in its capacity as the one in charge of longshoring. It is clear that freeing this occupation has yielded highly positive results, particularly at Bizerte Port which is run by Mrs Hayat Laouani.

Some people have proposed that longshoremen appointments should be turned over to private firms hired by public tenders to run the day-to-day port operations.

Our global commercial exchange amounts to 16.5 million tons annually, 95 percent of which is done through national seaports located along the country's shoreline.

Some people are entertaining the idea of designating the ports of Bizerte and Jirjis as transit ports for foreign goods headed for Africa, America, and other countries.

INDIA

Reportage on General Sundarji's Interview on Bofors**Editorial on Sundarji's Revelations**

46001002 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
6 Sep 89 p 8

[Text] General K. Sundarji—the retired Chief of Army Staff and the man whose professional judgment was brought into play to clinch the 84000 million SEK howitzer deal in favour of Bofors between November 1985 and February 1986—has done the nation and the cause of truth a signal service by speaking out, in an interview to INDIA TODAY, on the facts, the details and the nuances relating to the decision making and crisis management process under the aegis of Mr Rajiv Gandhi. The distinguished soldier's revelations are of vital importance to two or three issues involved in l'affaire Bofors. They should help to clear the air of deliberate obfuscations and falsities that the Government has constructed in defence of the indefensible—a defence deal kickback of the order of Rs 64 crores, a failed crisis management exercise, the crudest of cover-up invoking the sanctity of national defence. In the first place, General Sundarji effectively sorts out the question of the quality of the gun (or the merit of the choice) from the issue of payoffs: the two should not be mixed up or confused and indeed the latter does not even, necessarily, impinge on the former. As he tells the story, the competition between the (French) Sofma gun and the (Swedish) Bofors gun was close on technical merit and it could have gone either way. However, the general felt that the evaluation exercise before he made his input was loaded unfairly in favour of the French howitzer (a factor he helped reverse, on the ground of a change in the security environment, in February 1986, barely a month before the Bofors-India contract was signed). While conceding that "there will be people who believe that it should have been the French gun," the general sticks to his guns, highlighting in the bargain several infirmities, flaws and subjective factors in the decision making process on a major item of national security choice. This is an important contribution to the people's stock of knowledge, and it would require a Prime Minister [PM] and a Government of notable insensitivity to challenge General Sundarji's credentials—especially his knowledge and integrity—with respect to such matters.

The second revelation made by the general reduces the Government's defence to the status of a smoking howitzer. Which is to say that after the scandal surfaced (through a broadcast by the news department of the Swedish National Radio) on April 16, 1987, two lines emerged within the Government and the decision making process. One, backed by those like General Sundarji and Mr Arun Singh, then Minister of State for Defence, demanded that a threat to cancel the lucrative contract should be pressed with the Swedish arms manufacturer so that inside information on the payoffs could be extracted. General Sundarji himself expressed the view (first orally and then in writing, on a

specific request from the Defence Secretary) that cancellation of the contract was "an acceptable risk" involving the cost of an 18 to 24 month delay in deliveries; he insisted that a threat to cancel the contract should be pursued as a matter of national honour—to clear the air of the stink of a kickback scandal which lowered the image of the armed services. He substantiated his argument uncompromisingly, in writing—the first time on June 12, 1987, again on July 14. Mr Arun Singh clearly shared the general's perceptions and instincts and, in consequence, considerable pressure was put within the Defence Ministry, on senior officials such as Mr N. N. Vohra and Mr S. K. Bhatnagar, to pursue the track of extracting information from a cavalier Bofors on pain of cancellation of the deal or black-listing in the future. However—and this is the long and short of the general's story—Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave short shrift to this effort to wring information out of Bofors. Strategically upon his return from Moscow in July 1987, he intervened on behalf of suppression of the hard ball game. The facts show that speaking at a Congress(I) convention in Pune on June 16, 1987, Mr Gandhi claimed that those who demanded the cancellation of the Bofors deal did not realise that their demand would result in weakening India's defence. A month later, he declared that he would not "compromise the nation's security to clear my personal name." Later, the Prime Minister asserted, inaccurately, in Parliament and elsewhere that the evaluation he had called for within the Defence Ministry had held that the nation could not afford ("on the security side") the cancellation of the Bofors deal. General Sundarji's facts and nuances give the lie to the morality and logic of the line the Government eventually pursued—and almost got away with. The Swedish company was allowed to escape with the unmitigated lie that it had paid no "commissions" to "Indians" (official or non-official) but had incurred only "winding up costs", which did not amount to breaching the assurance given to India. It is another matter that there are literally hundreds of pages of documented evidence—unearthed by this newspaper and other sections of the media—which have knocked the bottom out of such stories. After General Sundarji's explosive revelations—especially on the cover-up initiated at the very top—no leader, party or Government in a democratic system could legitimately hang on to office on the plea that no personal wrong-doing has been proved.

Gandhi Denies Charges

46001002 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 4 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept 3. The Prime Minister [PM], Mr Rajiv Gandhi, today said that the Defence Ministry would "answer" the points raised by the former Army Chief, Gen K. Sundarji, in an interview to the fortnightly, INDIA TODAY.

Talking to presspersons at the Delhi Airport before his departure for Belgrade to attend the NAM [Nonaligned Movement] summit, Mr Gandhi described as "not at all true" Gen Sundarji's charge that the Prime Minister had stalled the Defence Ministry's efforts to force Bofors to

reveal the names of the kickbacks recipients. "I don't think he knows or could understand the amount of pressure put on Bofors from my office," the Prime Minister said. Anyway the Defence Ministry would answer the question and, therefore, he would not like to get himself involved.

The former Chief of Army Staff had stated in his interview that after carefully weighing the likely consequences of a cancellation of the Bofors contract, he had come to the conclusion that the risks involved would be acceptable and that Bofors should be told that the contract would be cancelled unless it disclosed the names of those who received kickbacks in the deal.

Gen Sundarji also said that he had tendered this advice to the Defence Ministry, both orally and in writing. According to him, however, the then Additional Secretary in the Defence Ministry, Mr N. N. Vohra, had confided in him that the Prime Minister "lit into him for adopting a threatening approach towards Bofors" at a high-level meeting on July 4, 1988.

PTI reports:

Mr Gandhi reacted sharply when a correspondent drew his attention to the reported remarks of the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Mr N. T. Rama Rao, that jawans should refuse to fight with sub-standard weapons. "I think it needs to be looked into if somebody in a responsible position calls for a mutiny. I have asked the Home Minister to go into the matter," he said. [passage omitted]

Mr Rama Rao was confronted by a questioner representing a Congress(I) publication. "What do you know about the weapon (Bofors gun)? Do you know the ABC of weapons?" was the kind of questions asked.

The Chief Minister replied that he may not be an expert in Defence matters but the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) clearly established the Army's own preference for the Sofma gun, in comparison to the Bofors. The report reveals the parameters in which the Army measured the performance of the two guns and in how many ways the Sofma gun proved superior.

"I am not interested in this weapon or that weapon, but this is a matter concerning the security of the country. You know how the CAG report reveals two canisters being empty when they were test fired. My country is greater to me than my own mother. Out of agony and distress, I made the allegation as an ordinary citizen of the country who has a stake in this country's welfare and prosperity," Mr Rama Rao had said.

The questioner persisted "But don't you realise that your remark will cause mutiny?" The Chief Minister replied: "So what? If it comes, let it come".

At the end of the press conference a reporter asked the Chief Minister to explain what he meant by "mutiny." Mr Rama Rao replied that in a democracy the people have the right to demand the highest executive to establish his

innocence in the face of an allegation. But if the ruler fails to do so, and if he does not establish his credibility in the face of resignation by 106 MP [Member of Parliament]s and in the face of a countrywide bandh, what would the people do? Out of a sense of frustration the people would revolt, like they did in Russian Revolution".

A reporter said what happened in Russia was not a mutiny but a revolution. Mr Rama Rao then replied, "Both are the same." [passage omitted]

Government, Bhatnagar Statements

46001002 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Sep 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Sept 6. The following is the text of the Government statement on General Sundarji's interview to INDIA TODAY on Bofors, issued by the Press Information Bureau:

INDIA TODAY's cover story in its latest edition (1-15 September, 1989), has published an interview with General K. Sundarji, former Chief of Army Staff. It is significant that in his interview, the former Chief has reiterated that the selection of the Bofors system was entirely on merits and wholly free from any extraneous influence from any quarter. General Sundarji has again confirmed that it was the considered professional assessment of the Army Headquarters that the Bofors gun was the best suited to meet the challenges posed to our security by arms acquisitions in our neighbourhood. However, the interview, and the story based on it, are misleading and contrary to facts in many other respects. It is, therefore, necessary to get the record straight.

As regards the cancellation of the contract, the former Chief's assumption is not based on a complete awareness of the full facts and the sequence of events.

Originated With PM

The Swedish National Audit Bureau Report received on June 4, 1987 indicated that certain payments had been made by Bofors but did not disclose the identity of the recipients. On that very day, i.e. on June 4, 1987 itself, PM not only directed that immediate action should be taken to elicit the full facts, but also desired a complete evaluation of the implications of cancellation, including security implications, the financial impact, etc. It is thus clear that the idea of the possible cancellation of the contract emanated from the PM himself.

While carrying out the evaluation of the various aspects, in pursuance of the PM's above directions, the then Defence Secretary, Shri Bhatnagar wrote to the former COAS [Chief of Army Staff] on June 12, 1987 for his views on the security aspects of the cancellation of the contract. The former COAS's note, which was received on June 13, 1987, indicated that the cancellation of the contract would leave a large void in the vital artillery support to field formations for 18 months to two years, which he said he was prepared to accept as a risk. The note, however, did not contain any evaluation of the

precise security implications, the attendant risks, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of potential adversaries during this period, in relation to probable threat scenarios. These serious lacunae were pointed out to the former COAS and the note returned for examination. While the matter was being examined in the Ministry, a reminder was received from Secretary to PM to expedite the reply. A second note was received from the former COAS on July 15, 1987 which was in substance a verbatim copy of the first.

Reasons Given

The Defence Ministry made an overall analysis which brought out that the cancellation of the contract would have several serious implications. It needs to be emphasised that national security is much larger than its military aspect. It is the Government which is answerable to the people. Therefore, the views of the COAS, though important, cannot alone determine national security decisions. Consequently, the very first consideration with Government was the effect which a hasty cancellation of the contract would have on every aspect of national security. In this connection, it is relevant to note that the process of trial, selection, contracting and induction of this modern artillery system had taken a decade, and in this area India was well behind the levels of preparedness in the neighbouring countries. There was, therefore, in the then prevailing security environment, a definite risk attendant upon delaying the induction of such a weapon system.

It has to be borne in mind that in the first half of 1987, there were serious tensions on our borders with Pakistan. Developments on our borders with China were also causing serious concern in the country. Secondly, there was no assurance whatever that such a risk, even if taken, would have yielded either a disclosure of the identities of the beneficiaries or a recovery of the amounts paid. On the contrary, there was every likelihood that a cancellation would have been legally contested, and besides a prolonged arbitration a cancellation might well have cost additional penalties by way of compensation, etc. Moreover, the replacement of the Bofors system by another system, apart from the delays involved, would result in an additional financial burden of hundreds of crores of rupees. It would be recalled that the reasons advanced against the cancellation of the contract have been comprehensively debated in Parliament on more than one occasion.

'Distorted' Picture

The interview and the story give a distorted picture of the meeting taken by PM on July 4, 1987, on his return from Moscow. It has been alleged on an admittedly hearsay basis, that a "threatening approach" proposed to be adopted by Defence Ministry officials towards Bofors was turned down by PM. This has been based on a statement purported to have been made by Shri N. N. Vohra (then Additional Secretary). This allegation is baseless and it has been categorically denied by Shri

Vohra. Indeed the entire sequence of correspondence with Bofors, which has already been made public, would clearly establish that no effort was spared to pointedly seek all the relevant information from the company. Once the payment of large sums was established by Swedish National Audit Bureau, Bofors were again addressed on June 16, 1987 accusing it of having gone against the Government of India's wishes and demanding information regarding inter alia the precise amounts which had been paid, the recipients of such amounts, and the services performed by them. Repeated communications were also addressed to the Swedish Government. An aide memoire was addressed to it on June 17, 1987, reiterating the Government of India's earlier request for full information, and suggesting that since details were not contained in the Swedish National Audit Bureau Report, "such further investigations as may be necessary" be undertaken and the following information be conveyed.

(i) The precise amounts which have been paid and the amounts which are due to be paid by M/s. A. B. Bofors.

(ii) The recipient of such amount whether they are persons or companies and in the case of the latter, their proprietors/presidents/directors and place of incorporation.

(iii) The services rendered by such persons/companies with reference to which such amounts have been paid.

(iv) Copies of all contracts, agreements and correspondence between M/s. A. B. Bofors and such recipients.

(v) All other documents, facts, circumstances and details relevant to these transactions.

Swedish Assurance

On June 22, 1987, the Swedish Foreign Office assured that an official reply would be sent to the Indian Ambassador in due course. When none was received till then, another aide memoire was given to the Swedish Embassy in New Delhi on August 18, 87 by way of reminder. It will be seen, therefore, that in early July, this request of the Government of India was still with the Swedish Government. Specifically, it is to be observed that even in this letter of June 30, 1987, handed over on July 3, 1987, by Mr Bredin, vice-president of Bofors, the company reiterated its claim to commercial confidentiality. When questioned further on that occasion, Mr Bredin was unable to give an indication whether his superiors would be willing to disclose the relevant information during a personal dialogue.

The pros and cons of such a dialogue at a level higher than that of Mr Bredin were carefully considered. Keeping in view the fact that on June 11, 87 the establishment of a Joint Parliamentary Committee had already been proposed to the Presiding Officers of the two Houses of Parliament, it was decided that it would be appropriate to require of Bofors to furnish through a written reply the entire information already asked for.

Bofors were, therefore, addressed afresh on July 16, and once again asked to furnish specific replies to the questions already put to them. This refutes the allegation that PM turned down any move proposed by Defence Ministry officers to coerce Bofors to furnish the requisite information.

Allegation of Impropriety

It is unfortunate that the former COAS has knowingly committed the impropriety of disclosing the contents of 'top secret' document especially when it contains an assessment on matters relating to national security. From an article published in the INDIAN EXPRESS on September 5, it seems that the former COAS made similar disclosures of contents of classified documents while still in service.

Bhatnagar's Statement

My attention has been drawn to the cover story on Bofors gun contract in the latest issue of INDIA TODAY (1-15 September) containing certain references to me as former Defence Secretary. There are many elements of the story as well as the statements attributed to me in the interviews given by Gen K. Shundarji (retd) and Lt Gen H. Kaul (retd) which need to be corrected and put in the proper perspective.

As desired by the Prime Minister, I had asked the then Chief of Army Staff in writing to examine the security implications of the option of cancelling the Bofors contract. This was in early June 1987. His views were communicated, as far as I recall, in a very brief and somewhat cursory communication (less than a page) around the middle of June. I considered it necessary to request him to re-examine in a comprehensive manner the implications of a possible cancellation, because his note had dealt rather cryptically with this crucial aspect. Since it was a top secret document, I cannot go into further details. Gen Sundarji undertook to further examine the matter and the note was returned to him.

As no communication was received for some time, I remember reminding him in mid-July, as Prime Minister's office was pressing the Ministry of Defence to send a comprehensive note after fully examining all the aspects. Any insinuation that I asked Gen Sundarji to modify his views in any way is unjustified and without basis. The relevant record in the Ministry of Defence will speak for itself.

Gen Sundarji's description of the meeting taken by the Prime Minister on July 4, 1987 is factually incorrect. I find it difficult to believe the remarks Gen Sundarji has attributed to the then Addl. Secretary, Shri N. N. Vohra, because I along with several others was present at the meeting. This hearsay account given by Gen Sundarji is contrary to facts and can be easily checked up with Shri Vohra and others present at the meeting.

The impression sought to be created that there was any let-up in the efforts to obtain the necessary information

from M/s Bofors is entirely incorrect and unjustified. Gen Sundarji could not have been aware of the persistent efforts which were being made by the Ministry of Defence in this regard.

As regards the statement made by Lt Gen H. Kaul (retd), I wish to clarify that he only told me that some intermediary had approached him with a big offer to help a particular company. I state categorically that the company Lt Gen Kaul mentioned was neither Sofma nor Bofors. On my expressing surprise as to how he was accessible to such an intermediary and on my asking him for a detailed written report, Lt Gen Kaul was not forthcoming with the necessary information. If Lt Gen Kaul had given any written report to the late Gen Vaidya, I am sure the latter would have initiated suitable action thereon.

National Front, CPI-M Appeals

46001002 Madras THE HINDU in English
4 Sep 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 3. The National Front has appealed to the President, Mr R. Venkataraman, to advise the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, to resign from office in the interest of the nation's security and purity of administration and public life.

In a letter to the President, the National Front Convenor, Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh, has drawn attention to the 'startling disclosures' about the Bofors deal made by the former Chief of the Army Staff, Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji, in the course of an interview to INDIA TODAY.

According to Mr V. P. Singh, these disclosures completely demolished the blatant untruth which the Prime Minister personally and the Government had been giving in Parliament and outside that it was on the advice of the Chief of the Army Staff that no threat was issued to Bofors for the cancellation of its contract in the event of its failure to reveal the names of the recipients of the kickbacks.

"Sensitive Issue": Quoting Gen Sundarji that it was the Prime Minister who blocked the move for the cancellation of the contract with Bofors to extract details of the kickbacks, the letter says that 'it is thus quite evident that the Prime Minister would not have adopted this adamant posture unless he was deeply interested in the Bofors kickback episode. It is most distressing that to shield the beneficiaries, he has not only told untruths to Parliament, but has also played with the sensitive issue of the security of the country.'

Appealing to the President in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and as the ultimate guardian of the constitutional system, the National Front letter said that Mr Venkataraman had turned down 'on the advice given to you by the very

Government which has everything to hide about the Bofors deal' representations seeking sanction to prosecute the Prime Minister.

Crusade: The President has also been apprised that it was only when every effort made inside and outside Parliament to bring out the truth in the Bofors deal and the attempt to protect democratic institutions 'was scuttled or drowned in the chorus of blatant untruths by the Government and the ruling party that the Opposition members and some members with a conscience belonging to the ruling party resigned from the membership of the Lok Sabha and chose to carry their crusade to the people, a decision that had now been vindicated by Gen Sundarji's disclosures.'

It is against this background that the National Front has appealed to the President as the custodian of the nation's interests to advise the Prime Minister to resign from his office.

CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist]'s charge: The CPI(M) has also called for the resignation of the Prime Minister in the wake of the interview. In a statement issued here today, the Politburo said that once again, from an authoritative source, the cover-up on the Bofors pay-offs had been confirmed. This time, from the Army Chief himself, the evidence of the cover-up pointed directly to the Prime Minister.

The interview showed categorically that there had been a deliberate attempt to shield the culprits at the highest level of the Government. The question, as Gen Sundarji pointed out, is not the quality of the Bofors gun but to find out in the national interest who had benefited from the illegal payments, the statement said.

According to the Politburo, Mr Rajiv Gandhi could no longer evade responsibility in the matter and therefore he should resign forthwith and the Lok Sabha should be dissolved. 'The country is entitled to know the full truth behind this squalid affair which has a serious bearing on the country's security and integrity.'

No Action Against Sundarji

46001002 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 9 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept 8. The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, today assured that no action would be taken against the former army chief, Gen K. Sundarji, on the charge of having violated the Official Secrets Act.

Speculations about the possibility of such action have been rife ever since the defence ministry accused the general of disclosing classified documents while still in service.

At a press conference at the airport on his return from Belgrade, Mr Gandhi was asked a pointed question on the possibility of action being taken against Gen Sundarji. The question was: "It appears that instead of

replying to the charges made by Gen Sundarji, a threat is being held out against him under the Official Secrets Act."

The Prime Minister's answer was categorical. "No, there is nothing like that," he said. But he chose not to say more on the subject. "I do not want to say anything beyond what the defence ministry has said because the ministry will give the answer (to the outstanding aspects of the charges made by Gen Sundarji). But I will see what is left (out) and if anything is left (out), I will see that a full answer is given."

Mr Gandhi appeared to skirt another pointed question on the subject. The question this time was: "One aspect that has not been dealt with by the defence ministry on the Sundarji interview is that in your interview to SUNDAY last November you had said the military stated an almost categorical 'no' to the cancellation of the (Bofors) contract. Now Gen Sundarji has said it was otherwise."

Mr Gandhi replied: "It is the government which is responsible for (the country's) security. The assessment is that of the government. The government's assessment comes from a number of aspects. The army is only one (such aspect)."

The newsperson intervened to say: "The question was of the military aspect. You had said the military has said a categorical 'no' (to the cancellation of the contract)." Mr Gandhi replied: "The military aspect is there in the security perception."

He did not expand beyond this. In fact, he brought the press conference to a close at this stage with a "thank you", which kept newsmen guessing whether he had referred to the military opinion about the cancellation of the contract in his SUNDAY interview or was it the overall government opinion.

Wellington (Tamil Nadu) (PTI): Gen Sundarji today refuted the former defence secretary, Mr Bhatnagar's statement that he had asked him (Sundarji) only to re-examine the security implications on possible cancellation of the Bofors contract and not modify his views.

Gen Sundarji said at his residence here this morning that Mr Bhatnagar's statement was "totally untrue."

Gen Sundarji said he had made it clear in his letter that cancellation of the Bofors contract was a risk but he had accepted it as it was one way to make Bofors come out with the identities of recipients of the alleged pay-off. He said he still held the same view.

Gen Sundarji said if a re-examination of security implications of cancellation of the Bofors contract had been required, as made out by Mr Bhatnagar's statement, "they should have written to me so".

The statement of Mr Bhatnagar, currently governor of Sikkim, was not "true", he reiterated.

Asked about the defence ministry's accusation that he had committed an impropriety by disclosing the contents of a top secret document relating to national security, Gen Sundarji said he had "no comments to make on this".

Reiterating his views on the quality aspect of the Bofors field gun, Gen Sundarji said Bofors guns were "second to none in quality and had an edge over other guns of the same class".

Gen Sundarji today accused national opposition parties of "playing politics" in the Bofors gun deal controversy.

He said by commenting on the quality of the Bofors gun, the opposition had only shown themselves up "as dishonest".

Gen Sundarji described the opposition parties' clamour on the Bofors issue as nothing but an "election gimmick".

He criticised the Andhra Pradesh chief minister, Mr N. T. Rama Rao, and other opposition leaders for their comments on the quality of the Bofors gun and Mr Rama Rao's using his (Mr Sundarji's) name to strengthen his claim that the guns were "substandard". "These leaders have no business to comment on the quality of the gun", he added.

Gen Sundarji said he had made public his view on the Bofors issue because he wanted to ensure that there was no compromise on quality and it should not be mixed up with corruption in purchase of arms.

Gen Sundarji said he nurtured no political ambition nor did he aspire for any position of power in government after retirement, as alleged by some Congress leaders.

He also discounted the rumour that he would contest the coming Lok Sabha elections.

He said he was, in fact, thrice offered ambassadorships and a gubernatorial posting, Mr Gandhi himself had offered the posting just few weeks before he laid down office as chief of army staff, but he had declined it. He had always felt that many such institutions were "politicised", he added.

PAKISTAN

Bhutto's Role in Obtaining U.S. Aid Praised

46000017a Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 17 Sep 89 p 6

[Text] The U.S. Senate has recommended 460 million dollars as assistance to Pakistan for the fiscal year 1990. In July the house of representatives had okayed 445 million dollars. Hence there is a gap between what the two houses of the U. S. Congress have separately recommended. The House of Representatives, where a powerful appropriations committee has always been tough on Pakistan, has tightened the purse-strings, whereas the

Senate, more sympathetic, has raised the sum. Now the final decision will come at the end of the current month after a joint session of the house and the senate. One should remember, however, that the cheese has already been pared. In March, the U. S. State Department had set the ball rolling by asking the Congress to give Pakistan 621 million dollars within the framework of the six-year aid package worth 4.02 billion. Before the request came up for hearing in the Senate, it was already 170 million dollars short of what Pakistan wanted. But the U.S. Congress has not approved the entire foreign aid bill required by the Bush Administration for 1990. Pakistan has to tighten the belt a little in the coming twelve months.

Although the State Department had warned congressmen that any cut in the assistance to Pakistan this year would seriously impede the developmental activities of the government of Ms Bhutto, the cuts have taken place. As it has developed over the past six months, the downturn in Pakistan's economy has not slowed down. Last year's floods and ethnic disturbances took a heavy toll of the economy but the law and order situation that seriously hampers economic activity has not followed the change of heart in America about Pakistan. Instead, the federal government's quarrel with the Punjab and Balochistan has gone into the upper gear with allegations in Lahore that funds are being blocked by Islamabad, a charge that Islamabad denies. These developments are going to affect the federal government's ability to collect the revenue it had projected in the budget 1989-90. The Balochistan government wants to change the constitution and gain control over natural gas and the Punjab politicians are eying agricultural exports from the province for augmenting the province's income. In these circumstances, the 460 million dollars a part of which will be converted into grants, are crucial for the government in Islamabad. U.S. interest in Pakistan has continued after the winding down of the Afghan war. Considering the fact that the Reagan administration had bowed out saying it could not certify Pakistan's nuclear programme any further under the Pressler Amendment, things have taken a turn for the better after the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The American interest is not suddenly disappearing after the Soviet exit from Afghanistan. Washington wants to see that the government following the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] in Kabul is favorably inclined to it and that Pakistan sitting next to Afghanistan is still willing to co-operate with it on Afghanistan. On the other hand, Ms. Bhutto has succeeded in convincing the Congress that she doesn't follow policies that run counter to American interests. She has moved more effectively against the heroin mafia than the government of Colombia. As for the nuclear issue, the Senate in particular has grown over the years to understand Pakistan's point of view in regard to the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons through the non-proliferation treaty and inclines to the regional concept that the latter has been advocating the South Asia. It is more or less certain that Pakistan would get the 1990 part of the aid package

and that will ensure the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] another year in power, allowing it to disregard the calls made by the opposition for mid-term elections. The money will postpone the crisis. It is the permanent cure, however, whose consummation should be devoutly wished.

Advantages of Rejoining Commonwealth Described

46000017b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 pp 6, 7

[Text] Pakistan finally rejoins the Commonwealth on October 1, after 17 years of estrangement. It will be now its 49th member with Namibia waiting in the wings to complete the half-century mark. It was the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government in 1972 that led Pakistan out of the association and it has been returned to it by the same government in 1989. Pakistan's efforts to rejoin the Commonwealth assumed seriousness when the prime minister visited Britain in July. With India dropping its opposition to Pakistan's sailing back into the Commonwealth, the actual readmittance was looked upon as a mere formality. General Zia launched his first *Ballon d'essai* in this regard as early as 1980. The Commonwealth forum refused to accept a military regime because of the fact that most of its members represent functioning democracies.

While the question of rejoining has occupied the foreign ministry, and the prime minister is credited with taking the crucial initiative, people on the whole have generally tended to be lukewarm. The lack of interest or enthusiasm is quite distinct in this case. It is true to a great extent that the Commonwealth does not bestow any tangible economic benefits nor is it a club of nations that can influence any bilateral dispute between its members. Besides, all decisions have to be unanimous. It could also be argued that the decisions have to be unanimous. It could also be argued that the decision to leave the Commonwealth was, after all, not extraordinary. Barring the compulsions of nostalgia and historic association of our leaders, the Commonwealth of 1970 was no longer the kind of profitable co-operative enterprise that it earlier was. Britain was well on its way to joining the European Economic Market. The trade preferences system was almost over, and even the college fees for our students had skyrocketed. Most importantly, the difficulty faced by Pakistanis living in Britain about their status has now been overcome one way or the other. Why, then, must we go back? The answer to this is quite convincing. We have to pursue the foreign policy principle that Pakistan should avoid the isolation of being outside any international forum. The benefit will mainly consist in becoming part of an exclusive body of almost 50 states of Asia, Africa, Australia, America and Europe, about half of them faced with comparable problems of development and social and political growth. The fact remains that given the common language of English, the Commonwealth's potential for promotion of learning and education in member countries is considerable.

Ghafoor Ahmed Criticizes Decision To Rejoin Commonwealth

46000014b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] Karachi—Prof Ghafoor Ahmed, secretary-general of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI], has criticized the government decision of rejoining the Commonwealth. He said that instead of taking both the houses of Parliament, the prime minister has taken an arbitrary decision.

He said that it was a decision of an individual and not of the entire nation. Prof Ghafoor Ahmed said the government on one hand claimed to be a democratic one while on the other it had negated all the democratic norms. He strongly criticized the decision of rejoining Commonwealth and said that before taking this decision the parliament should have been taken into confidence. He said that till the time the parliament did not approve the decision it should not be implemented. He said that since both the houses were in session the government must take them into confidence on the issue.

He said that the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government had disappointed the masses in regard to the legislative business, and it was not appreciative that when the session of the National Assembly has been summoned by the president the ordinance has been promulgated. He said that the ordinance could only be issued at the time when the assembly was not in session.

The IJI leader also asked the federal government to make efforts to ease the tussle between the provinces and the Center.

Britain To Help Develop Country's Railways

46000013b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 16 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] Islamabad—The British government will provide an assistance from its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funds for the development of Pakistan Railways. Haji Zafar Ali Khan Leghari, federal minister for railways said here yesterday.

Talking to newsmen at the Islamabad airport on his return from the U.K., he said that the British Railways would prepare a feasibility report to bring an improvement in the Pakistan Railways within a period of three months. A joint communique, he added, had been signed in the U. K. in this regard.

A team of British railway experts will soon visit Pakistan to study the railway sector and make it economically viable besides enabling it to provide better services to the people.

The railway minister paid a ten-day visit to the U. K. at the head of a three-member delegation after attending the independence celebrations in Libya.

The minister was of the opinion that a property development board on pattern of the U. K. would also be established in Pakistan for proper utilization of railway land and other resources.

Mr Leghari said that railway fares would not be upwardly revised to overcome better services to the people.

The British Railways, he said had also agreed to provide reconditioning and air conditioning services for the used coaches of Pakistan Railways.

The minister said that second class air-conditioned coaches were expected to start from Karachi to Rawalpindi from December next. They would be named "Zulfikar Express".

Besides, he added, another programme of starting shuttle trains from Karachi to Hyderabad, and Lahore to Rawalpindi was also under consideration. These trains would be non-stop.

Mr Leghari said that the financial assistance extended by the Italy would be utilized for electrifying the Khanewal-Samasatta railway section.

Mr Leghari said that the World Bank would provide loan for the railways during the current seventh five-year plan. The loan was not provided in the previous five-year plan.

The minister said that the katchi abadis, which had developed in the railways lands, would not be disturbed. The dwellers of these abadis, he said would be given ownership rights. Besides, the railway quarters would be sold out to the railway employees on subsidized rates.

Haji Zafar Leghari also said that Pakistan would compete in the international tenders regarding railway track and "man-made river" projects of billions of dollars to be floated by Libya.

The minister explained that the "man-made river" project could absorb about 5,000 Pakistani workers. The project, he added, would include laying of pipelines and water filtration work.

The railway track project of 800 kilometers costing dollars 200 billion would be initiated in 1992.

The Libyan government was keen to help Pakistan and had positive posture for Pakistan's participation in the international tenders of the two projects, he added.

Minister Hayat's Press Conference Criticized

46000019a Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 18 Sep 89 p 12

[Article by Tahir Ikram]

[Text] Islamabad—Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat's press conference failed to deliver the goods. The press conference scheduled for 5.15 p.m. in the committee room number seven of the Parliament House was first boycotted by the

press because the minister was late. Simultaneously, the assembly session was going on thus making the reporters uneasy for wasting time at a press conference which was delayed beyond half-an-hour. Ironically, when the minister entered, the reporters were leaving and no amount of persuasion brought them back. Eventually emissaries of the minister pleaded for reason and forgiveness and the reporters left the press gallery to return to where the press conference was being held.

After a long chronological recollection of facts about the Frico milk scandal, and putting the blame on the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] for having allowed the import in the first place, Faisal Hayat had to admit that the milk was not fit for human consumption.

This, many reporters interpreted was indirectly endorsing the viewpoint of the Punjab government which was warning people through advertisements about the danger of that milk.

In fact, Saleh Hayat's effort was to dispel the impression that PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government directly or indirectly had anything to do with the milk. However, reporters, especially those sympathetic towards the IJI were reluctant to see this side of the coin. They insisted that in essence the minister had admitted what he had avoided to comment upon in the beginning, that the milk was dangerous, if consumed.

Apart from the detailed and comprehensive explanation of the commerce minister, it was also learnt that the federal investigative agency (FIA) has been ordered to enquire into the case and fix responsibility on the custom officials responsible for the 'lapse'.

While this was going on the fourth floor, committee room number seven, the House was doing the business as usual, which means no business at all.

Except for points of order which travelled back and forth between the opposition front and back benches, nothing seemed to be taking place.

More time is perhaps consumed by the frivolous points of order than on the agenda, which one is sorry to say is again, not an agenda at all.

For one, the legislation is completely out and secondly the members seem to take the Parliament as a joke.

Chaudhry Shujat Hussain, leader of the opposition in the absence of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, used an unparliamentary word against the government which was expunged by the deputy speaker, Begum Ashraf Abbasi. Later he repeated the same word thrice asking how it was unparliamentary and earned quite a few laughs from his colleagues.

Chaudhry Ashraf, another IJI back bencher and quite fond of points of order tried to explain the semantics of the word implying it was not unparliamentary and hence permissible. One must praise his keen sense of intelligence but the speaker thought otherwise and ordered him to sit down.

The impudence to the chair is manifesting itself more with time, and especially when Begum Ashraf Abbasi is in the chair, the members seem to take things more lightly.

Last evening the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] appeared to be vindicating old grudges with their political allies. First during the question hour Youth Affairs Minister Pervaiz Ali Shah, was ramrodded with questions over the youth delegation taken by the federal government to youth festival in North Korea.

The list contained the names of Sheikh Rafiq Ahmed, secretary-general of the PPP, and Qayum Nizami, the information secretary of the party. Members wanted to know how come 'such youthful persons' were included in the delegation and how old were they.

MQM was particularly intrigued and asked at least half a dozen questions. Later Waseem Ahmed, agitated to stress the need for bringing his adjournment motion to the house which sought to discuss the 'mass migration of people from interior of Sindh'.

He was so overwhelmed by the urgency of his motion that he preferred to ignore that the house had suspended rules for another adjournment motion tabled by the IJI against the rise of power rates by WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority].

He insisted, and rather vehemently, that his subject was more important and urgent thus requiring immediate attention of the house. His fellow members belonging to the MQM shared his perceptions and shouted again and again that the adjournment be considered or at least the government should fix a date.

In keeping with his style of not committing anything, Tariq Rahim promised to take it up at the "earliest opportunity." In the end, the House simply continued the talking out of the adjournment motion by the IJI members.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Hafiz Hussain Ahmed and a few other members agitated for consideration of their adjournment motion on similar lines. They wished to discuss the arrest of 40 youth from outside the Parliament House on Thursday when they tried to protest against the rising inflation and price hike. That matter will be taken up when Malik Meraj Khalid returns from Lahore where his wife has taken ill.

PPP Accuses Wardag of Attempting To Disrupt Sindh Peace

46000015b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 p 2

[Text] Karachi—Leaders of Pakistan People's Party, Hyderabad, have alleged that Mr Asif Wardag was distributing huge sums of money among certain elements in Hyderabad on the pretext of organizing a public meeting and was trying to create turmoil in order to disrupt the peace of that city.

In a statement issued here, the leaders of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Hyderabad, Mr Nuzhat Pathan, Pervez Leghari, Saghir Qureshi and Mirza Ashiq Hussain said that IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] had also distributed huge sums of money in an attempt to disturb peaceful conditions in Sindh besides webbing intrigues to encourage people to pitch against each other.

They alleged that IJI was attempting to restart bloodshed through miscreants in Sindh.

They said the city of Hyderabad had already suffered due to IJI intrigues and it could not afford the situation again.

The leaders appealed to the people of Hyderabad to remain peaceful and be vigilant against such intrigues and called upon the government to take immediate notice of the activities of the subversive elements and initiate speedy action against them—APP.

Mian Sahib States His Position Against Government

46000019b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 18 Sep 89 pp 6, 8

[Text] In his latest statement, the Punjab Chief Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif has catalogued his complaints against the federal government. According to him, if the federal government adopts the right attitude, the confrontation can be ended within 24 hours. In the long drawn-out feud between the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] government in the Punjab and the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government at the Center, the foremost casualty has been credibility. Since Mian Sahib's statement is comprehensive it would be in order to give its salient points here.

- The federal government is using federal agencies like the Federal Investigative Agency, the Income Tax department, the Federal Land Commission and the nationalized banks to victimize the IJI members and supporters in the Punjab.
- Economic development in the Punjab is blocked because the federal government is not releasing funds earmarked for the province and is refusing to pay for expenditures incurred at its behest.
- No discussion is held on disputed matters between the province and the Center, which has not been the experience in the past. The last National Economic Council meeting displayed a total negative attitude towards the provinces.
- The Center's refusal to convene the session of the Council of Common Interests [CCI] demonstrates its reluctance to settle outstanding disputes with the provinces and its deviation from the position that it respects provincial autonomy under the constitution.
- The federal government is using its leverage with the federally recruited civil servants to embarrass the Punjab government, ordering officers out of the province without consultation with the provincial government.

- Corruption at the federal level is spawned in the secretariat of the prime minister and the prime minister has no control over the decisions made in her offices.
- Ms. Bhutto is more mindful of the advice rendered her by the Indian secret agency RAW [Research and Analysis Wing (Intelligence Agency)] than by the right-minded Pakistanis. Pakistani state secrets have been surrendered to the Indian prime minister.

Since Mian Nawaz Sharif has expressed himself as reconciled to the constitutional tenure of the PPP government, it would be useful if the above complaints are studied and answered by the federal government whose leaders are equally articulate in favor of democracy and constitutional rule in the country. For those who are on the sidelines, it is almost impossible to arrive at the truth and pin clear blame on one party or the other. For instance, federal minister of state for finance, Mr Piracha, has recently denied the charge that his government has been blocking money to the Punjab. Since Mian Sahib has proof of what has actually happened he should order his finance minister to go public on the statistics proving federal persecution of the Punjab. The journalists, who have been floundering in a sea of confusion, would dearly love an opportunity to publish something other than the ordinary froth of abusive rhetoric. The matter of transfer of civil servants has been pending since day one and is owed to the total lack of communication between the Center and the Punjab. Given the atmosphere of extreme distrust and animosity, it is difficult to expect the PPP government to convene the CCI if the constitution makes such an act the prerogative of the incumbent government. However, a recourse to the supreme judiciary is open for both parties complaining of constitutional violations.

Just as one cannot close one's eyes to the wrongness of the PPP actions in the Punjab earlier on, one finds it difficult to ignore the stratagem adopted by the IJI to embarrass the PPP leaders and supporters. According to Mian Sahib himself, anything can happen. Allegations of police being used in the Punjab to harass opposition have swelled. As if to counterpoint this tendency, there is news that some IJI leaders have been attacked in Sindh. Because of this unscrupulous use of the police and its intelligence branch, the conduct of the department has deteriorated, giving rise to an unprecedented crime wave sometimes involving the police personnel. People are speculating about a possible physical clash between forces employed by the Center on the one hand and the Punjab on the other. The abusive rallies held by the IJI (Mian Sahib denies the charge of indecent language), have reinforced the dread possibility of a kind of civil war played out by the two bureaucracies. Yet, despite all this, the leaders are vowing their allegiance to democracy and constitution. Since all avenues of accommodation have failed, why can't we turn to the Supreme Court and let the conflict be resolved on the basis of its verdict?

Ajmal Khattak: Pakistan May Be Dragged Into Afghan War

46000011b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 15 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] Karachi—Mr Ajmal Khattak, a veteran leader of the Awami National Party, has warned that if the war continues across the Afghan border, it will engulf the entire region.

He said that Afghan president, Najeeb was ready to come to Pakistan for the sake of peace in Afghanistan, so the rulers should consider the matter keeping in view that the war was not serving the interests of Pakistan. He said that no country could achieve anything except destruction through war, and the Afghan people were being badly affected by the flames of war.

He said that the Pakistani rulers had annoyed our neighbouring countries while "we claim to be the friend of those who are sitting thousands of miles away from here and cannot be able to save our country." Mr Khattak said that it was not the war between the mujahideen and the Afghan troops, but its implications were most significant for the whole region.

Addressing a big gathering at Karachi Press Club, on the occasion of launching of a book about the Afghan revolution Thursday, he said that if the Afghan war continued then the people living in Karachi would also be not saved. He warned that there was tremendous pressure on Najeeb government to launch an offensive against Pakistan, but he, so far, had resisted it.

He said that the Afghans had become revolutionary and it was a big achievement that a society had been transformed from the tribal setup into a revolutionary one. He said those who were thinking that they could undo the Afghan revolution were negating the history which was not capable of going anti-clockwise.

Mr Ajmal Khattak urged upon the writers and intellectuals to convince the rulers of peace on both sides of the borders.

Ajmal Khattak Criticizes Qaumi in Qilabi Party

46000018b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 18 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] Quetta—The Awami National Party [ANP] is struggling for the rights of oppressed people and the party has not deviated from its principled stand on national and international issues.

This was stated by Ajmal Khattak, central leader of the Awami National Party while addressing a public meeting in Liaquat Park here yesterday evening. The meeting, presided over by Mohammad Rahim Kakar, was also

addressed by Haji Ghulam Sarwar Yasinzai, Mir Abdur Rehman Kurd and Sajid Tareen.

The ANP leader said the imperialist forces were sabotaging the struggle of the ANP to achieve their nefarious designs in the region because the "ANP is the only force in the way of American imperialist and its lackeys in the region".

Criticizing the leaders of QIP [Qaumi Inqilabi Party], Mr Ajmal Khattak said those elements had already decided in April this year to form their own party although "one of them in Kabul agreed with me that they will strengthen the ANP but after returning to Peshawar he changed his mind". The leader of the ANP announced that Pushtoons, Baloch and Sindhis could not succeed in their struggle separately. He called upon nationalist and progressive forces of smaller nationalities to launch a joint struggle for their national, political and democratic rights.

Ajmal Khattak asserted that Pakistan was in serious crisis and now the COAS [Chief of Army Staff] Gen Geg, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab had accepted that reality. He warned that if political forces did not realize the gravity of the situation Pakistan might have to face grave consequences.

The ANP leader alleged that Pakistan and the U.S. imperialist were interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and creating problems for the revolutionary government in Kabul. He said Pakistan's policy of fueling the Afghan civil war was not in the interest of Pakistan because the war could spill over to this side of boarder as there was, he said, pressure on President Dr Najibullah from Afghan people to retaliate against Pakistan. He called upon Pakistan to abide by the Geneva accords so that the Afghan issue could be solved through negotiation.

Awami National Party Leader Criticizes Qaumi Inqilabi Party

46000016a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 p 3

[Text] The provincial president of Awami National Party, Bashir Ahmad Bilour has said that imperialist forces had been busy in conspiring against the ANP [Awami National Party] since its very inception but the sincere and conscious workers of the party always foiled such plans.

Commenting on the recently established Qaumi Inqilabi Party, the ANP leader in a press statement issued yesterday alleged that the newly-launched party was aimed at dividing the ANP cadres with their secret contacts with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]'s leadership and in this connection, he claimed that top leaders of the QIP [Qaumi Inqilabi Party] had clandestine meeting with Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad.

Bashir Ahmad Bilour also alleged that the QIP's name, constitution, manifesto and flag was already approved in a meeting of QIP leaders held in Swat on April 13 and 14

last. He said efforts by prominent scholars and ANP's leader, Ajmal Khattak were made to bring the leaders of QIP back to the party fold but since they had to tow the PPP policy, they refused to return.

He said the increase in the prices was generating hatred among the people.

Bashir Ahmad Bilour said that ANP was the changed form of 1930s struggle which could not be eliminated by temptations or intimidations and added that people could not forget the Liaquat Bagh firing case, Hyderabad tribunal.

He said the QIP should have displayed its revolutionary reaction against the ruling party for massacre of Pukhtoons in Afghanistan. He said Pukhtoons were now conscious enough and could discriminate between good and bad.

General Beg Reiterates Commitment to Democracy

46000011a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 15 Sep 89 p 6

[Text] Talking to journalists at the GHQ in Rawalpindi, Chief of the Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg has reiterated his commitment to the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and has underlined it by saying that his entire top-brass agreed with his policy of non-interference in civilian affairs. General Beg repeatedly asserted that the armed forces of the country were subordinate to the civilian government and were committed to the system that maintained the ascendancy of the civilian government in a representative order. The general also explained that he was compelled to deviate from the normal course of military's isolation from the civilian setup by the necessity to explain the army's position vis-a-vis the new democratic order. He was aware of the fact that there were elements within the country that did not want democracy and wished to create ambiguities about the real position of the army to reap advantages in the current political contest. A periodic explication of the army's 'hand-off' policy had, therefore, to be made.

Those who are scared that the democratic order bequeathed to the country by the 1988 elections might turn out to be an Indian summer should be rejoiced by the latest statement of General Beg. His words carry conviction because it was after his ascent to the rank of COAS [Chief of Army Staff] in August last year that the decision to go back to a democratic order was taken and chairman of the senate asked to announce a definite election date. The world perceives the army in Pakistan to be the paramount power. It has ruled the country directly and indirectly for most of its life and by now has a reflex that would cause a coup d'etat to take place without risk of any misadventure. The other party that is centre stage in Pakistan is the United States of America that holds the purse-strings and is able to render advice that cannot be ignored in Islamabad. The third party is the person of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan buttressed by unprecedented powers in the amended constitution.

It is clear that all the three parties are agreed on allowing the democratic order in Pakistan to continue and consolidate itself.

The role of General Beg will attain a historic meaning if democracy is saved today and allowed to last into the next century. What caused confusion in the run-up to the general elections last year has now emerged as a highly evolved policy that will give a positive direction to the country's armed forces. Whenever the rumours gathered strength that the army would not let the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] rule if it won at the polls, General Beg pronounced clearly that the party who won fair and square would be able to rule. The IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], which contained vestiges of General Zia's reign, was reputed to be the army's party destined to rule once again under a democratic order. There were equally rumours about coups after the elections which the COAS lost no time in quashing. Till recently, the public mind could not grasp the fact that the army could truly be non-aligned in this period of high passions. But General Beg's unequivocal and almost blunt avowal to stay out of civilian affairs and be content with a role subordinate to the civilian government, should set all worries to rest. Under him, the army is worried about its professionalism and its competence to fend off the threat of aggression against Pakistan. This is good for Pakistan and, by example, good for the entire Third World where armies conquer their own people.

Balochistan Chief Minister Akbarkhan Bugti Interviewed

46000013a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
(Weekend Post) in English 15 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] [FRONTIER POST] You have said in your speech that the 1973 Constitution is an imperfect document as far as provincial autonomy is concerned and it needs to be amended. What would you suggest in an amended charter of provincial autonomy?

[Bugti] Well, at least, as much as the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy]—of which Peoples Party was also a member—had agreed upon. That gave the Federation only four subjects and the rest to the provinces. This was, as you might recall, what the committee headed by Malik Qasim had proposed. Now Malik Qasim is sitting there with them.

[FRONTIER POST] The composite parts of your Balochistan National Alliance, especially its student arm BNM, are very progressive. How would you explain your current shift and co-operation with right-wing parties of the national scene?

[Bugti] Shifting where? From what to what?

[FRONTIER POST] You are supporting the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] in national politics which is right-wing.

[Bugti] The IJI is supporting us. The IJI is one of the components of our government. It is one of the four-member parties who are in coalition with us in Balochistan. They are supporting us rather than we supporting them.

[FRONTIER POST] But...

[Bugti] There are no buts about it.

[FRONTIER POST] You have said that in your meeting with the President you had asked him to take measures to save the federation but he had replied that under the Constitution these can be taken only if special conditions are so warranted. Has he indicated the circumstances which might prompt his intervention?

[Bugti] What intervention?

[FRONTIER POST] Intervention in the current circumstances to fulfill his constitutional role and save the government of Federation from chaos?

[Bugti] Right now do you think that would be unconstitutional?

[FRONTIER POST] It isn't. But has he indicated what exactly would prompt him to do so?

[Bugti] If you dig out the text of his speech at Quetta you'll find it. I had told him what those conditions are today. I said that he should put the things on the rails. They've off the rails right now. Federal government today is taking extra parliamentary steps and unconstitutional acts. He should correct things on a constitutional basis.

[FRONTIER POST] The President has not acceded to your demand for action which means that his assessment of the situation is not grave?

[Bugti] I am not concerned with whether he has or not whether he can or not. That's his decision and judgement.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you think circumstances prevailing today warrant a mid-term poll?

[Bugti] Anything is likely.

[FRONTIER POST] For instance?

[Bugti] I said anything is likely.

[FRONTIER POST] We actually mean to ask whether in your opinion there should be mid-term polls?

[Bugti] Why should there be and why should not there be mid-term polls. The Prime Minister can ask for them at any time. She has the legal right to ask for it. For that matter, in any country of the world, the Prime Minister or the President can ask for a mid term or a quarter-term poll. There are no bars to it.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you think it should be done?

[Bugti] If she thinks it should be done, it should be done. Don't ask me, ask her.

[FRONTIER POST] In your opinion, is the time ripe for it.

[Bugti] From whose point of view.

[FRONTIER POST] Form your point of view.

[Bugti] My point of view? We have been elected by our people for five years unless, some kind of monstrosity falls from heaven we have to represent them.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you think the 8th Amendment should be repealed or kept on the statutory books?

[Bugti] Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, she does not have the requisite two-third majority in the National Assembly to repeal it.

[FRONTIER POST] But what do you think in principle, what is your personal opinion? Should it be repealed or not?

[Bugti] Initially, I was not supportive of the 8th Amendment. But then seeing the Prime Minister's ways and methods, we are convinced that in spite of having limited authority, she has taken such unconstitutional actions that if we empowered her, she will completely ruin the country. Tabahi macha de gee.

[FRONTIER POST] So the 8th Amend....

[Bugti] I am not saying 'so'. You are saying that.

[FRONTIER POST] Has Balochistan been affected by ethnic strife in Sindh?

[Bugti] No. So far it has not been affected by it. I cannot say about tomorrow. It is our problem though. A large number of our people are settled in Sindh. Even my own tribesmen. In fact there are more Bugtis in Sindh than there are in Balochistan.

[FRONTIER POST] The Punjab was always opposed to provincial autonomy. But lately it has started demanding it. What do you think about this?

[Bugti] We were called traitors. If you (Punjab) have joined the ranks of traitors, face the charge.

[FRONTIER POST] Don't you see the difference? When Balochistan in the seventies demanded more provincial autonomy, the Punjab intelligentsia was all for it. Now when some leaders from the Punjab demand it, the Punjab intelligentsia in not exactly supporting it. Don't you see the difference between the intent and support of demand then and now?

[Bugti] This is your own affair, this is your headache; we are not involved in that whether you are for it or against it. I have nothing to do with it.

[FRONTIER POST] But you have appreciated in the IJI forum that Punjab is siding with you for more provincial autonomy?

[Bugti] Quite right. I made that statement. And I have nothing more to add to it.

[FRONTIER POST] Federal Justice Minister Iftikhar Gillani will see you on 10th? Will you ask for a meeting of the Council of Common Interests [CCI]?

[Bugti] CCI is for any disputes between the federating units and the center or a single federating unit and the center. There is some dispute right now.

[FRONTIER POST] But he is coming with an offer of a Provincial Coordination Council (PCC) forum?

[Bugti] Yes I know. That's 'Gup Shup' forum. You know what 'Gup Shup', is? Like we are having right nor over tea.

[FRONTIER POST] You think nothing would come out of it except 'Gup Shup'?

[Bugti] Ask your Shah Sahib, what's his name?

[FRONTIER POST] Iftikhar Gillani. He is hopeful that something will come out of it.

[Bugti] Let him be hopeful. I don't want to make him hopeless. He is already hopeless. If he wants to have tea and 'Gup Shup' without purpose, then he can come with the PCC.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you think your coalition with the JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam], Pakhtoonkhawa and the IJI will hold together?

[Bugti] I am not a Wali Allah nor am I a Prophet. How can I tell whether it will or won't?

[FRONTIER POST] Do you support the Punjab CM [Chief Minister] or the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] one on the Kalabagh Dam issue?

[Bugti] I support myself.

[FRONTIER POST] Meaning thereby?

[Bugti] I support myself. When we go to the CCI, you will know what I mean.

[FRONTIER POST] Your demand for royalty of gas...

[Bugti] I have asked for royalty; I have asked for 'the revenues'.

[FRONTIER POST] You say that these revenues be given to you...

[Bugti] They are ours. They should not be given to us. They are ours. They come out of my land. I am the owner of it. You usurp and take these away.

[FRONTIER POST] The Constitution clearly comes the tapping of all natural resources as a federal prerogative

[Bugti] I am not talking of the Constitution. I am talking of the natural right.

[FRONTIER POST] But the Federation has been subsidizing the budgets of your province in return for this?

[Bugti] They distribute Annual Development Plan. And that's our right.

[FRONTIER POST] About the People's Works Programme in Balochistan...

[Bugti] I am not conversant with the term. I only know of people's workers nawazish programme. There is no such thing as people's works programme. And there is no such thing in Balochistan.

[FRONTIER POST] It seems you are not happy with the Federation? The concessions that you ask for, no federation can give you. Do you then propose a confederation?

[Bugti] I haven't followed your question?

[FRONTIER POST] Let's put it that way that now that we have a weak center, you could have more hopes of extracting concessions than...

[Bugti] I did not know that we have a weak center.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you think we have a strong center. A center is as strong as the provinces that back it. This government at the center has no command over two provinces while it has coalition governments in the other two.

[Bugti] They are not weak. They are trying to assert themselves and they are trying to impose their will on us. We are resisting it. They are taking extra constitutional steps. They have violated the Constitution time and again. A weak center would not. Only a strong one would.

[FRONTIER POST] Would you elaborate on their extra constitutional steps.

[Bugti] I am not under interrogation you 'akhbar wallas should ask questions, not hold interrogations. Ask questions, get answers and 'Bas Khtum' (That's all).

[FRONTIER POST] Please let us clarify. This is not an interrogation. Just that your answers are not very clear and we want an elaboration.

[FRONTIER POST] You say that natural gas is our property. Do you imagine what will happen if Sindhis say tomorrow Karachi Port, from where 80 percent of the country's revenue comes, is their property?

[Bugti] I did not know that 80 percent of the country's revenue comes from Karachi Port. From what figure have you arrived at that? All our import taxes are levied at Karachi.

[FRONTIER POST] but okay lets put it that way, that a considerable revenue of the country...

[Bugti] Not considerable - Some...

[FRONTIER POST] Same is the case with other things. For instance, electricity which is generated by the NWFP.

[Bugti] It is theirs. It is theirs. Do you understand? It is theirs.

[FRONTIER POST] Does that mean that the billing of the whole country's electricity should go to the NWFP?

[Bugti] Well, every question does not merit an answer.

[FRONTIER POST] Do you view the situation of the country as stable?

[Bugti] Far from it. It is unstable. It is getting more unstable by the day. The Federation is fighting with us and the Punjab and now with the President, armed forces and armed commanders of forces. Can you think of anyone with whom they do not have some kind of a rift? And the rift is only self-created.

Government Policies Blamed for Price Hikes

46000018a Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 18 Sep 89 p 3

[Text] Syed Sardar Badshah, chairman All Pakistan Audit and Accounts Association and president of Frontier Civil Accounts Association, has criticized the government policies which he claimed resulted in the price hike and were haunting the low-paid salaried class.

In a statement issued in Peshawar on Sunday, he said the democratic government in its last budget announced 5 percent interim relief to the government employees but it proved just an eye wash in the face of the persistent sky rocketing prices which had unbalanced the budget of the low-paid employees families.

He appealed to the prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, to immediately announce 50 percent dearness allowance of the basic pay to enable the low-paid government employees to meet the extra burden due to recent price hike. He said during the past 11 years, the pay committee of 1987, totally ignored the employees of 1-15 pay scales which had adversely affected these employees.

He suggested delegation of the powers of the pay commission to the Services Reforms Commission to review the pay scales of the low-paid employees. He proposed a service structure for the audit employees in which an auditor be granted promotion up to the pay scale 18 on seniority-cum-fitness, and demanded scale numbers for junior auditor, PBS 15, for senior auditor, PBS 16. He also demanded 50 percent selection grade for scale No 15, 16, 17 and 18 for scale No 11, 15, 16 and 17 respectively.

He urged that the word of the audit employees was quasi-judicial and technical. So under the analogy of the federal civil secretariat, the audit employees be given 20

percent audit allowance of basic pay. The audit department, he argued, could be an apparatus of accountability only when it is made autonomous and the Auditor General of Pakistan is answerable only to the Parliament. He demanded delegation of the powers of administration and technical control to the Auditor General.

The rest of the demands he made included restoration of Rest and Recreation Allowance, Eid Allowance, equivalent to the basic pay of an employee—minimum 20 percent and maximum Rs 200/—monthly medical Allowance, 100 percent of the basic as House Rent Allowance, 20 percent of the basic pay as Conveyance Allowance, minimum house building advance Rs 2 lakh, minimum Rs 25000 as Scooter Advance and proprietary rights on easy installments of the official accommodation to the government employees under the house allotment scheme.

Opposition Voiced to 'IMF Dictated' Budget, Economy

46000010b Karachi *BUSINESS RECORDER*
in English 11 Sep 89 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 10: Senator Prof Khurshid Ahmad has observed that preparation of budget and economic policies in IMF and World Bank framework are in the long term injurious to the economy of the country.

In an exclusive interview, he observed that the endeavors of these donor agencies were to keep Pakistan's economy linked with world capitalistic system which was also detrimental to the country's interests. He said if we mobilize domestic resources fully and properly including foreign remittances, we will become independent of the IMF and World Bank's stringed loans.

He advised the government to plan credible projects on the analogy of PIDC [Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation] in the areas from where considerable number of workers have gone overseas, and after setting up industries, transfer them in the private sector.

This will not only attract billions of dollars held up foreign savings but will also go a long way in making the country economically independent.

He, however, said that if the country is forced to accept international loans then these loans should be received on equity financing basis and must be had from those countries which agree to transfer technology to Pakistan including China, Japan, Holland, Brazil and Scandinavian countries.

He observed that the United States and United Kingdom had most miser approach towards transferring technology.

He said the existing international loan financing was damaging for the economy of a country because it was being made irrespective of the economic viability of the

project. And the donor countries received back the capital invested along with the interest even if the project fails.

He also criticized the policy of raising interest based tax free domestic loans and suggested promotion of domestic savings and raising of loans on equity basis.

He advised the government to go for establishing joint venture with the interested countries on the equity financing basis specially with Muslim countries.

About the present economic situation, he said inflation was rampant in the country and observed that real inflation rate during the current fiscal year will become 25 percent while the official sources will try to conceal it from the public through juglary figure work. He recalled that during the days of Z.A. Bhutto the inflation rate also registered 20 to 24 percent increase between the period from 1974 to 1976. About the increase of electricity tariff, he observed that it will cause "cost push inflation" in the economy and make the life of common public miserable.

He recalled that Wapda had already increased electricity tariff by 16 percent prior to present increase of up to 20 percent and had earned rupees three billion. And asked where did the huge amount of rupees three billion went when the Wapda did not have any viable big plan of power generation before it.

Government To Allow Women To Play All Sports

46000016b Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 p 12

[Text] Islamabad—The federal cabinet has decided to allow the women to take part in every game both in and outside the country as banishing the female from playing is a move which no civilized society is going to encourage.

Confirming the news, the minister of sports Qadir Bukash Mela, told *THE FRONTIER POST* yesterday that the Pakistani women have been encouraged to play "tennis" and "athletics" during the SAF Games beginning in Islamabad in the first week of October this year.

Permitting women to play, he said was like inviting trouble, as certain sections of society had taken it upon themselves to exploit the issue to settle their political scores. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government, he added, was fully conscious of the sensitivity of the issue and would not do any thing contrary to the public aspirations.

The minister said that the government just wanted to test the public reaction by permitting women players to display their talents on the ground. Women players he added, would not be allowed to play, if the government found any public resentment against the women playing outdoor games. Women players would be supplied with specially tailored suits to wear before playing on the grounds, he said.

About the elements opposing the women playing outdoor games, the minister said such individuals must watch women like a "gentlemen spectators". Press. Mr Mela said, could play a role in frustrating the designs of all such elements who did not wish women to play games.

Answering a question, the minister said that the former military ruler Gen Zul-ul-Haq had banned the women hockey team terming it contrary to the Islamic values and norms. The PPP government which too stands for a true Islamic-oriented society, he said, will permit women to play all type of games provided the people of this country too wished so.

Increase in Tarbela Power Capacity Planned

46000010a Karachi *BUSINESS RECORDER*
in English 11 Sep 89 p 3

[Text] Lahore, Sept 10: The installed capacity of Tarbela Dam power generation will be raised from the existing 1750 megawatts to 3478 mws by October 1992, thus providing an estimate 3751 mws per annum additional energy to the electricity system on completion of the extension project units of the Dam.

This was disclosed in a detailed briefing about the on-going projects at the world's largest earth filled dam by senior Wapda officials to a party of Lahore-based journalists who visited the Dam yesterday.

The work on project units 11 to 14 commenced in June 1984 after the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) approved the scheme with an estimated cost of Rs 10,957 million with foreign exchange component of Rs 4,922 million.

Over 2,000 laborers are working day and night on the extension project with contractual contributions from South Korea, Austria, Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan besides Pakistan.

Saeed Akhtar Niazi, General Manager (Hydel), Mahmud Hussain Qizalbash, Chief Engineer Power House and Mohammad Akram Khokhar, project director detailed the journalists about the extension project.

However, the Wapda officials said despite such an increase in the output of the power generation, the country would still not be able to meet its electricity requirement which at the present stood at 5000 mw.

They underlined the need to conserve the electricity and stressed that this could be done on voluntary basis by avoiding extravagant use and display of electricity.

The officials disclosed that Pakistan was one of the few countries in the world where domestic consumption of electricity was greater than industries.

But at the same time, they declared that Wapda was fully conscious of the needs of the nation and stressed the

importance of establishing more hydel projects for generating energy and at the same time keeping electricity tariffs in check.

One of the officials said Wapda has drawn up 14 power generating schemes based on hydropower but financial constraints has prevented these projects from taking-off.

The officials said the hydropower was the cheapest form of the electricity which could be generated in Pakistan as the country was blessed with plentiful of water and it was imperative that optimum use was made of this resource to overcome energy shortage.—APP

Palejo Addresses Problems of Sinomis

46000015a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 17 Sep 89 p 2

[Text] Hyderabad—Secretary-General of Awami National Party Rasool Bux Palejo said that if Sindhi youth rose for their legitimate rights nobody would be able to keep them slaves anymore.

Addressing a big rally of Sindhi youth at Keenjhar Lake in Thatta district. He said Sindhi people have been made slaves because they mistook their masters as Muslim brothers.

He said that opportunities and vested interests whenever found their interests endangered they started exploiting Holy Quran and Prophet to press the poor Sindhis.

He said time had passed when people could be befooled and exploited in the name of Islam and Holy Quran. Sindhi people have woken up and nobody could dare keep them slaves for long.

He complained that Sindhi members of National Assembly never spoke on the floor for the cause of Sindh and members of other provinces decided the fate of Sindhi people.

Mr Palejo said the present education system had only promoted copying competition.

Hunger Strike: Six organizations of students of Agriculture University Tando Jam have decided to go on token hunger strike outside the main gate of the university. The student organizations have taken this decision to protest against university decision refusing admission to three students in M.Sc.

SNA [Sindh National Alliance] Office-Bearers: The general council of Sindh National Alliance has elected Mr Abdul Hameed Jatoti, chairman. Mr Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Dr Hameeda Khuhro co-chairpersons Gul Mohammad Jakhani, secretary-general, and Qamar Rajper as joint secretary. The names of other office-bearers and decisions of general council are yet to be made public.

Editorial Urges Removal of Flammable Materials

46000014a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 16 Sep 89 p 6

[Text] One wonders whether our authorities have heard the deafening explosion at Lahore. On Thursday, the blast in a chemical shop in the Circular Road killed 10 people and about 25 were hospitalized with severe injuries. The official handout from the government has expressed grief over the incident, sympathized with the affected families and promised (again) that all chemical shops and depots of explosives would be shifted out of the urban areas, very soon. One recalls with great dismay similar promises from the authorities on similar tragedies last year at Shahdara and Badami Bagh.

One fails to understand the reasons for the negligence of our authorities towards urban safety. There are scores of firecrackers factories, crude oil depots and chemical shops right in the heart of some of our most densely populated areas. But mishaps have never caused the clearing out of these potential ojhris from the urban areas. Perhaps they do not realize that with a war on our northern frontiers going on for many years, we need to be careful about possibilities of sabotage. By having these booby traps in our cities, we are exposing ourselves to the risk of inflammable situations. May one remind that such an inflammable situation after the Ojhri blast, an act of foreign sabotage, had led to the toppling of a government?

Article Discusses Eighth Amendment, Attorney General's Role

46000007 Karachi *THE MUSLIM*
in English 22-25 Sep 89 pp 4, 7

[Article by Senator Prof Khurshid Ahmad]

[22 Sep 89 pp 4, 7]

[Text] [Passage omitted] In response to my rejoinder to his statement published in the PAKISTAN TIMES of August 24, 1989, the Attorney General chose to draw up on an article of mine written in October 1985 while discussion in the National Assembly on the Eighth Amendment was unfolding and a final version of the Bill on which consensus was sought had yet to crystallize. In that article I had emphasized that "Constitution must never be tailored to suit individuals howsoever noble or great they may be. Whenever institutions have been tailored to fit individuals, such institutions have not outlived the persons for whom they were made." I also emphasized that "Constitution should always be a consensus document. It should be above party politics." In view of this, I had submitted that the amendments made by PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government during 1972-77 (except the one about the Ahmadis had been incorporated arbitrarily in the interest of and at the strength of the party in power alone, and "were never accepted by the nation and never enjoyed the confidence of the people." I had requested the Official Parliamentary Group and the Independent Parliamentary Group to arrive

at a consensus, as "parliament is competent to amend a consensus Constitution through a new consensus."

General Thrust

While I stand by the general thrust of my argument and acknowledge that the final consensus version of the Eighth Amendment did correct a number of weaknesses and lapses of P.), 11, 14, 20 and 24 of March 1985, there is scope for improvement in a number of provisions of the Constitution as they stand today. Negotiations between the PPP, the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and other opposition groups, and dialogue between representatives in the national Assembly and the Senate is the only way to arrive at an agreed set of amendments to the Constitution.

Every Constitution is a living document and is expected to respond to the challenges that emerge from time to time. I had written in my first rejoinder (full text published in *The Nation*) that "even those who had certain reservations about some provisions of the Eighth Amendment are now heaving a sigh of relief, admitting that now there is a better balance of power and a more effective set of checks and balances between the President and the Prime Minister, safeguarding the process of democracy in the country and restraining the People's Party from becoming wielders of despotic power." I confess, I am one of them. If I had adopted the technique the learned Attorney General had chosen to follow, I could have advanced ample material to draw from the positions he took in the Asma Gilani case.

I would like to thank the learned Attorney General for correcting me on the matter of constitutional amendments made by Ge Ziaul Haq. I have no hesitation in admitting that he is right in the case of President's Order No 3 of 1979 through which Chapter 3-A in Part VII of the Constitution was added, i.e. the creation of the institution of Shariat Benches at High Courts and Supreme Court. However, it deserves to be noted that this Amendment represented a step in the direction of fulfilling the Islamic provisions of the Constitution and was vastly acclaimed in the country and abroad. It added to the rights of the people and did not deprive them of any rights that the Constitution ensured them.

Secondly, the Attorney General disclaims my observation that "during the entire PPP rule—1972-77 the country was under Martial Law or was under Emergency powers and suspension of fundamental rights." He justifies that Bhutto had to become a civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator [CMLA] because the Supreme Court laid down that after abrogation of the Constitution, the 'law-giver' of the land was the CMLA. If this was the position then what was the status and role of the National Assembly in adopting the Interim Constitution (1972) and the Constitution of 1973? And if, according to the Supreme Court, President Ayub had no authority to hand over the reins of power to Gen Yahya Khan and that Gen Yahya Khan was a "usurper", how could he transfer legitimate power to the civilian CMLA and the

two act as valid law-givers? Has not the Supreme Court observed in the Asma Gilani case that:

Civilian CMLA

"Kelson, therefore, does not contemplate an all-omnipotent President and Chief Martial Law Administrator sitting high above the society and handling its behests downwards. No single man can give a constitution to the society which, in one sense, is an agreement between the people to live together under an order which will fulfil their expectations, reflect their aspirations and hold proviso for the realization of their selves. It must, therefore, embody the will of the people which is usually expressed through the chosen representatives. It must be this type of Constitution from which the norms of the new legal order will derive their validity... A person who destroys the national legal order in an illegitimate manner cannot be regarded as a valid source of law-making."

Was it really essential for Mr Bhutto to take over and continue as Chief Martial Law Administrator? Did Mujibur Rahman become a CMLA in Bangladesh or did he just take over as Prime Minister and framed a new Constitution? Is it not a fact that the Assembly was called in April 1972 only after persistent demands from all parts of the country and after all efforts on the part of the PPP government to justify continuation of Martial Law had totally failed? Is it not a fact that all actions taken under martial Law by Mr Bhutto were given blanket indemnity in the Interim Constitution (1972) as also in the 1973 Constitution (Article 270)?

About continuation of Emergency and suspension of Fundamental Rights, the Attorney General's claim is not correct. Emergency was imposed on November 23, 1971, and "continued in force by Article 280 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and varied on 21st April 1977." It was revoked by a Presidential Proclamation dated September 15, 1977. During the period of Mr Bhutto's government, there was not a single day on which Emergency did not remain imposed on the country.

The learned Attorney General claims that Fundamental Rights were suspended on July 5, 1977. Perhaps, he has forgotten that the accord between PPP and PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] which he has invoked contained as item number seven, the following:

The declaration of Emergency shall be withdrawn on the signing of the Accord and all Fundamental Rights shall stand restored, nor shall a new Emergency be imposed for the duration of the Accord except with the previous approval of the Council.

If Fundamental Rights were not suspended, what had been sought to be restored? He claims Fundamental Rights were restored in August 1974. To set the record straight, let me quote from the Report of the Amnesty International, London, for the year 1975-76:

"The pattern of arrest and detention in Pakistan of critics of the government:—mainly under the emergency laws—has continued over the past year. Those arrested include writers, editors, printers and, on one particular occasion, even lawyers assisting in cases of a political nature... In December 1975, Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiar stated that there were only nine political prisoners in Pakistan. Amnesty International feels that this figure in no way reflects the true scale of political imprisonment... "In November 1975, unofficial estimates of the number of political prisoners in Pakistan ranged as high as 38,000. This figure appears to be based on a statement given by the government of Sindh province, giving the total of prisoners detained during 1974 under preventive detention laws (other than DPR) 36,279. Figures of a similar range were given by the government for 1972 and 1973... Amnesty International estimates on the basis of these and other reports that at least several thousand prisoners are actually in prison for political reasons."

Amnesty International Report for 1977 expressed deep concern about the detention, trial procedures, and treatment of government opponents in Pakistan. It estimated that "before 1977, there were already at least several thousand political prisoners in Pakistan, the vast majority held without trial." The Report described "the serious erosion of fundamental rights in Pakistan reflected in the post-election events."

The learned Attorney General has also claimed that "not a single amendment was passed by throwing out any member of the opposition from the Assembly," and has asked me to specify the date and the amendment which was passed by throwing the opposition MNA [Member of National Assembly]s out. He has called my allegation "baseless" and "wild statement." It is not my memory that is failing; it is the Attorney General who is trying to hide facts and to mislead the public.

The facts are that on November 14, 1975 when the Assembly was discussing the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill, members of the opposition were not allowed to introduce amendments, were harassed and then on the pretext of disorderly behavior, thrown out physically from the Assembly. Although only three persons were named by the Speaker, almost all opposition members—including the acting Leader of the Opposition Mufti Mahmud and Mr Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri who held the floor at the time of adjournment—were thrown out, not only out of the Assembly Hall, but also out of the Assembly building.

The doors of the Assembly building were shut and opposition MNAs not allowed to enter the premises. The opposition members alleged that they had been thrown out by FSF personnel. Proceedings of the National Assembly for the day, including the Prime Minister's speech which is full of fury, are an index of the attitude of the party in power. The privilege motion moved by Mr Ahmed Raza Qasuri on August 17 and 19 provided irrefutable record of this shameful incident.

Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, then an MNA, who was also thrown out, although not amongst those named by the Speaker, records in his book *Phir Martial Law Aagaya* (Jang publishers, 1988, p 72):

November 14, 1975: I wish the day had passed differently in the history of Pakistan. It had been an achievement of the PPP that it had taken the opposition into confidence and produced an acceptable Constitution. The scenario changed after that. Till then we had been complaining that the government was not working according to the Constitution. It then resorted to bringing about amendments in the Constitution simply on the basis of its brute majority,—amendments that changed the very structure of the Constitution. The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill was steam-rolled on November 14 without giving the opposition and opportunity to express its viewpoint. Opposition MNAs were thrown out of the Assembly by persons belonging to the Federal Security Force.

Outside doors of the Assembly were closed and the Bill was passed in twenty-three minutes after that (expulsion)."

This is the evidence given by one who was physically thrown out. The disgraceful event has also been recorded in a number of books published in the world. Let me quote Professor Khalid B. Sayeed, who records in his book *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (Praeger, New York, 1980):

"Later, during a National Assembly session in November 1975, when the opposition members voiced their bitter opposition to the way the government was pushing through a constitutional amendment limiting dissent, the Federal Security Force was brought in and several protesting opposition members were beaten and physically ejected from the assembly (p 107)."

A special correspondent of *The Guardian*, London, also records the incident in a story published on February 6, 1976. Let the readers decide who is distorting facts: the Attorney General or someone else?

The Attorney General insists that amendments to the 1973 Constitution were not arbitrary because they were passed by the majority. Nobody denies their having been passed by majority.

PPP had 102 captive votes in the Assembly of 144. The whole question about their arbitrariness relates to three aspects: First, they were introduced by the government on the basis of brute majority without taking the opposition into confidence and as such they destroyed the consensus character of the Constitution. Second, the amendments changed the very character of the Constitution, abridging the authority and independence of the judiciary and depriving the people of Fundamental Rights that were ensured by the 1973 Constitution. Finally, they were arbitrary because they were introduced by silencing the opposition, by gagging the press and, at least on one occasion, after physically throwing

out opposition members from the Assembly. All this may fail to convince the learned Attorney General, but any impartial observer of the Pakistan scene cannot deny that the Constitution of 1973 was mutilated by none other than the leadership that had been instrumental in introducing it in the first place.

[23 Sep 89 pp 4, 7]

Before we examine the major issues involved in discussion over the Eighth Amendments, it would be worthwhile to frankly state that while the Constitution of 1973 had been accepted as a compromise document on which consensus was reached, it suffered from a number of weaknesses and imbalances. Mr Bhutto wanted a Constitution of the presidential type, very much in line with the Ayub Model. The Interim Constitution was almost a replica of Ayub's Constitution of 1962, as has been rightly described by G.W. Choudhry, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule*, London, 1988, pp 23-24.

It was under irresistible pressure from the opposition and the overall political climate of the country that he was forced to agree to a parliamentary model. He, however, took every care to so strengthen the position of the Prime Minister. The scheme of checks and balances that is essential for the healthy operation of a parliamentary system was destroyed. This inherent weakness of the 1973 Constitution has to be kept in mind when we are examining the Eighth Amendment.

Note of Dissent

The opposition was conscious of this weakness of the 1973 Constitution, and had placed on record their strong differences on a number of issues in the form of their notes of dissent to the Report of the Constitution Committee, 1973. Of special significance are the notes of dissent contributed by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, Prof Ghafoor Ahmad, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Mufti Mahmud and Mr Mahmud Ali Kasuri (*Constitution-making in Pakistan*, National Assembly of Pakistan, 1973, pp 121-141). For the sake of record, the following excerpts from the note of dissent by Mr Mahmud Ali Kasuri deserve to be noted:

"Instead of a full-fledged democracy and a parliamentary government, we are provided with a government wherein the Prime Minister will have every opportunity of becoming a dictator. Once a person has secured his election as the Prime Minister, he can act and continue to act, in defiance of the wishes of the majority of members of parliament or even the overwhelming majority of members of his own party. The constitutional expedients which have been introduced in the name of stability and will be effective for the first fifteen years of the Constitution (later reduced to ten years) find no parallel in any country of the world. A Prime Minister/Chief Minister, who has the power to dismiss a

parliament/provincial Assembly, even when the legislative body has manifested its desire to express no confidence in him, which incidentally can only be ensured by a majority of two-third of the entire strength of the House, is not a servant of the legislature, nor is he "responsible to the directly-elected representatives of the people", but is its master who would possess the constitutional authority to dictate to his legislature...

"This is not parliamentary government, but is Prime Minister's/Chief Minister's dictatorship. It is interesting to note that official designation of both Hitler and Mussolini corresponded to "Prime Minister". The President proposed in the Constitution is a mere burden upon the exchequer and apparently performs no useful function except of denying to the Prime Minister a 21-gun salute. The concentration of too much powers in the hands of any one man has its own risks and may prejudice the growth of parliamentary government in Pakistan.

"The President has been completely eliminated from the chapter of the Constitution dealing with the Armed Forces and the Prime Minister has been given the authority to raise and maintain military, naval and air forces of Pakistan, to grant commissions in these forces and to appoint their Chiefs of Staff. It would have been appropriate to vest these powers in the President acting on the advice of the Federal government. We should avoid giving even an impression that the Armed Forces are the armed forces of the Prime Minister and keep these as the forces of Pakistan (Constitution-making in Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan, 1973, pp 138-139)."

Imbalance

Most of the constitutional experts have taken note of this imbalance and have expressed reservations about accepting the 1973 Constitution as genuinely conforming to the parliamentary model. Justice Dr Nasim Hassan Shah's view, as recorded in his recent book *Constitution, Law and Pakistan Affairs* deserves to be noted:

"The claim that the 1973 Constitution provides for a parliamentary form of government is debatable. In a parliamentary form of government the cabinet, i.e. the persons forming the government, are answerable to the legislature and must enjoy its confidence... The provision that the President shall be the Chief Executive Authority in the State has now been done away with... in fact as well as in law, the Prime Minister is (now) to be the Chief Executive of the Federation.

"In view of the pre-eminent position granted to the Prime Minister under the Constitution, a special procedure has been laid down in the Constitution itself as to the manner in which he is to be appointed... Once elected by the majority of the total membership of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister has been ensured security of tenure to enable him to run the government without the fear of being easily displaced from his office. The stability of tenure is ensured in two ways:

"Firstly, a resolution of a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister shall not be moved in the National Assembly unless, by the same resolution, the name of another member of the Assembly is put forward as the successor. It is only if the resolution is passed by a majority of the total membership of the National Assembly, the President shall call upon the person named in the resolution as the successor to assume office of Prime Minister.

"Secondly, the Prime Minister can advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly, which advice being binding upon him. The members of the National Assembly will not easily think of moving a resolution of no-confidence against a Prime Minister which may entail the dissolution of the Assembly and thereby of termination of their own status as members thereof.

"The special position granted to the Prime Minister shows that the 1973 Constitution does not provide for a classical parliamentary form of government where the Prime Minister can be removed by simple majority. Here the Prime Minister is practically irremovable. Thus the system of government envisaged in the 1973 Constitution can fairly be described as an amalgam of a parliamentary and presidential system or a mixed system."

Referring to the amendments made in the 1973 Constitution during 1973-77, particularly the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Justice Dr Nasim Hassan Shah says:

"These provisions were bitterly criticized in legal circles and characterized as an attempt to interfere with the independence of the judiciary."

Lawrence Ziring of Western Michigan University, commenting on the 1973 Constitution, says in *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*:

"Bhutto equated his personality with Pakistan itself. Without him Pakistan would cease to have any meaning, and no one believed this more than Bhutto... In 1973, the country was given its third Constitution. Once more it described a parliamentary system in a federal state. Unlike previous constitutions, however, the power of the President was circumscribed and limited to ceremonial functions. Real power was wielded by the Prime Minister and Bhutto gave up the presidency for that office... Bhutto's refusal to permit an unqualified parliamentary system led to the resignation of his estate Law Minister, M.A. Kasuri. It also caused the political opposition in the National Assembly to boycott the proceedings leading to the finalization of the document.

"Although Bhutto worked out a compromise formula concerning the powers of the Prime Minister and received the grudging support of the opposition, the powers conferred upon the office meant that there could be no real challenge to PPP rule in the National Assembly for at least ten years. Bhutto insisted that all his suggestions and enactments were aimed at avoiding political instability. Parliamentary system, he opined,

can be extremely well... Bhutto would have preferred a strong presidential system and submissive legislature, but if he had to accept the parliamentary system, then he wanted to be certain that the powers of the Prime Minister could not be undermined by political maneuvers in the Assembly.

"Bhutto's opposition, however, was unimpressed with this explanation. To Wali Khan and others, Bhutto was blatantly erecting a political system that placed him above reproach or scrutiny... The Constitution of 1973 belongs to the people of Pakistan. Bhutto tried to shape it to suit his peculiar ambitions. Given his demise, that concern is no longer warranted. It can be assumed that the 1973 Constitution will be continually amended so as to satisfy the needs of Pakistan's present and future leaders."

Khalid B. Sayed describes Bhutto's state not only as a 'Bonapartist State' but comes to the conclusion that the 'Bonapartist State of Ayub' was less advanced as compared to "the more advanced Bonapartist State of Bhutto." He elaborates:

"Bhutto was primarily motivated by *animus dominandi*, that is, through the aggrandizement of his own power, he wanted to control every major class or interest by weakening its power base and by making it subservient to his will and policies. He nationalized a number of major industries with the purpose of setting up not socialism but a kind of state capitalism... Through greater control over the civil service, the expansion of the police force, and the political management of the Army, the 'Bonapartist State' had mobilized more effective and coercive power."

The Constitution of 1973 is to be seen in this background. Khalid B. Sayed's judgement deserves serious thought:

"The Constitution of 1973 made it crystal clear that the kingpin of the entire governmental structure, whether it concerned decision making in the central government or whether it related to matters vis-a-vis the provincial governments, was the Prime Minister... The Constitution of 1973 ensured that in the future no President would be able to act against the advice of the Prime Minister or issue orders without the approval of the Prime Minister... It was in the matter of the dominance of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the National Assembly that the Constitution of 1973 departed fundamentally from the parliamentary form. No other provision made the position of the Prime Minister impregnable against almost every eventuality that a parliamentary government was subject to as that which related to the motion of no-confidence in the Prime Minister.

It was clearly stipulated in the Constitution, Article 96(5), that for a period of ten years from the commencing day of the Constitution, that is, April 12, 1973, or from the holding of the second general election to the National Assembly, whichever occurs later, the vote of a member, elected to the national Assembly as a candidate or nominee of a political party, cast in support of a

resolution for a vote of no-confidence shall be disregarded if the majority of the members of that political party in the National Assembly has cast its vote against the passing of such a resolution. This meant that as long as the Prime Minister enjoyed the support of the majority of the members of the Pakistan People's Party in the National Assembly he could not be ousted if a minority of the PPP members in the National Assembly decided to support a motion of no-confidence.

"A motion of no-confidence could not be moved during a budgetary session and such a motion could not be reintroduced in the National Assembly until a period of six months had elapsed after its first rejection. All this clearly indicated that the Prime Minister could neither be controlled by the President nor challenged by the Assembly. The latter feature was extraordinary because the essence of parliamentary government was that a Prime Minister was both accountable to and removable by the Assembly... As it has often been remarked, the government of Pakistan under Ayub was that of the President, by the President and for the President. Could it be said that in the Bhutto regime, the Prime Minister's position was equally dominant?"

Many more authorities can be quoted to substantiate the point that the 1973 Constitution did not conform to the norms of a genuinely parliamentary form of government and was tailored to suit the ambitions of one man. Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It failed to provide any political stability to the country. It was unable to provide any solution to the crisis that engulfed the country in 1977 as the Supreme Court has observed in its judgement on the Nusrat Bhutto case. The Court observed:

"...—it becomes clear, therefore, that from the 7th March 1977, onwards Mr Z.A. Bhutto's constitutional and moral authority to rule the country as Prime Minister stood seriously eroded. His government was finding it more and more difficult to maintain law and order, to run orderly the ordinary administration of the country, to keep open educational institutions, and to ensure normal economic activities... There was, thus, a serious political crisis in the country leading to a breakdown of the constitutional machinery insofar as the executive and the legislative organs of the State were concerned. A situation had, therefore, arisen for which the Constitution provided no solution."

The learned Attorney General has suggested that in the Accord between the PPP and the PNA a way out was sought. But the fact is that even that accord was an extra-constitutional arrangement and an index of the failure of the Constitution in providing a way out of the situation. Had the President the power to dissolve the Assembly and seek fresh elections, the situation could have been resolved by resorting to a constitutional provision. And that is the crux of the matter.

Our discussion has so far shown that the 1973 Constitution suffered from certain serious weaknesses and imbalances; that its claim to establish a parliamentary form of

government is dubious and controversial; that it was further amended in an arbitrary manner to concentrate power in the hands of the Prime Minister, who no longer remained really accountable to parliament, the institution of Presidentship was reduced to a mere nomenclature and the Assembly had become an ineffective piece of decoration and almost irrelevant in exercising any control over the Prime Minister. It is this context that the role and real importance of the Eighth Amendment is to be seen.

[24 Sep 89 pp 4, 7]

It is our considered opinion that the most appropriate method of amending the Constitution would have been through a Constitutional Bill in Parliament after it came into being as a result of the February 1985 elections. Parliament should have passed a Bill of Indemnity in a reasonable form to pave the way for the withdrawal of Martial Law. The method adopted was different. The method President Ziaul Haq adopted was not much different from the one Mr Z.A. Bhutto had adopted in 1972 and 1973. He chose to take a leaf out of Bhutto's book. The Assembly, particularly the opposition, had to opt for a compromise, in order to make the best of a difficult situation, again almost in the same manner as the opposition had done in 1972 and 1973. Those who boycotted the elections in 1985 had their own reasons. But they also realized that people had not responded to their call.

1985 Elections

As many as 52.9 percent of the registered voters voted in the 1985 elections. And some of the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] parties, particularly the PPP, had openly declared that if elections in November 1988 were held on a non-party basis, they would participate. After this declaration, whatever, if any, political or moral weight existed in their objection to the 1985 Assembly, was struck off. The legitimacy of the Assembly and the Senate came from the fact that they were brought into existence as a result of general elections acclaimed all over the world as fair, with highest percentage of voter participation in any national elections in Pakistan and endorsed by the fact that the higher judiciary of the country accepted the two Houses as Parliament of the country.

The Eighth Constitutional Amendment was passed by both Houses of Parliament after serious debate and protracted negotiations. An effort was made to evolve a new consensus. A number of persons who are now serving in the PPP Cabinet or are sitting on the treasury benches were in the national Assembly and Senate that passed this amendment and they recorded their votes in its favor. Not that the Eighth Amendment has no scope for improvement or change, but it must be acknowledged as a fact that in its final form it was passed as a consensus document, albeit with a promise to bring in a Ninth Amendment to bring about further improvements in the Constitution.

Those who try to challenge the Eighth Amendment on the grounds that it was introduced by the Chief Martial Law administrator are incorrect because they forget that the Eighth Amendment materially modified the Amendments introduced by the CMLA and as such made the Constitution more balanced. It was passed by both Houses of Parliament unanimously. They also forget that if one goes back into the history of constitution-making in Pakistan, one finds that 1985 was not much different from 1973 or 1972 or 1962 or 1956. The original Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 1954. It was an improvised Assembly on the basis of indirect elections that framed the 1956 Constitution. The 1962 Constitution was given by one man—a Chief Martial Law Administrator. The 1972 Interim Constitution was given by a civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator and not adopted by the National Assembly through proper procedure but by way of a resolution, without discussing the document clause by clause.

The assembly that passed that resolution was itself a remnant of the Assembly that was elected in 1970 under a Legal Framework Order [LFO] issued by a Chief Martial Law Administrator who the Supreme Court called "a usurper" under an LFO containing the provision that if the Assembly did not frame a new Constitution within 120 days, it would automatically stand dissolved. The oath of the Assembly in April 1972 was taken by all remaining members in West Pakistan, including two members from East Pakistan and the names of all other members from East Pakistan were still in the list of members of the Assembly at the time of oath taking both in 1972 and 1973. The question of the power of this Assembly to make a Constitution, even when raised in the Assembly, was conveniently by-passed ("Proceedings of the National Assembly of Pakistan, Saturday, April 15, 1972, pp 92-98"). Professor Ghaffor Ahmad, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and Mufti Mahmud in the note of dissent to the 1972 Constitution Committee Report say:

Dissent

"The present National Assembly is 'the rump'. It comprises only 144 out of 313 members. There was no mandate from the people for these 144 members to rule over the whole country or frame a Constitution. The latter function is justified under the 'doctrine of necessity' as laid down by the Supreme Court in the Asma Gilani case. But there is absolutely no warrant for giving it a licence to rule for five long years after the Constitution has been passed. In these circumstances a new election must be held within a maximum period of three months of the passage of the Constitution and for interim period the country should be run by a caretaker government."

This was the viewpoint of the opposition about the Assembly even when it was framing the Constitution. The position with National Assembly of 1985 and the Eighth Amendment is not unique. It has to be accepted in the same manner as the earlier assemblies and the legislation they adopted has been accepted.

Next, let us examine the contents of the Eighth Amendment and the earlier Amendments which were legitimized by it. In my view, some positive contribution has been made by these Amendments in the following fields, although some serious weaknesses remain to be remedied:

The Islamic provisions have been improved upon by incorporating the Objectives Resolution as Article 2-A of the Constitution, by further improving the qualifications of the persons eligible for election to Parliament and by introducing the institution of the Federal Shariat Court, which has played an important role in bringing a number of laws in conformity with the Shariah.

Certain major lacunae remain in these Amendments from the Islamic point of view, and they relate to the absence of a clear declaration in the substantive part of the Constitution (Articles 2, 4 and 5) that Shariah constitutes the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. The definition of law as given in Article 203 and elsewhere needs modification. The powers and jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court remain restricted and incomplete, and independence of the judges of the Federal Shariat Court is affected by the arbitrary terms of their appointment, transfer and limited tenure. These are the areas where modifications are needed.

The position of the Senate has been strengthened by increasing its numerical composition and by the inclusion of experts and technocrats. Its legislative powers are now at par with the National Assembly as far as Constitutional Amendments and ordinary legislation are concerned. As such, it is no longer a 'revisionary House'. This has strengthened the Federal character of the Constitution and further consolidated provincial autonomy as contained in the Constitution.

On the other hand, the Senate still remains deprived of the right to consider and make its contribution in relation to national budget and finance bills, which is a very serious omission in a Federal structure, and deserves to be rectified as early as possible.

These Amendments have ensured greater provincial participation in the affairs of the Federation not only by enhancing the role of the Senate and its committees but also by broadening the electoral base of the President and bringing in all the four assemblies within the electoral college.

Independence of the judiciary, which had been seriously compromised by the Constitutional Amendments during 1974-77, has been restored to a great extent. There are certain aspects which deserve to be further modified, particularly the power of the executive to transfer a judge of a high court without his consent, its power to transfer judges of the Federal Shariat Court, or to assign to them any other responsibilities and the like. Effective separation of the executive from the judiciary and complete independence of the judiciary are a *sine qua non* of a truly Islamic and a really democratic system.

The position of the President, which had been reduced to a ceremonial function, has been changed. Not only his electoral base has been widened, he has been authorized to play a more effective role, without in any way becoming a second Chief Executive. Normally, he is to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, but he has the right to remain informed about all aspects of executive and legislative activity and he has the power to invite the Cabinet and/or the legislature to rethink and review policy decisions and/or pieces of legislation which he thinks deserve to be revised. He, however, has no power to vet these decisions/legislation on second presentation.

He enjoys certain discretions in some appointments of crucial national importance. In view of the bitter experience of politicization of the armed forces and the civil services of the country by political leadership in the past it has become essential that the President should have the power to appoint Services Chiefs as well as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. Similarly, to protect the institution of elections from political interpolation by the executive, the Chief Election Commissioner is to be appointed by the President in his discretion.

He has also been given limited powers to dissolve the National Assembly in certain specific and well-defined situations. This is exactly what the Supreme Court had pointed out in the Nusrat Bhutto case. If the President had the constitutional power to dissolve the Assembly, that could have been done in 1977 after the March situation, and imposition of Martial Law could have been avoided. This is not an arbitrary power. This action of the President is subject to judicial review, as was laid down in the Eighth Amendment by adding in Article 58, clause (2): "notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48." Judges of the Punjab High Court and the Supreme Court in relation to the action of May 29, 1988, have borne it out.

By and large, the Eighth Amendment has established a new and more healthy balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister. Pakistan is an evolving democracy and the Constitution cannot ignore the political realities of the country. Democracy can be stabilized by consolidating institutions and by developing new habits and traditions of constitutionalism, i.e., respect for and obedience of the Constitution. The problem with the People's Party is that it has not shown any seriousness in running the government according to the Constitution and has wasted the last nine months in attempts to grab more and more power and to destabilize those institutions (the Senate, the judiciary, the civil services, the armed forces, the provincial governments, the provincial assemblies) which it thought were not under its absolute control. The whole quarrel on the Eighth Amendment is not related to the search for a healthy parliamentary system but for grabbing more power to settle certain political scores. And this has vitiated the whole political climate in the country.

The issue of balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister is not a closed question, like any

other question in relations to the Constitution or the political system. But if the PPP wants to reduce the presidency to the plight in which it was in the days of President Fazal Elahi and wants to give to the Prime Minister the dictatorial powers grabbed by Mr Z.A. Bhutto, the nation would never be prepared for it. We have learned the hard way that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The nation would never be prepared to repeat the mistakes of the past. That is why it has not given the mandate to any of the two leading political parties of the country to unilaterally change the Constitution. The PPP will have to learn to live with it, if it wants to behave as a partner in the democratic and constitutional process. Any effort to destroy or to covertly manipulate the process is bound to backfire.

[25 Sep 89 pp 4, 7]

The Attorney General has contended that in a parliamentary system the President cannot dissolve the National Assembly/Parliament without the advice of the Prime Minister. I have shown that in a number of parliamentary democracies of the West, President has the right to dissolve parliament in certain cases without the advice of the Prime Minister or even against his advice, and that does not adversely affect the parliamentary character of the Constitution. The Inter-Parliamentary Union reference book *Parliaments of the World*, states:

"In its classic form the power to dissolve parliament is strictly speaking one of the prerogatives of the head of the state, who is called upon to arbitrate in dispute between the executive and the legislature: this is the spirit of the provision for this power in fourteen countries which include France, Italy."

Dissolution

It is not too difficult to realize that in a case where the head of the state has to arbitrate between the executive and the legislature, his power is discretionary. If he was to act on the advice of the executive head (the Prime Minister) how could he arbitrate? The power to dissolve parliament in all these cases is not dependent on the advice of the Prime Minister, but is there in spite of him. If this is not discretion, what else is?

The learned Attorney General also tries to shift the ground 'from all parliamentary democracies' to 'the Westminster model'. He says: "Besides, we are following and talking about the British pattern of parliamentary system."

Let us now take up the British model. First of all, the 1973 Constitution is based on the British parliamentary model, as we have earlier shown. In the British parliamentary model, the Prime Minister can be removed by a simple majority and has no absolute power over parliament. The Prime Minister is a creature of parliament and is accountable to it. The 1973 Constitution made even parliament subservient to the Prime Minister. It was not a parliamentary system, but mockery of it.

For the sake of argument, I ignore these and other differences between the two systems including the fact that Britain has no written Constitution and we have one; that Britain has constitutional hereditary monarchy and a hereditary House of Lords, we have none; that Britain has a civil service which is truly apolitical and works as a faceless steel framework for administration and we lack such an administrative machinery; that Britain has a judiciary whose powers have never been tampered with in recent history and we only wish we could have a similar institution; that Britain has a free press that works as a watch-dog of democracy and is not subject to the influence, interference and manipulation by the executive, and less said about the state of our media (a few illustrious examples notwithstanding), the better.

Even if we ignore all these realities, I want to submit with all humility that the learned Attorney General is not correct when he asserts that the issue is so firmly settled in the British parliamentary system. If anyone cares to study and examine the literature produced on this issue during the last one century, one cannot but agree that the issue is not uncontroversial and settled as the learned Attorney General assumes. The leading constitutional lawyer, Sir Ivor Jennings, says in his book, *Cabinet Government*:

"The queen's function is, it is suggested, to see that the Constitution functions in the normal manner. It functions in the normal manner so long as the electors are asked to decide between competing parties at intervals of reasonable length. She would be justified in refusing to assent to a policy which subverted democratic basis of the Constitution, by unnecessary or indefinite prolongations of the life of parliament, by a gerrymandering of the constituencies in the interests of one party, or by fundamental modification of the electoral system to the same end. She would not be justified in other circumstances; and certainly the King would not have been justified in 1913."

British Case

After establishing the fact that in practice "a parliament is dissolved by the Queen on advice before the five years elapse;" and formulating three critical questions about the exercise of this prerogative, that is, (a) the advice upon which it is exercised, (b) whether the Queen is constitutionally bound to accept such advice, and (c) whether the Queen can dissolve parliament without advice; Sir Ivor Jennings concludes:

"It will be seen that for more than a hundred years there is no clear case in which the sovereign has rejected advice to dissolve, though there have been examples in other commonwealth countries. There has been, nevertheless, a persistent tradition that he could refuse if the necessary circumstances arose. It is difficult to see what those circumstances would be. An appeal to the electorate is an appeal to the supreme constitutional authority... If the major parties break up, the whole balance of the Constitution alters; and then, possibly, the Queen's prerogative becomes important... Thus, while the

Queen's personal prerogative is maintained in theory, it can hardly be exercised in practice."

So the situation is not as monolithic as the learned Attorney General would like us to believe. In the constitutional debate that arose on the Home Rule Bill in 1913 The Times took the position as to the "undoubted right of the sovereign to dissolve parliament" that: "Legally there is no question that under the Constitution there are certain reserved rights of the Crown; but they are atrophied by long disuse."

In response to this, Sir William R. Anson, a leading constitutional lawyer, wrote:

"The facts are there. The government have taken advantage of a combination of groups in the House of Commons to deprive the Second Chamber of its constitutional right to bring about an appeal to the people on measures of high importance which have never been submitted to the consideration of the electorate. While this part of our Constitution is in abeyance, they are pressing on legislation which will shortly lead to civil war.

"Our only safeguard against such a disaster is to be found in the exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown. I am not ready to admit that, under such circumstances, these prerogatives have been atrophied by disuse; but, on the other hand, they can be exercised only under certain conditions which those who write on this subject are apt to ignore.

"Mr Cave (letter in The Times is doubtless right in holding that a dissolution would be a milder exercise of the prerogative than the refusal of the Royal Assent to a Bill."

While Lord Hugh Cecil, Prof J.H. Morgans and others did not agree with the view that the Crown may use its prerogative without the advice of the ministers, leading constitutional-lawyer Prof A.V. Dicey supported the view that the prerogative was very much there. He wrote:

"Allow me to express my complete agreement with Sir William Anson's masterly exposition of the principles regulating the exercise of the prerogative of dissolution...

"The question is sometimes now raised whether during the present political crisis the King could rightly or wisely refuse assent to the Home Rule Bill after it should for a third time have been passed by the House of Commons and rejected by the House of Lords. This is happily a purely academic inquiry on which I decline now to enter. Every advantage by way of appeal to the electors, in consequence of the exercise of the so-called Royal veto, can be far better and more regularly obtained by a dissolution of parliament. Mr Balfour has struck the right note. The safety and the prosperity of the United Kingdom absolutely demand a speedy dissolution."

Let me conclude this part of our discussion by quoting from Dicey's *Law of the Constitution* (ninth edition, London: Macmillan & Co. 1941), where he expounds the

established doctrine and about which he has claimed in his letter to The Times (September 15, 1913) that "this doctrine has been repeated and defended during the last 28 years in every edition of my book. My opinion as to the occasions on which a dissolution may rightly take place has, as far as I know, never been assailed and assuredly has never been controverted by any writer of authority." Let us see what that constitutional doctrine is:

"... There are certainly combinations of circumstances under which the Crown has a right to dismiss a Ministry who command a parliamentary majority, and to dissolve the parliament by which the Ministry is supported. The prerogative in short of dissolution may constitutionally be so employed as to override the will of the representative body, or, as it is popularly called, 'the People's House of Parliament'. This looks at first sight like saying that in certain cases the prerogative can be so used as to set at nought the will of the nation. But in reality it is far otherwise. The discretionary power of the Crown occasionally may be, and according to constitutional precedents sometimes ought to be, used to strip an existing House of Commons of its authority. But the reason why the House can in accordance with the constitution be deprived of power and of existence is that an occasion has arisen on which there is fair reason to suppose that the opinion of the House is not the opinion of the electors. A dissolution is in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political sovereign. A dissolution is allowable, or necessary, whenever the wishes of the legislature are, or may fairly be presumed to be, different from the wishes of the nation."

The legal position, as far as I could ascertain, is that this prerogative has remained unchanged and operative. Why it has not been resorted to in practice is a different matter. If all parties to the democratic process respect rules of the game, not taking resort to such prerogatives and discretions would not mean their non-existence. That is the mistake some persons make. Moreover, the fact remains that in extraordinary situations, the Crown has taken initiatives. One such example is the establishment of a national government in the 1930s at the initiative of King George V intention is not to go into the political history of the United Kingdom. I only wanted to show that the position about discretion to dissolve parliament without the advice of the Prime Minister even in the Constitution of the United Kingdom is not what the learned Attorney General is trying to establish.

Finally, I want to make two more submissions: First, the electorate has, in the election of November 1988, given a very limited mandate to the parties that have been voted into the National Assembly. The PPP has received only 39 percent of the votes cast, which goes to make only 14 percent of the total registered voters in the country. It could get only 104 seats in a House of 237 (as against 102 it had in a House of 144 in the 1972-76 National Assembly). In the provinces, the position is that it does not have majority in three out of four provinces of the country. Its manifesto mentioned the question of constitutional changes it would like to make, and as such, by

not giving it two-third majority that is needed to amend the Constitution, the electorate has refused to give it the authority to change the Constitution. It has fought elections under the amended Constitution and all its members, ministers, the Attorney General and the Prime Minister have taken oath to defend and safeguard this Constitution. In this context they must accept the realities as they are. The manner in which this crusade against the Eighth Amendment is being made shows that it is an effort to subvert the Constitutions. If they are honest about democracy they must try to operate within the framework of the mandate people have given to the two major parties in parliament.

It should also be understood clearly that the Constitution cannot be amended by a referendum, as an honorable minister has tried to shoot from the hip. Amendment to the Constitution can be made only through the process laid down in Article 239 of the Constitution. Referendum is not a constitutional option in this respect.

There is some clamor that the Eighth Amendment should be struck off. This is nonsense. It is an accepted principle of law that merely by repealing an Amendment, the amended law is not changed. It can be changed only by a new constitutional Amendment, which needs two-third majority of both the Houses of parliament. Moreover, it must be understood that if the entire Eighth Amendment goes, the whole fabric of the present political system would collapse. The Eighth Amendment has also changed the composition of the National Assembly. Its original strength of 200 has been increased to 207. Women's representation has been increased from 10 to 20.

Representation for non-Muslims has also been increased. If the Eighth Amendment goes out in toto, the National Assembly will also go with it, otherwise there is no criterion to retire some of the MNAs [Member of National Assembly]. All constituencies would have to be re-allocated and redemarcated. If Senate's position is affected, so would be the authority of the Acting President who took over by virtue of being the Chairman of the Senate and under whose authority the elections of November 1988 took place. The whole system would collapse.

The talk of revocation of the Eighth Amendment, ab initio is not only wild, but an invitation to disaster. People in seats of authority must avoid making such statements. There is no harm in reasoned discussion on constitutional issues, including the merits and demerits of changes made in the Constitution through the III, VI, V, VI and VIII Amendments. The only reasonable course to amend the Constitution is to develop a new consensus. Unless PPP and IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] cooperate and unless the National Assembly and the Senate concur, no Amendment in the Constitution can take place. The PPP government has refused to respond to the IJI offer to come out with concrete proposals about constitutional amendments and initiate negotiations with the IJI thereon. They are resorting to petty agitational tactics which can hardly help in this respect.

Justice (retired) Mohammad Yaqub Ali Khan is also very critical of the Eighth Amendment. But his proposal contains the most reasonable way out of this controversy—that a committee of parliament (both Houses) may "review all the amendments made in the 1973 Constitution since it was enacted on August 15, 1973, and submit its report to both the Houses." This is a counsel of sanity in an otherwise tower of Babel.

Commentary Supports Setting Up New Refinery

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[Text] The official indecision as to whether or not to go in for the establishment of a new oil refinery, it appears, is about to be shed sooner than expected and the option is likely to be in favor of the establishment of a new refinery in Southern Sindh in the proximity of the newly-developed oil wells. Assurance to this effect was given by Dr M.H. Chaudhry, Chairman, State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation, that his Corporation was planning to establish a new oil refinery with a capacity to process about 30,000 barrels of Crude per day in lower Sindh. The programme deserves to be welcomed as the area in lower Sindh where explorers have been rewarded with success in discovery of new oil wells, has the potential to further expand into an important concentration of oilfields.

Observers interested in the country's economic activity were already wondering as to why no plans were afoot for a new refinery to process the Crude discovered in lower Sindh, the daily output of which is estimated to have exceeded 20,000 barrels, and by the time a new refinery stands on the ground and is put on stream the local production of crude is expected to go up. In this context, the capacity of 30,000 barrels per day, planned by PERAC [Petroleum Refining & Petrochemical Corporation] for a new refinery, appears to be quite appropriate. The crude produced in this area from Khaskheli wells is now supplied to the two refineries of Karachi through underground pipelines while relatively superior Crude is being exported.

The establishment of a new oil refinery would indeed mark an important step for the economic uplift and generation of employment opportunities in a region which otherwise is in a relatively backward state. It may be mentioned that the Attock Refinery near Rawalpindi is based exclusively on the indigenously produced Crude which is generally of multifarious grades but the refinery has overcome the technical problems through installation of certain additional facilities. The proposed refinery in lower Sindh would be the second to be based entirely on indigenous Crude.

It may be pointed out that Pakistan is deficient in various petroleum products to the extent of 3.00 million tonnes per annum which are imported in addition to imports of about 4.00 million tonnes of Crude oil for processing. Despite the considerably large shortfall in the country's refining capacity to meet the rising demand for

the finished petroleum products, the official policy on the question of allowing the establishment of a new refinery has reflected hesitance and indecision though expansion plans for the National Refinery—a public-sector unit—are under way which will increase its throughput from 50,000 to 65,000 barrels per day.

In fact, the Seventh Plan has not included any programme for the establishment of a new refinery in the public-sector but the door was kept open for the entry of the private sector as a matter of policy although no definite provisions were spelt out in the Industrial Policy. The previous Government's lack of interest in allowing the setting up of a new refinery was, by and large, based on the argument that the difference in the international prices of finished petroleum products and Crude oil is not very wide except that it covers the processing cost which otherwise would also be involved if the crude is processed locally, and thus the argument did not favor a relatively huge capital investment on a new refinery. The rationale of this argument seemingly ignores the macroeconomic benefits that would result from the establishment of a new refinery. The proposal becomes more justifiable because the country is already facing a sizeable gap in the indigenous products vis-a-vis the demand.

The demand for petroleum products in the country has been projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 10.03 per cent during the Seventh Plan period. The existing demand at around 8.90 million tonnes is met to

the extent of over 3 million tonnes through imports. It has been projected that the rise in demand to around 14.34 million tonnes by 1992-3 (end of Seventh Plan) would lead to widening of the gap in indigenously-produced petroleum products to over 7.00 million tonnes even after the completion of the proposed expansion of National Refinery Karachi.

If seen in this context, the proposal for a new refinery to be based entirely on indigenous Crude appears to be viable from the economic standpoint. The Government should also think in terms of needs of the country near the turn of the century while finalizing the capacity of the new refinery as it would take nearly 3 to 5 years for the new refinery to become operational. The difference between indigenous crude and capacity can be met from imported crude. Therefore, both for raw material and finished products the location should be near the PARCO pipeline. The absence of a provision in the Seventh Plan for such a project in the public-sector can be overcome by making the new project a subsidiary of the National Refinery.

The encouraging feature of the proposed project is that it would further open ways for the establishment of additional facilities to process its by-products. Naphtha from the proposed refinery would be available in surplus quantity which is proposed to be converted into basic chemicals to be used as raw material for the production of terephthalic acid, the main raw material used in the manufacture of polyester fibre. Thus, the proposal's implementation would yield significant economic benefits.

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